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PREFACE
The Soviet Union's political strategy has undergone
far-reaching changes toward the non-aligned nations since
the twentieth Russian Communist Party Congress of 1956.
In this thesis, 1

will examine this strategy and the

changes it has undergone with respect to one of these
countries, viz., the United Arab Republic (UAR).
Various questions arise concerning the relationships
between the U.A.R. and the .Soviet Union during the critical
period. Did a basic ideological unity provide the founda
tion for the relationship?

Was it a pragmatic one in which

each tried to use the other to its own national interest
advantage?

What specific points of common interest and

what common policies evolved out of this relationship?

Do

the relationships of this 1956-1967 perioa give us any indi
cation of what the future may hold in terms of U.A.R.Soviet policies?
In this thesis I will attempt to answer these and
related questions within the framework of my general thesis.
My hypothesis is that the joint policies developed during
this period constituted a "marriage of convenience” for
both powers, and that, for the U.A.R., the acceptance of
depending upon Soviet economic and military aid to with
stand Western pressures and Israeli threat, constituted a
Hobson's choice.
ii
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The reasons Tor choosing the U.A.R. to represent this
case are:

first, because the U.A.R. is economically under

developed and politically non-aligned in the ideological
conflict between the East and the Vest; second, because
all the techniques

for expanding its influence used by

the Soviet Union, including trade, aid, propaganda, and
exchange programs, have been used in this case; and third,
the Middle East provides an excellent laboratory for analyz
ing such a great power confrontation,
is a personal reason.

in audition, there

I lived in the area during this

period and have developed some understanding as to what
was happening, especially in the five years curing which
I attended Cairo University from 1961 to 1966.

iii
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND: FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATION IN
1943 UNTIL 1955
A.

•«
Ideological milieu: Nationalist movements
and the Soviet Foreign Policy

la order to understand tne development in the i950's
and 1960's of the special political ana economic relation
ship between Egypt and the U.S.B.R., it is necessary to
know something of the iaeological ano political points of
view which the Soviets

cook

in their benerai policies toward

emerging nationalist movements in the underdeveloped woric.
During the period from Lenin to Khrushchev, Soviet foreign
policy underwent three distinct shifts in its approach to
emerging nations.

The first, or Leninist approach toward

nationalist movements, depended upon the conception that such
movements had their roots in the masses, and were therefore
called "popular fronts."

In the interest of building and

expanding world Communism, Lenin believed that such "popular
fronts" should be supported and subsequently takren over by
the Communists in their efforts to further the aims of Commu
nism by fostering revolution and the establishment of a Sovietstyled Socialism.
With the succession of Stalin in the late 1920*s, a new
"Orthodox Policy* was established which replaced the Leninist
1
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approach with one that favored the strengthening of local
Communist organizations rather than the process of building
and taking over "popular fronts."
The third baaic shift in Soviet foreign policy toward
the underdeveloped societies came with the denunciation of
Stalinism in the late 1950*3 and early 1960's and a return
to the policy of encouraging the "national fronts" and of
giving aid and encouragement to underdeveloped nations in
an effort to win their friendship for the Soviets.
The first two stages of Soviet foreign policy (i.e.,
the Leninist approach and the Stalinist Orthodoxy) will be
discussed in this chapter.

The third phase, the post-Stalin

shift adopted in the 20th Communist Party Congress in Febru
ary, 1956, will be discussed in the following chapter.
In addition in this background chapter, Gamal Abdul
Nasser's Philosophy of the devolution will oe examined.

In

cluded will be his domestic and Arab policies, and the con
tinuing good relations between Egypt and the West up to the
Egypt-Czech Arms Deal in 1955*

Nasser's basic approach will

be analyzed within the framework of the Soviet approach of
the period.
During the period following the establishment of diplo
matic relations in 19^3 between Egypt and the Soviet Union—
an

event which went largely unnoticed— there were tensions

and incompatibilities which kept relations between the two
countries at an extremely low level of activity.

In fact,
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3
some observers have noted that;., prior to the Anglo-Egyptian
agreement concerning evacuation of the Suez in 1954, the
foreign policy of Egypt was almost non-existent.1

Egyptian

foreign policy aid not exist as an independent element, and
consequently it reflected the great power interest of Britain
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
It was not until the Egyptian-Czech Arms Deal, and es
pecially after the 20th Party Congress with its adoption of
a new policy toward nationalist movements, that there were
some common points in the foreign policy frameworks of the
two countries.

These were primarily based on a mucual hosti

lity toward Western imperialism and colonialism ana a new
Soviet awareness of and support for rising nationalist move
ments.
1.

Leninism and the Nationalist Movements

Our discussion of the prologue to the present-day
U.A.E.-Soviet relations begins with the Leninist approach
to nationalist movements.

The ideology of the Communist

regime in Russia concerning the nationalist movements has
its roots in the discussion of nationalities problems in
the Empire of Russia before the 1917 revolution.

In the

Russian Empire, where in 1897 the minority groups consisted

kittle, Tom, Modern Egypt. (Mew Yorks Fredrick A.
Praeger, 1967), p. SI7T
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4
of 55.7$ of the total population*

2

the problem of national

ities was considered of great importance by the political
parties of that time.

Different solutions for this problem

were offered* most based on some form of cultural autonomy*
Among the several which considered the problem one of impor
tance was the Social Democratic Party* but this view was taken
only by its Menshevik faction.

Its Bolshevik faction* on the

other hand* was concerned solely with the Marxist theory of
creating the perfect socialist prototype for the world.

When

the Socialist Revolutionary Party, for instance* advocated
an unconditional right to self-determination for ail nation
alities, the Social Democrats, as well as the rightists in
3
the First Duma, rejected this proposal.
The reason for this
rejection by the Socialists was the fear of overriding the
principle of class revolution which might result from recog
nizing even implicitly the principle of nationalism.
In his approach to the problem of nationalities in Russia,
V. I. Lenin had laid the foundation for dealing with other
nationalities abroad.

During the years from 1913 through

1917 he developed a plan for utilizing the national minority
movements in Russia as well as abroad in the service of the
revolution.

In this respect he looked upon the nationalist

movements mainly as a force suitable for exploitation in the

^Plpes, Richard* The Formation of the Soviet Union.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press* 19&4J* p. 2.
^ibla., p. 21.
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5
struggle for power between the proletariat and bourgeoisie.
His views were different from either the extreme leftists,
led by Plekhanov, who considered nationalism an obstacle to
the Socialist movement and argued that it ought to be fought
directly, or the majority of Mensheviks who thought that
nationalism should be neutralized by channeling it through
4
cultural autonomy.
In the Socialist debates over the role of nationalism,
Lenin took a middle position between that taken by Rosa
Luxemburg of Poland, who advocated the theory of Marxism in
its first look, "abolition of nations," and that of Bauer
and Rener of Austria, who demanded national culture autonomy.

5

Lenin’s position was characterized mainly by a real

istic appraisal of the force of modern nationalism.

His

attitude, however, was negative toward embracing the national
principle as a basic Socialist objective, although he real
ized that the rising of national revolts would strengthen
the movement of the Western proletariat by weakening the
Western bourgeoisie.

In short, he viewed nationalism and

self-determination as a means for achieving Communism but not
as ends or objectives.
After the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, the world

4

ibid., p. 35.

^Meyer, Alfred 6., Leninism, (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1957)> p. 148.
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socialist revolution Has considered the first duty of those
responsible for Soviet foreign policy.

At that tlae a fee

nationalist movements in Asia aod Africa had already started
their struggle for independences

this fact necessitated a

practical appraisal by the new Soviet regime of the national
ist movements in order to find a middle ground for dealing
with them while the revolution was consolidated in Russia.
The suggested middle ground, however, was characterized by
Lenin's ideas of exploitation of, but eventual denial of
the national principle.

This policy approach suggested that

the most appropriate way of dealing with the nationalist
movements was merely to use them as a means for creating
new proletarian parties.

This view was expounded by the

Second Congress of the Communist International on 2d July
1920 in its resolution concerning the national and colonial
questions:
"Furthermore, it is necessary to take a
decisive stand against the attempt to conceal
a revolutionary liberation movement that is
not truly Communist-oriented under a false
guise of Communism. It is the duty of the
Communist International to support the revol
utionary movements in the colonies and back
ward countries solely for the purpose of
collecting the constituent elements of future
proletarian parties.... The Communist Inter
national is to establish temporary union, even
an alliance, with the revolutionary movements
in the colonies and backward countries^but
most not, however, amalgamate with it."**

^Muller, Kurt, The Foreign Aid Program of the Soviet
Bloc and Communist China, (new York: Walker and Company,
1967),"p." 7:------------

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7
Even fchi* suggested platform for working with the
nationalist movements doesn't imply a realistic estimation
of the potential power of nationalise that would in time
he unleashed in Asia and Africa.

On the other hand, it was

considered at that time to be a successful step towards in
fluencing and activating these movements.
Lenin's views aoout the nationalist movements could
be summarized by stating that he looked upon them as a crit
ical means to be utilized for the oeneflt of Communist-in
spired social revolution.

The lack of precise estimation

or greater Communist enthusiasm for using nationalism can
be attributed to the shortage of experience.

The emergence

of nationalism as a powerful indigenous force in the third
world as a fact rather than a theory was a post-Lenin de
velopment.

Vith Lenin's flexibility, however, it.is likely

that had he survived through the Stalin period, the Soviets
would have developed a more accurate evaluation of the power
of nationalism and would have used it more effectively to
pursue Soviet goals in Asia and Africa.

The ultimate adop

tion of Leninist policies toward nationalist movements during
the Khrushchev era lends some credence to the view that
Stalin's narrow policies in this area weakened Soviet foreign
policy in a critical way.
2.

Stalin's Orthodox Policy

Before discussing the Stalinist policy toward the
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8

nationalist movements abroad, it is appropriate to compare
his stand concerning the nationality question in Russia
with that of Lenin.

Although a non-Russian himself, Stalin

was against any kind of political independence for Russian
nationalities.

His interpretation of Lenin's doctrine of

self-determination was that this right was only for the
proletariat.

The nationalities in Russia were denied the

right because in Stalin's view, they did not represent che
working class.

Moreover, even his stand concerning those

republics and countries which had their own Proletarian
parties was negative on the issue of self-determination.
In the struggle for power that ensued in the late
1920's following renin's death, the advocate of building
the revolution in one country through highly centralized
power— Josef Stalin— became the leader of Russia.

He was

preoccupied first with the elimination of his rivals and
then with the construction of the new regime, especially
in its form and capacity for dealing with economic matter.
For these reasons, the aim of fostering world revolution
receded but was never completely abandoned.

Stalin himself

maintained that “the complete victory of socialism" in the
Soviet Union was possible only when the "capitalist encircle
ment" had been ended by socialist revolution in the most
7
powerful industrial countries.
The theory of wording with
7

Seton-Watson, Hugh, nationalism and Communism. (New->York
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964), p. I90.
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9
the nationalist movements at that time was based mainly on
supporting them in the hope of progressively weakening the
advanced capitalist states and of assuming leadership later.
In addition, there was a trend of Communist thought that im
plied that the Communists must assume the leadership in the
first phase of the revolution to prevent the national bour
geoisie from capturing the movement.

This latter view, which

was against Lenin's former view, was advocated by the Indian
Communist M. N. Roy at the Becond Congress of the Communist
international in 1 9 2 0 .
Stalin, however, seemed to forget Lenin's compromise
which was adopted as soviet policy in dealing with the nation
alist movements.

The League Against imperialism and Colonial

Rule, formed in 1927 at Brussels, was the last great success
in influencing the nationalist leaders of Asia and North
Africa during the Stalinist era.
Prom the outset Stalin was inclined to take a tough
line in dealing with the nationalist movements,

in 1924 ,

for instance, he stated that:
"support must be given to such national
movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow
imperialism.... Cases occur when the
national movements, in; certain oppressed
countries come into conflict with the
interest of the development of the pro
letarian movement. In such cases support
is, of course, entirely out of the question.

q

Q
Muller, op. eit., p. 9 .
^Rubinsten, Alvin Z., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet
Union. (New Yor*: Random House, 1 9 5 0 J, p. 3 5 3 .
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1°
At that time, the Chinese Nationalist Movement was the
sole experiment extant of applying Lenin's policy towards
the nationalist movements.

Stalin, seeking

to proyg^him-

self to be Lenin's rightful heir, followed Lenin's policy
by supporting the Chinese Kuomintang or National People's
Party headed by Chiang Kai Chek.

This policy was later to

be applied to other independence movements 'out, for some in
explica ole reason, was not applied to the Gandhi movement
in India at that time.

After assuming leadership of the

Chinese communist party in 1935, Mao tze-tung, reflecting
on his own experience with Chiang Kal Chek, criticized the
Soviet policy of supporting the national Dourgeoisie.

As

a result, he was expelled from the Comintern and criticized
for deviating from the Soviet model in ouilding his socialism
The Chinese case, combined with Stalin's economic vic
tory in 1930* led the Russian dictator to believe that all
socialist revolutions must adopt the system designed by
the Soviet Union.

Prom that time until the end of World

War II this dogma served as the basis for Stalin's foreign
policy.

It would be misleading, however, to describe Stalin*

foreign policy as consistent.

It was, indeed, affected by

emerging factors which led to responses that were determined
largely by Stalin's personal dogmatism and egomania.
Three important phases of Stalin's policy toward nation
alism should be clarified.

The first, which was an extension

of Lenin's Ideology, was characterized by so-called "popular

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

u
fronts, * which implied ttas cooperation of the proletariat
vltS ttas national bourgeoisie of ttas third world.

2||ia

approach was not practiced— with the exception of Soviet
policy toward China— before the Second World War.

The

faaoua nationalist movement, with which Stalin had to oeal
at that tiae, waa in lodia unoer the leadership of uentahi.
The Stalinist policy toward the nationalist moveaents,
and the criticism of Gandhi, had its outlines at the Sixth
Congress of the Communist International in 1^26.

A resolu

tion adopted by that congress stated that the bourgeoisie
is unable to lioerate a colonial or seal-colonial nation,
that it betrays its people and allies itself with Imperialism,
and that, therefore, liberation can be achieved only under
the leadership of the working class.A°

Under this policy,

the Soviets experienced a complete failure to influence the
national liberation movements during the Stalin era.

This

unfruitful Soviet policy was not surprisingly continued for
two years following Stalin's death as Soviet leaders were
absorbed in the internal struggle to fill the power vacuum at the top of the Soviet hierarchy.
It was during the first three years following the
Second World War when the second phase of Stalin's policy
was put into practice.

This phase was characterized by ex

tensive Soviet encouragement of the nationalist movements

10
Daniel, D. J., Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin.
(New Yorks J. B. Lippincott bo., 19&1J, p. 291.
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M d litetttlot frooli m u c h
at tint t i n .

m n

cair^

in l»ia and Africa

A eoaplate shift fron cooperation with the

national oourgeo isle to tha aore orthodox coaauniat policy
of eaoouraging ravolutioo aaa aada.
tta shift which ayaoollxeo tin third phase of otalin'a
policy aay oa attrioutad largely to Hhat nappaoad in lu0o* la vie in

here, otalin recognised that fitoisa, or

national doaaunlsa, would weaken tha soviet position in
doeialiat couotrias ^uat aa nationsa oourgeoisle aovesents
taao in thoaa potentially ooclaxist countriea of the thlra
worxd.
xf tha case or dovlat policy toward tha xnolan nationallat aovaaant ia an axawple of tha traditional dtalinist
foreign policy in Ita early years, the Yugoslav and Arab
nationalists' cases would be exaapies of Soviet policy
pursued durino the last years of otalln's life,

in the

case of Yugoslav!*, Jovlet policy was faced with the de
fection of a Socialist state, a situation which created
such oitteroess and hostility toward the renegade state.
Ibis passage of Stalinist propaganda against Yugoslavia
illustrates this:
"never before Yugoslavia have there been
so M a y beAgars, ragged, barefoot and bone
less people. Uneaploywenf is increasing
steadily. The first to be thrown out are
the physically weak, invalids, and woaen,
especially pregnant woaen aod those with
oany children.... Toiling people are de
prived of wedical care, since at the end
of last year prices of aedicloes and
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13
medical treatment in the hospitals were
increased several times.“H
Such propaganda seems to be a bitter attack by Stalin
ist Orthodoxy against the run-away Socialist state.

Stalin

could not accept defections from the ranks of the Soviet
bloc, since such acts would weaken the bloc.

Tito's brand

of national Communism separated Yugoslavia from the Soviet
bloc and made his policies more acceptable to the West.
13118 led the Soviets to declare bitterly that the new Yugo
slavian constitution, which made Tito a dictator, had been
drafted by the U.S. ambassador.
The last example of Stalinist policy ccould be illus
trated by reviewing the Soviet reaction toward the Arab
nationalists before 1933*

The Arab nationalist movements

were treated similarly to those of India and Yugoslavia,
in describing the 1952 revolution in Egypt, Soviet propaganda
noted that:
"at the end of January 1952, the AmericanSritish imperialists staged a coup d'etat
and appointed their men.... On the night of
July 23, 1952, power in Cairo was seized
by a group of reactionary officers connected
with the United States, with General tfaguib
at the head."
In Moscow on January J, 1953, New Times was stressing
the role and influence of "Hitlerites" in Egypt and Syria,

^ibid., p. 32.
X ibid., p. 293.
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while a national round-up of Communists of "plotters" was
carried out in Egypt at that time by Naguib and Nasser.1^
In addition, at the time of the creation of the State of
Israel, the Soviet Union was the first country to grant
de .lure recognition, a move designed to antagonize the
British and .at the same time perhaps influence the new
nation and satisfy the-Soviet Jews.

However, the feelings

of the Arabs concerning the Jewish state were not tah.en
into consideration.

It might be argued that Stalin realized

his mistake in treating the Palestinian problem when the
deterioration of Soviet relations with Israel took place in
the early fifties.
case.

But this would appear not to be the

The dispute was mainly a result of the course of

Soviet internal affairs.

A large majority of Russian Jews,

after the creation of Israel, showed pro-Western sentiments;
the reaction of the Soviet government was to undertake a
campaign of anti-Semitic repression and persecution.

As

a result of this anti-Semitic attitude, violent anti-Soviet
feeling was aroused in Israel.

This was followed by the

breaking off of diplomatic relations with Israel on the
initiative of the Soviet Union in 1953*
In conclusion, Staliuist foreign policy, especially
with reference to the nationalist movements, stemmed largely
from the warped personal attitudes of the Soviet leader.
Stalin viewed the world scene from the Marxist perspective

13ibid., p. 111.
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of the dialectic.

For him, it was a conflict between two,

and only two, basic forces, which he translated into the
practical aphorism of “he who is not with us is against us.”
There could be no position of neutrality,

This policy was

the main cause of Soviet isolation from the nationalist movements, and it took the new Soviet leadership after
Stalin about two years to oegin to revise the Stalinist
legacy.
3.

Passer’s Philosophy of the devolution

To understand the nature and causes for doviet-Egyptian
relations during the 19^ 3 -1 9 5 5 period, it is essential to
describe and analyze the new nationalist-oocialist ideology
that emerged in Egypt and has since come to be descrioed as
"hasserism."

its main fundamentals are found in Gamai Abdei
14
passer's Philosopny of the hevolution,^ which was not so
much a pnilosophy, xnasmuch as it was a description of the
15
path he foresaw that revolutionary Egypt must follow. His
analysis led him to conclude that the future of Egypt, and
indeed the future of the Arab countries, lay in the pursuit
of a nationalistic policy.

'The first part of the book de

scribes his search for the roots of the revolution, the
second part lists the various courses of action which were

ilasser, Gaaaal Abdel, Egypt’s Liberation; The Philosophy
of the Revolution (Washington, i>.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955).
15
ibid., p. 1 7 .
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16
considered, sod the third part examines the "place" or stage
upon which Egypt was to act out tne role which aeetiny bad
provided.
In the first section of his Philosophy,

a s aaer

olacuaaea

the beginnings of the revolution In the hearts and minds of
himself and his generation,

he searches for the roots of

his dawning nationalism and concludes that he mss oorn with
the seeds of nationalism aireaay in him.

he traces the

history of revolution bacic to the unsuccessful devolution
of 1912* and concludes that Egypt must wo through two revolu
tions at the same time:
lo
revolution.

a political revolution and a social

Tne second part devotes itself to tne course of action
which r&sser considers essential to realize the oowectlves
of the devolution.

Nasser has come to the realization that

the Army must be the instrument of revolution, but how?

he

turns away from political assassination, preferring to "bring
forward those who can build....

We dream of the glory of our

nation; it is necessary to build that 0lory.Bi^
Sgypt must achieve freedom.
throw the existing regime.

How?

To begin,

It is necessary to over

This is his justification for

revolution against the old order.
The final section examines the stage upon which Egypt

16

Nasser, op. cit., pp. 17-45.
17
ibid., p. 56. The italics are Nasser's.
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w m t act.
'Am

wasaer

m m

Sgypt at tha center of tfcraa circles.

first circle is. ss Arab oos.

Egypt is pare of the Arab

world a on it la part of Egypt, bound oy ties of common his
tory sab experience.
Arab circle.

As African circle coaes next to the

Egypt la a part of Africa and shares the des

tiny of the Dark Continent.

It must play a part in the

struggle between the inhabitants and the white colonizers.
Am

last circle Is that of Islam.

Egypt is a part of the

world of Islam, sharing Its history and its future.
notes their pervasiveness;

Nasser

"All these are fundamental

realities with deep roots in our lives which we cannot—
18
even if we try— escape or forget."
The Arab circle taxes the place of primary importance.
Nasser poetically sees with the circle a "role, wandering
aimlessly In search of a hero.”

he doesn't know why this

role has settled on the oorders of Egypt, out he believes
it Is waiting for Egypt to assume the role.

It is not one

of leadership, but:
"a role of interaction with, and responsi
bility to, all the above-mentioned factory.
It is a role such as to spark this tre
mendous power latent in the area surround
ing us; a role tantamount to an experiment,
with the aim of creatiog a great strength
which will then undertake a positive part iQ
in the building of the future of mankind.

18Nasser, op. cit., pp. 81-114.
~
^ibid., p. 88.
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His pt^fclosopfay outlines a nationalistic ideology in
which be see*K,Egypt as waiting for a vanguard to break the
path to freedom, after which the orderly ranks would form
to carry on the goals of the Revolution.

This conception

was not only idealistic, but politically naive.

The hoped-

for leaders did not materialize; instead of order there was
chaos, instead of unity, dissension. Nasser describes this
m
„20
as the greatest shock of my life.
It was, therefore,
necessary for Nasser and the junta to remain in power and
guide Egypt’s political future.
The aims of the Egyptian Revolution, as Nasser wrote
them in his Philosophy, were:

to end exploitation of the

people, to realize national aspirations, and to develop the
mature political consciousness that is an indispensable
preliminary for a sound democracy.

The Revolution also

sought to bridge the gulf between social classes and to
foster the spirit of altruism which marks a cultivated
21
individual and a cohesive group.
In order to achieve these aims it was necessary to
clean Egypt from the corrupt past, especially from the sub
versive and reactionary groups which had spread their ten
tacles wide in the land.

Nasser believed the greatest in

ternal enemies of the people to be the Communists who serve

^ibid., p. 60.

21

'

-

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, "The Egyptian Revolution," re
printed from Foreign Affairs, An American Quarterly Review.
Jan. 1955, P. 208.
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foreign rulers, the Moslem Brotherhood which still aeeics
rule by assassination in an era that has outlived such
practices, and finally, the old-time politicians who would
22
like to reestablish exploitation of the masses.
Nasser points out that having rid themselves of corrupt
politicians, a corrupt king, and an outmoded monarchy with
out loss of life, it became necessary to impose restrictions
"to prevent enemies of the people,

(here he hints at Commun

ists and reactionaries) from exploiting the people and poison
ing their minds.”

"But," he says, "if we have had to exer

cise our authority, it has been in order to pave the way for
a better life for the men and women of our country."
adds:

He

"We want to lift these restrictions as soon as we

feel the people are no longer in danger from such groups,
and the sooner that time comes, the better, so far as we
are concerned."^
Nasser says in The Egyptian Revolution, "our ultimate
aim is to provide Egypt with a truly democratic and represen
tative government, not the type of parliamentary dictator
ship which the palace, and a corrupt 'Pashd'class imposed
on the people.

In the past, Parliament was a body for

blocking social improvement.

We want to make sure that in

the future the senators and deputies will serve all the

22
ibid., p. 209
Nasser, op. cit., "Otoe Egyptian Revolution," p. 209.
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Egyptiaas rather than a few.11
Here, Masser is speaking clearly about his aims for
future Egypt.

He indicated in his Philosophy of the Revolu

tion that he wants to build a sound democracy for the whole
Egyptian peopie as a cohesive group.

He wants to insure

that “in the future the senators and deputies will serve
all the Egyptians rather than a few," and we can see here
that his thinking was different from that of the Soviets.
While they put their emphasis on the necessity and the in
evitability of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he
emphasizes a system of "sound democracy" for all Egyptians.
He also proclaims in the document his belief in social
reform which would abolish exploitation in all its forms,
especially in the agrarian sector.

He thinxs that exploita

tion should be abolished by the Agrarian Heform Law, which
was issued immediately after the Revolution of July 23, 1952.
This law made a maximum of 200 Feddan the limit of land
ownership.

The excess lands were to be distributed among

the poor peasants in plots of 5 Feddan each.

The peasants

were to pay the price of these lands to the Egyptian treasury
over a period of thirty years.

The treasury in turn was to

pay the old landlords with bonds on the treasury paying 1-1/2J6
interest per year for thirty years.

24

ibid., p. 208.
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This approach to solvlAg tha "land for tha paManta"
problem la different froa that advocated and practiced by
the Communists.

These and aiallar aolutlooa to baalc proe-

leaa advocated by Sasser lad tha soviets to coocludc that
the Egyptian Free Officers aara raactlooary.

The Egyptian

Revolution was described in tha Great soviet Encyclopedia
aa the action of a "reactionary officer'd group linked with
the Uniteo otates," and it d*ac?ii>«d the United States aa
having embarked on a "savaee repreaaion of the worker's
movements."

The Soviets thought that the Revolution had

resulted in more persecutiona of Communists and they called
it demagogic.

They described the Revolution aa a "fascist

military dictatorship to stifle the Orovln£ anti-imperilHat
movement in Egypt."
There has been talk, Rasser noted in an obvious message
to the West, of "Communist infliltration" in the various
Arab and African nationalist aoveaenta.

Re warned that,

"It would be unwise for the United States to take such a
view of nationalist activities.

Such activities are led

by sincere patriots whose only desire is to see their nations
free from foreign domination.*

"Americans," he says,

"recognize this to be the inalienable ri^ht of every aan,
yet balk at supporting these nationalists for fear of annoying

^MacKlntosh, J. R., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet
Foreign Policy (London: Oxford university Press, 19b2), p. 118.
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soot colonial power that tea refused to nova with tte tlaea.
It la thla procrastination ttet gives tte CoaBunists tte
cteoce to taica over what usually starts as a genuinely pat
riotic eoveaent."

he cites Indo-Chlna as an appropriate

exaapl*.2*
If tte United states were sole to "develop a coura-

• ^
geous policy— and tte only morally correct one— of support
ing those who are anxious to oe rlo of foreign domination
and exploitation, there would oe no communist infiltration
of Africa and tte Arab countries.”

"Real independence,”

teaser says, "would be tte greatest defense against Communist
or any other type of infiltration or aggression.”

"Free men

are tte most fanatical defenders of their liberty, nor do
they lightly forget those who have championed their struggle
27
for Independence.”
The roots of Arab nationalism are a^so to be found in
his Philosophy.

In the same way that he was able to see that

Egypt*s future must be built on the base of nationalism, he
also saw that a powerful base could be fashioned from a greater
unity among Arab countries.

One possible instrument to greater

unity Nasser saw was the Arab League.
When Nasser wrote his Philosophy, he thought of the Arab
League as a reality.

He envisioned it as "an effective force

Nasser, op. cit., "The Egyptian Revolution," p. 210.
^ilid., p. 211.
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for the defense of this area."

Nasser believes tiiat the

defease of the Middle East “oust rest primarily with the
inhabitants of the area.

No outside forces can defend this
og
soil as effectively as the people who live here."
In
addition, he says, "That is why Egypt has made every effort
to strengthen the Arab League’s Collective .Security Pact."2^
He thought that it was the best possible system to defend
that part of the world against any possible aggression.
Egypt i3 assuming the role, in his mine, which Nasser saw
"wandering in search of a hero."
B.

Nasser's domestic and Arao Policies

in order to understand the relationship between the
Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic in the period
following the 1952 revolution, it is necessary to examine
the implementation of Nasser’s philosophy and to understand
his domestic ano Arao Policies.

It will be shown that

Nasser followed a path independent of the wishes of the
Soviet government; he distinguished between Egyptian
Communists on the one hand, whom he considered enemies of
Egypt, and the Soviet government on the other hand, from
whom he continued to receive economic aid.
The events which took place in the Spring of 195^
pC
ibid., p. 210.
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conspired to curb the conservative forces who were fighting
for the old order and the secular pro-Communist wing of
the radical movement.
powerful.

But the Moslem Brotherhood was still

The Movement wanted to use the military move

ment and the Free Officers for its own purposes to gain
and capture power.

They had suggested to Lieutenant-Colo

nel Nasser (who had been a memoer of the Brotherhood Move
ment) that the regime should retain power for ten years in
cooperation with the Moslem Brotherhood and under its sup
ervision.

The Supreme Guide Council for the Moslem Brother

hood proposed to Nasser in 1S53 that the Moslem Brotherhood
should inspect all laws drafted by the government.

They

also suggested the establishment of a committee for this
purpose.

Nasser refused the suggestion, and subsequently,

Hassan el-Hudeiby, the Guide General of the Movement, ordered
his followers in and outside Egypt to oppose the Revolutionary
30
Command Council.
The crisis between the new regime and the Communists
and Brotherhood Movement was brought to a head by Nasser's
determination to secure an agreement with the British over
the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal bases.
These two groups, the Communists and the Brotherhood, and
especially the Young Bretheren (as the Brotherhood called
the resistance groups in the Canal Zone) had been conducting

^°Little, Tom, op. cit., pp. 147-48.
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commando raids on the British bases around the canal.

Nasser

had secured resumption of the negotiations in the Spring
of 1954, and any major outrage by these groups in the Canal
Zone could have halted the negotiations between the two
parties.

Nasser guaranteed the security of the Canal Zone

and insured that neither the Communists nor the Brotherhood
Movement’s members would disturb the negotiations.

In turn,

the Communists and the Brotherhood attacked the regime and
branded Nasser a "traitor.
In the face of this opposition, lvasser struct back
strongly, striking first at the Communists.
he had arrested and jailed about 252 of them.

By May 31* 1954,
He accused

the Communists of trying to place the country in chaos, and
further accused them of having the support of the Zionists
in these attempts.

In addition, he accused them of being

agents of a foreign power seeking to control Egypt.

On the

other hend, he accused the leaders of the Moslem Brotherhood
of seeding to seize power through such defiant means as
assassination, and of 1 racing the Movement into alliance
with the Communists in the campaign of destruction and sub32
version.-^
The Brotherhood Movement's response was to plot the
assassination of Nasser.

The attempt was made October 26, 1954,

31ibid., p. 148-49.
32
Little, op. cit., p. 149.
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while Nasser was addressing a Liberation Bally in Alexandria.
The assassin, however, failed to kill Nasser, and this
reckless action by the Brotherhood Movement brought its
legal existence to an end.

The police took to the streets

to arrest most of its important leaders and members.

As

the purge was completed, about four thousand were arrested
and put in jail.

At this stage, President NaguiD, who was

not in harmony with the young officers, was overthrown and
placed under house arrest allegedly on the oasis of evidence
of his involvement in or encouragement of the plot by the
Brotherhood rlovement.^
Having gained control of the domestic political crisis,
Nasser now faced the twofold problem of economic and social
needs.

To meet these problems, which Nasser knew could not

be solved immediately, Egypt needed inaustralization and
capital investment.

Thus, Nasser 'sought the long-range

goal and directed the nation outward in the development
of a foreign policy, which he hoped would help the nations
inwardly to grow and develop.

He stressed Arab unity and

Egypt's common ties with the Arab circle.

He attacked the

creation of the State of Israel in the heart of Arab lands,
and he pounded away at Western Imperialism.
For Nasser as for any Arab Nationalist, the bonds which
tie Egypt to the.rest of the Arab countries also link the
people of Egypt to the ^ther Arab peoples.

First, he points

Little, op. cit., p.p. 149-50.
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out4 Arab peoples are bouod together In tUs circle by a com
mon religion.

The center of Islamic learning has always moved

within the orbit of its several capital cities— first Mecca,
then shifting to Jtufa, then to Damascus, next to Baghdad,
and finally, to Cairo,

finally, he points out:

“The fact

that the Arab Btates are contiguous has joined them together
in a geographical framework made solid by all these histori
cal, material, ano spiritual factors."^
It would be Nasser18 Arao policy, at this early stage,
to foster Arao unity by means of the Arab ueague.

±n his

Philosophy of the Revolution, he says chat “aespite alx re
ports to the contrary oy enemies of the Arab World, the Arab
League is a reality."

However, the ooviets noted that the

Arab League wasn't a revolutionary organization; it included
traditional reactionary political regimes, such as Iraq ano
Yemen.

"There are social and economic differences," Nasser

says, "between one Arab (nation) and another."^

"The

(nations) of tne AraD .League believe that they can unite

in

a force that contributes to the cause of world peace."*'

Nasser, op. cit., Egypt’s Liberation, p. 89*
35
At the first stage of the development of Arab National
ism, it is interesting to note that he was talking here about
Arab nations and not about Arab peoples or regions. But now
it becomes the belief of the Arabs that the Arab peoples
constitute one Arab Nation, although there are several
political institutions within the one Arab Nation.
36
Nasser, op. cit., "The Egyptian Revolution," p. 209*
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Dynastic rivalries, local differences, and to a greater
extent, interference by "outside forces conspiring against
us (ttae Arabs}" have blocked all efforts to unite the Arab
countries.

But the Arab League, Nasser thought (at the time

of his writing the Philosophy of the Revolution in 1955)
"can be made the instrument through which a 0reater unity
can be achieved among the Arab nations in every field of
activity."^
On the question of defense, Nasser thought that the
member states of the Arao League could form an effective
force for a common defense of the area.

To answer or refute

the claim that the evacuation of the British troops from
the Suez Canal area would create a military vacuum, Nasser
said that "throughout the negotiations for the evacuation
of British troops from the Suez Canal, the government of '
Egypt has pointed out that this evacuation will not create
a military vacuum in the Middle East, but will pave the way
30
for stren0thening the area's defenses."
The British government (Conservatives) had clearly ex
plained its policy regarding the Canal Zone bases.

Sir

Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, had stated
in 1953:
"We do not wish to keep indefinitely 80,000
men, at a cost of perhaps 50 million pounds

^ibid., p. 210.
^Nasser, op. cit., "The Egyptian Revolution", p. 210.
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($140*000*000) a year* discharging a duty
which has largely fallen on us* and us alone*
safeguarding the interests of free nations
in the Middle East and preserving the Inter
national Waterway* the Suez Canal.... We re
main convinced that it is in our interest*
military and financial* to secure the re
deployment of our forces in North Africa
and the Middle East."39
He also declared that the solution to the canal contro
versy will "not be dictated either by the violence of our
foreign enemies (referring here probably to the Egyptian
40
Feaayeen) or the pressure of some of our best friends."
The creation of the .state of Israel in the heart of
the Arab lands brought diplomatic relations full circle.
The West favored the establishment of the State of Israel
which it was believed wouic help their interests in the
Arab world* but by supporting Israel, the West seriously
weakened its position in the area.

Support for Israel,

in fact, had the opposite effect from what had been intended
in that it helped to awaken the dormant forces of Arab
nationalism which have proved to be basically anti-Western
Imperialism in nature.
Britain serves as an example of how the Western powers
lost and are still losing their prestige and privileged posi
tion in the Arab world.

It had been its interest- in the Suez

Canal which had partially motivated the British government

^Lilienthal, Alfred M., There Goes the Middle East
(New York: Dev in-Adair Company, 1957)» P* t>4.
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to make the Balfour Declaration in 1917*

Ike presence in

a nearby territory of a Jewish National Home in Palestine,
friendly to the British, was regarded by the War Cabinet
of Lloyd George as a security measure for the Suez.

The

Balfour Declaration served as a legitimatizing and rally
ing force for Zionists and ultimately led to the formation
of the State of Israel thirty years later.

Thus, instead

of solidifying control over the Canal, British policy toward
Palestine contributed to the pressure forcing the British
ii,
to evacuate their Suez bases.
It appeared, at .the end of 195^, that the new regime
under Nasser was stabilized and that the Egyptian economy,
which had initially suffered severe shocks from the impact
of the Revolution, was no longer threatened with collapse.
There was some Egyptian-West German economic cooperation
with West Germany promising to build Nasser's dream, the
ho
Aswan High Dam.
Relations with the West were cordial and
appeared to promise a future of harmony and cooperation with
the British who were involved in evacuation of the Nile river
starting from Port Said on the Mediterranean south to the
interior of the Dark Continent.
However, with the introduction of the Baghdad Pact
and the American efforts to enlist the Arab states' coopera
tion in subscribing to a pact or pacts against Soviet Russia,

Little, op. cit., p. 157.
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the Arab-West relations took a turn for the worse,

by the

conclusion of this Pact in 1933* goodwill oe tween Egypt and
Britain was brought to an end, and the page that had just
been opened to establish good faith was quickly closed.
C.

Continuing Good delations With The West

The Communists ta*ce-over in Czechoslovakia in 1948 ana
in China in 19^9, the Soviet blockade of aerlin in 1946-49,
the Soviet test of its first atomic bomo in 1949, and the
attack by North Korea against South Korea in 1950, were
evidences of Communist probes ana successes in the Cold War
which the West attempted to curtail or contain.

All hao

some impact on the Kiddle Bast situation and on tne evolving
Soviet-Egyptian relations.
The Middle East was a particularly delicate consideration
for both East and West because of the oil.

Without Arab oil,

the Western powers would find themselves in a aangerous
economic situation.

Oil production outside the widdle East

constituted only one-third of the world’s output and cost
up to eight times as much to produce,

in 1955 the Middle

East countries were producing up to four thousand barrels
of oil per well a day.

xStasser pointed out in his Philosophy

of the Revolution that the average daily production of oil
per well in the United States, in contrast to the Middle
East, was only about eleven barrels, and the cost of produc
ing a barrel of oil in the United States at. that time was
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about 7b oaota aa compared to 10 cants in the Middle East.*^
In addition to the precious oil, one must consider the
strategic location of the Kiodie Eastern countries and the

ii— eoat inporta nee economically and militarily of the dues
canal, end tne significant role of the brltish bases in the

Arab countries which hold a strategic military position.
All of these political, economic, ana military factors addeo
up to a policy of the West to defend the area for Europe's
security and prosperity.

In the early fifties, growing

nationalism threatened tne oil as well as the oases in iran,
Iraq, ana hgypt.

American policymakers oelieveo that it was

in the national interest of the Unitea otates to support its
main allies— oritain in the Middle East ano trance in Portia
Africa— oy helping them to maintain their positions of
strength,

The United otates urged the formation of a de

fense system linking the Arab states with the United dtates,
dritain, France, and Turkey oriented around the duez Canal
bases.

Unoer this proposal, the Western powers were to

command and the Arab states were to furnish the facilities.
The sensitivity of the Arabs to any alliance with the colonial
West cast douots on the feasibility of the plan, and even
the pro-West, pre-revolutionary Egyptian government couldn't
accept the idea for fear that the people would rise up against
it.

All Arab governments, even those who owed their position

Nasser, op. cit., Egypt's Liberation, p. iOo.
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to ttM Meat's support rejected the idea, not only because
the Del ted Etates, which advocated a Middle JSast Defense
Co— and, naa in full league with the European imperialists
the Arab nationalists had reason to distrust, but also

Ufa—

because the United Etates championed the creation of the
Etat* of Israel.
fhe Egyptian Pree Officers' revolution, which took
place the night of July 23, 1952, openeo a new phase in
Aaerlcan-Egyptian diplomatic relations,

Ifce pragmatic pol

icies of the Pree Officers and their concern with reform
in Egypt met with approval from the Americans.

Diplomatic

support from the Uniteo states gave the new regime some
assistance to overcome difficulties ano to achieve pol
itical oojectives.

Good relations between Egypt ana the west were further
insured oy the Agreement made by Eritain in 1953 to with
draw from the Eudan and to evacuate the Euez Canal Ease in
1954.

The agreement concerning the withdrawal of the Eritish

from the Canal zone was reached with some support from the
United Etates.
The American Point Pour Program also served to cement
ties between Egypt and the United Etates.

Under this pro

gram, the United Etates gave forty million dollars in econ
omic assistance to Egypt and promised to give military aid,
a promise which was never fulfilled.
The Point Pour Program Indirectly fostered American

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
security by giving economic and technical assistance to the
developing nations as a means to combat Communism.

The

advocates of the Poiot Four Program believed that by help
ing the new nations to raise the standard of living of
their peoples they would help provide Joos and give the
people an interest in preserving the status quo, staoiiizing the political situation in each country, and thus dis
pose these countries to be friendly towara the United states.
Such a program theoretically woulc diminish Communist threats
to American security.
In March, 1953> President Eisenhower asxed his Secre
tary of State, John Foster Dulles, to visit the Middle East
for the purpose of demonstrating American friendship to the
governments and peoples of the area,

it was Dulles’ inten

tion to take some measures in order to remedy the deteriorat
ing Western and American influence in the Middle East.
Dulles was accompanied by the Mutual Security Director,
Harold Stassen, who previously had urged that Egypt should
44get special help.
During the long meetinto oetween the President of the
Council of Ministers, General Naguib, and the Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles, an excerpt of a speech which was
made by Sir Winston Churchill in the house of Commons about
Egypt was handed by the newspapermen to General Naguib.

44

Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 63.
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In

this statement Churchill declared that he was "a supporter
of the Zionist Cause."

He also "gave renewed assurance of

British support for Israel" saying, "It is very unfortunate
that there is no peace between Israel and the Arab states."
"But," he adds, "fortunately for Israel, they have the best
army in the Levant."^

These uncalled for remarks by

Churchill inflamed the Arab press and angered the Arab
public opinion.

When pressed to give his view on the

Churchillian statements, Mr. Dulles "referred to the full
agreement reached by the Truman Administration with the
British government on policy regarding the Canal and the
defense of the Middle East."

A solution reconciling Egyptian

sovereignty with the need of maintaining the bases for future
eventualities was defined by Mr. Dulles as "an Anglo-Amer-*46
ican aim.
With this statement by Dulles, "all chances
of ouilding American good will (with the Arabs) had now
been inadvertently destroyed."^

Mr. Dulles was accused

by the Arab press of coming “not to listen, but to inform
-46
the Arabs of solutions previously reached."
The British-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez Canal
bases reopened on April 27, 1954, after having been post
poned several times.

45
46

There is reason to believe that the

Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 67.
ibid., p. 68.

47
‘ibid...
48ibid., p. 69
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Dulles visit co Cairo, during his mission in the jAiadie
East, had enhanced the resumption of the negotiations.
Eventually, after the revolution of July 23, 1932,
Egyptian foreign policy objectives were directed toward
expanding her scrategic, economic, and diplomatic indepen
dence.

Egypt's leaders pursued two courses in order to

achieve these aims:

first, they pursued a policy of neu

trality and non-alighment in their relations with the
Great Powers, and second, they oe^an to spread Egypcian
influence in the area around, particularly the Arao circle.
A foreign policy pattern was evolvm* inside Egypt
which characterized soviet-E^yptian relations throujiout
the period of domestic consolidation.

On the inter-

nationax level, relations oetween the Soviet Union and
Egypt were growing and improving while at.the same time
Communists were being imprisoned in Egypt oy the Nasser
regime.

The new government had banned all political parties

from the beginning of its take-over, and on January 17,
1933, Passer announced his intent to arrest every known
Communist in Egypt,

he had already shut down six news

papers with Communist leanings.

From the time of the

announcement, periodic purges of Egyptian Communists were
carried on.
Nasser continued in the ensuing years to distinguish
between the Soviet Union on the one hand the Egyptian Com
munists on the other.

Soviet shipments of equipment arrived
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la Egyptian posts sod Soviet dignitaries visited S^ypt in
the aldst of the trisls of loesl Co— unlsta.

The Soviets continued to ^rant sld la spite of tte
arrests sod laprisonaent of local Co-uniats oy tte ae«
Egyptian revise.

This is one of the nost conspicuous ex-

amplea of the policy of Soviet national interest taking
precedence over regard for local Co— unist parties if the
existence of such parties constltuteo a conflict of the
national interest of the Soviet union.
At the end of 195^* the initial steps can oe seen to
extend Soviet influence in Egypt ana the Middle East.

The

change in attitude toward store cooperation with the unoerdeveloped nations was delineated in a pro^raa calling for
expansion of trade, grantinc of creuits for purchase of
industrial equipment, ana giving of technical aid ano
assistance.
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CBAPffi* 11
Tift TURNING POINT: A NEW APPROACH
TO aOViSI-BGXPTlAN hEiATIONS

A.

The 20th Communist Party Congress Revises its
Policies Toward Nationalist movements

Is the previoua chapter we pointea out that SovietU.A.R. relatiooa ourin* the period 19^3-1955 hao little or
nothing in common.

After otaiin's death, and especially

after the Czech Arms Deal, Egypt was crawn into closer ties
with the Soviet oioc.1

riavln0 oenounced Staiin ano his

approach to xvatlonaiist movements, the 20th Communist Party
Congress decided to return to the iieninist policy of support
of national Pronts, and at that time affirmeo the new pattern
in Soviet-C.A.R. relations which had oeen developing since
the Czech-x^yptian Arms Deal.
As previously mentioned, the new ooviet authorities
were unable to revise the otalinist traditions immediately
after Stalin*s death.

When they were faced with the Iranian

national revolution, for instance, which was headed by
Mossadegh and supported by Tudeh, the Iranian Communist
Party, the Soviets reacted in the traditional Stalinist
manner and belligerently announced that "the present politi
cal bases (in Iran) are hindering the nationa1-liberation

^See Chapter II B for a discussion of the Arms Deal.
3&
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movement of the Iranian people.*

2

The first two years of the new leadership passed as
an extension of Stalin's policy with the exception that
the Cominform's economic blockade of Yugoslavia was ended
in late 1954.

The year 1954, however, witnessed the begin

ning of the new turn in foreign policy.

It was in that year,

in addition to the rapproachment with Yugoslavia, that the
Soviet Union began its economic aid to the third world
(i.e., the non-Communist non-Western countries).

The only

exception to this policy was a loan of $30 million to Argen
tina made in 1953.^
The new turn in Soviet policy is characterized oy en
couraging and coping with the nationalist movements in the
third world.

The new leadership started practicing the more

pragmatic approach in 1955 out announced it at the 20th
Communist Party Congress in February, 1956.
The signs which preceded the official adoption of this
policy can be seen in the economic aid to the third world
countries, such as, Afghanistan in 1954, and India in 1955.
Moreover, the case of Yugoslavia was of great importance in
this respect.

The Khrushchev-Bulgainin-Mikoyan visit to

Belgrade in May, 1955, and their efforts to normalize rela
tions were the first steps which were followed, after Tito's

^Daniel, op. cit., Soviet Foreign Policy .After Stalin.
p. 274.
^Muller, op. cit., p. 219.
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visit to the Soviet Union in June, 1956, by Moscow's accept
ance of the concept that there are "many roads to socialism."
The new Soviet leadership realized how the Stalinist
policy had contributed to their country's isolation.

They

realized that some or most of the non-Communist countries
were influenced by the West, ana they understood that it
was Stalin's belligerency which caused their country's iso
lation.

The new leadership, by adopting this new policy,

hoped to demonstrate its reasonableness and flexibility.
They strengthened their relations with Yugoslavia to encour
age neutrality in the non-coramitted world ana to demonstrate
that the U.S.S.R. was not a threat against which an un»
aligned country needed to seek protection by joining the
other bloc.
In order to demonstrate the Soviet’s good will, two
important events should be mentioneo.

The first one is the

enthusiastic support given by the Soviet Union to the Bandun*
Conference of Afro-Asian States held in April, 1955-

The

second is Khurshchev's and Bulgainin's visit to India, Burma,
and Afghanistan in November and December of ±955-

This

visit, especially to India, was preceded by the Communist
party of India giving its support to the foreign policy of
the Indian Government.

In August, 1955, Moscow reported

that the central committee of India's Communist Party, as well
as that of Indonesia, had resolved to support their respective
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governments in foreign affairs.

k

The signs of Soviet good will and unselfish friendliness
were shown in 1935 even to Egypt whose policy was seriously
criticized in 1954 upon the British-Sgyptian Agreement to
withdraw British troops from the Suez.

The agreement im

plied complete withdrawal, but granted certain privileges
to Britain in case of war.

The reaction of Wasser to the

Soviet criticis.. was to persecute the Egyptian Communists.
This delicate situation did not prevent the Soviets from
going ahead with their new policy.

At the beginning of

1955, the Soviet Union looked to the Arabs as a potential
ally.

The Arabs were in conflict with the West over its

support for Israel and over the activities of Western oil
companies, and support by the Soviet Union of anti-Western
imperialism Arab policies could be regarded as mutually
beneficial.

On this assumption, and after the Bandung Con

ference, the Soviet Union hoped to estaolish friendly rela
tions with Egypt and in late 1955, the Soviets decided to
supply Egypt with weapons after the West refused to sell
ft

badly needed arms to that country.
At the end of 1955, the new policy was in complete
application.

But between this policy and the Stalinist

Communist literature, an undeniable gap had to be bridged.
The Communist literature had to be rewritten to match the

k
Daniel, op. cit., p. 295.
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Dew policy.

It was at tbe 20th Communist Party Congress

in February, 1956 > that Khrushchev denounced dtalln, de
claring tbe adoption of tbe new policy,

at the aaee Party

Congress, tbe veteran Coonuniat, Otto Kusslnin, admitted
that tbe tenets of the dlxth Congress of tbe Communism
International in 192tJ and the criticism of Gandhi had oeen
a mistake.*'
It is clear that the new policy, which lmplleo aealing
with the nationalist movements, implied also the belief in
peaceful co-existence.

Nehru's five principles of peaceful

co-existence were not only accepted by the ooviet Union,
but were made part of the resolutions of the famous 20th
Party congress.

And in 1957* Khrushchev reported to the

Supreme soviet on the fortieth anniversary of the bolshevik
Revolution;
"We Communists have never sought and will
never seek to achieve our aims by such
(violence) terrible means; this is immoral
and contradictory to our communist world
view, we work from the premise that wars
are not necessary to aavance Socialism.*
'fhe rejection of the necessity of war between capitalism
and socialism was preceded by dissolving the Cominform in
April, 1956; but this was only justified by the possibility
of atomic war which would destroy both olocs.

^Muller, op. cit., p. 25.
^Rubenstien, op. cit., p. 32.
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8m

ooly alternative to via over capitalism is ay

peaceful assos.

Os this prcalee, ths Co— moist parties

in the uooerdeveiopea oouotvles were encouraged to seek
power through the existing aya terns oy peaceful wsys.

gven

when the exist ln.« systea a la not allow communist* to work,
that was oot reason for fighting.

hssser's wel.-<nown attack

on Communism in 1950 was s Oood example of this,

heacting

to jJaaaer's attack, aruahchev salo:

".••out on question of the struggle against
imperialism, the conaolloation of political
aod economic inoepeooence of countries newly
lloerated from colonialism, ano the fl^ht
against war, there ia an agreement among us
(toe U.d.a.h. ano the U.A.h.j. .ideological
differences must not impede the development
of frleodly relations oetween our countries,
nor our cooaon cattle against imperialism.117
hut such a case lixe aasser's would be treated differently
if It were in a satellite state, as, for example, what
happened in hungary in 1*56.
The justification of the new policy was not exclusive
of the danger of atomic war.

It was also based on reestima-

tlon of the power of the nationalist movements and their
role against imperialism.

One of the Soviet economists

reported in 1937 the role of the nationalist movements as
follows:
"..•as a role, the national bourgeoisie
leads the battle against the imperialism
but is, under certain conditions, ready to
7

Muller, op. cit., p. 33.
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compromise. Yet the experience of recent
years has been that such compromising is
of temporary nature, and after certain
intervals the struggle for freedom is
resumed, to be carried on ustil full poli
tical sovereignty is achieved...-8
To sum up the post-Stalin foreign policy, one should
consider three significant doctrinal shifts.

First, the

war between capitalism and communism is not inevitable
although the reconcilability of the two systems is impos
sible.

Second, accepting the fitoist contention that there

are several roads to socialism is a significant shift.
This implied recognition of the national principle and,
more importantly, it was hoped that better relations with
the nationalist movements of Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East could be cultivated.

Third, Communists were encouraged

to seek power where and when possible, through peaceful,
parlimentary means in democratic countries.

The three

shifts made possible the return of the "popular front"
which was neglected by Stalin during his last years.
B.

The Egyptian-Czech Arms Deal of 1955

As pointed out previously, after Stalin’s death the
Soviets became more and more anxious to find ways to over
come the isolation imposed by the Stalinist legacy.

Having

returned to a policy of support for nationalist movements,
the Soviets searched for ways to make their support palpable,

8

ibid., p. 2o.
\
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especially to the underdeveloped and nonaligned nations
of the third world.

Obviously, economic and technical

assistance could be a valuable method to demonstrate support
for those who would shake off the imperialists.

The Egypt-

ian-Czech Arms Deal was one high-impact way the boviets saw
to extend their influence in the Middle East, demonstrate
their support for nationalist movements, and at the same
time, confront the West with an alarming and embarrassing
situation.
On February 28, 1955> the Israeli armed forces launched
an attack on the Gaza strip, a part of Palestine which had
been under Egyptian control since the 19^8 war.
killed 3$ persons and woundec 31 more.

The raid

This raid on the

Gaza was not the first such attack by Israel against Arab
territory; Israel had begun a series of "reprisal" raids
with an attach on the Jordanian village of Kioya in October,
1953.^

However, the Gaza raid was the first such venture

to be launched against Egyptian-held territory since the
19^8 war.
The Gaza raid producea several far-reaching effects.
It had a very important effect on Nasser and his associates
in that the raid exposed the weakness of the Egyptian army
and showed its lack of effective modern weapons.

This

Israeli raid was considered by the Free Officers as a blow

^Cremeans, Charles !>., The Arabs and the World. (New
York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1963)* P- 1^4.
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to Egyptian prestige.

After all, it had been the army and

its Free Officers, led by Nasser, who had made the revolu
tion, and the Egyptians couldn't bear to see their army
receiving the Israeli blows without being able to defend
either themselves or their frontier positions.
The army officers had accepted the priority given to
economic and social reforms which the regime had emphasized
since coming to power in 1952, but now, with the Israeli
challenge, the army demanded new and modern weapons, and
"it was doubtful whether the Army's loyalty could be counted
upon if it did not receive more and better weapons.
The Israeli challenge coinciaea with the challenge of
the Baghdad Pact to Egypt's leadership in the Arao world.'1'1
The West attempted, by means of this Pact, to support xraq's
Nuri Essaid, leader of the traditional forces which opposed
Nasser's progressives, as a rival leader of the Arab world
to encourage Arab participation in an alliance against the
Russians.

Egypt stood firmly against any alliances with

the West which would reestablish Western forces on Arao soil
and indirectly exert control over the Arab countries.
It would, therefore, be wrong to assume that the Gaza
10
ibid.
11
The Baghdad Pact was a collective defense treaty
which was signed on February 24, 1955 between Iraq and
Turkey, joined shortly after by Britain, Pakistan and Iran.
The United States was a sponsor, too, although she did.not
directly join the Pact. The declared purpose of the treaty
is to defend the Middle East against possible Communist
aggression.
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raid u a solely responsible for the Egyptian decision to
see* a roe from the Soviets,

in addition, tbs

fact

vas an lapovtant factor, as sell as tbe Egyptian unwillingness to participate In tbe American Mutual Security frograa.
Tbe high cost of Aaerlcan aras and the requirement of dollar
finally, tbe desire of

payaents oust also be considered,

the new regime to follow a policy of non-alignment was a
contributing factor.

12

The policy of non-alignment which ivaaser espoused later
became known as "positive neutralism."

The outlines of this

foreign policy emerged during the period after the Gaza rale
and before Nasser approached the United states for arms.
Passer's primary concern was that small nations should
"keep themselves free from domination by great powers and
the necessity of avoiding alignments with them."

The

stru^le between the two great power olocs ana their appro
ximate military equality could oe an advantage for the small
nations, especially the Arab states, which could deal with
both sides for their own benefit.

Nasser recognized that

the traditional dependence of Egypt upon the West for mar
kets and assistance was in reality of no benefit since it
kept Egypt in economic bondage.

There was much to be gained

by dealing with the Soviet bloc, both in markets and in
12
Cremeans, op. cit., p. 143.
13ibid., p. 144.
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CO— odltisa aucn aa waapooa, aaicb a«ypt atroooiy oeaireo,
out ablob tba Meat

m i

unaaxllOo to auppiy either la tat

dealred aaounta or at taraa a*ypc couio afforo.

Xberefore,

aaaaar coocludeo, "fat nay aac clear for a^ypt to oaiance
lta aooooalc relation* oetaaea tbe beat a no soviet oloc."

14

bben tbe a^yptiana faij.au to 0et toe oeeoeo araa from

tbelr treoltiooal aourcea in toe beat, tney approacoed toe
dovitta, wbo aelcoaeo tbe aove ano q u ic *iy reaponoeo.

in

an interview in April, x*3o, uemal Abdei aaaser stated:
"be asked tbe doviet Union lor oelp. ror
yeara we baa aeaeo everyone else, ae turned
to tbe boviet oloc knowln* tbat tbe western
poavra bad so intention of oealln^ witb us
aa lndepeooent equal*, neip case from tbe
dovlet bloc almost aw ?uickly aa tbe in*
orlea on our request*.1?
In just four days, Masser recelveu an anaaer from tbe soviets.
The arrangement for tbe purcbaae of araa oy j w p * mas
raaae witb Czechoslovakia, ratner tban with tbe doviet onion.
duch a deal ^ave tbe appearance of a "aiapie commercial
a^reement"1^ between two aaall nations and strengthened tbe
concept of non-alignment.
The formal announcement of tbe Czecn-S^yptian Arms Deax
was oade during tbe last wee* of September, 1955, oy President

ibid., p. 143^Duncan, David, "Masser(s Prank and Startling Views,"
Life, vol. XL: Mo. 16 (April. 16, 1956), P. 34.
^WbeeloctL, Keith, Masser*a Mew S^rot, (Mew Yor*:
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 230.
^Masser, quoted in Tbe Times (London, dept. 28, 1955).
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Haaser.1*5 The deal was estimated to be valued at about
$250,000,000, ^ although there has never been any formal
statement to that effect.

Egypt received jet fighters and

bombers, surface-to-air-missile3, tanks, submarines, troop
carriers, and a variety of small arms ana artillery.

Al

though the exact price has never been revealed, some observ
ers think that the arms were purchased at a low figure.

It

is also believed that Nasser negotiated a further reduction
of 20% to 30ji of the original purchase price when he visited
2Q

the Soviet Union in 195^.
An important part of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Beal was
the method by which Egypt would pay for the purchases.

The

Czechs agreed to accept payments in Egyptian currency and
commodities; they did not require payments in collars or
gold as did the United States.21

Communist purchases of

Egyptian cotton were at prices well above the prevailing
world mar*cet price which served to oolster Egypt's economy
and at the same time, eliminated the competition from Western

lS
The New York Times, Sept. 28, 1955, p. 1.
^Council for Economic and Industry Research, "Foreign
Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc and Their Im
plications for the united States," in Foreign Aid Program.
Senate Doc. No. 52, 85th Congress, First session (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 724.
^ibid., p. 652.
^ .S. Senate, Committee of Foreign Relations and Committee
on Armed Services, Hearings. The President's Proposals on the
Middle East, 85th Congress, 1st session, (Washington, D.G.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), PP. 730-31.
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buyers.

This led to a reduction of the United Arab Repub

lic's trade with the Vest and a simultaneous increase in
the volume of trade with the Soviet bloc.

op

Wilton Wynn states in his book, Nasser of Egypt,
that the West suffered a political defeat in diplomacy con
cerning the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal when the Soviet Union
returned Ambassador Soloa to Moscow with a promotion for his
aid in the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, to the Middle East
desk in the foreign office,

in short, the Soviets had gained

a valuable propaganda victory by showing a strong indication
to the Arab world that they were ready to listen, as well
as respond to their needs.
The years following the Arms Deal orought an expansion
of cooperation and friendship between the Soviet Union ana
the United Arab Republic.
There was a favorable response throughout the Arab world.
By making the Arms Deal, Nasser's prestige was enhanced by
his success in breaking the monopoly of the West in supply
ing arms in the Middle East and in enoing Arab dependence
on the West for equipment and arms.

This meant that the

Arabs, at last, had a place to appeal the West's decisions,
and the Soviets stood ready to discredit the West at every

22
The New Yora Times, Dec. 18, 1955* p. 10.
23Wynn, Wilton, Nasser of Egypt; The Search for
Dignity, (Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959)* p. 121.
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opportunity in order to enhance Its own position in the
Middle East.

She Arms Deal was the first in a series of

steps in the deterioration of relations between Egypt and
the Western powers, while it paved the way for further coop
eration between the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union.
As a result of the arms agreement, the United states
withdrew its offer of assistance in the construction of
the Aswan High Dam, and pressured the International sank
also to retract its offer of financial aid.

Britain followed

suit in this course of action, which led Nasser to retaliate
by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, which, in turn,
precipitated the Israeli French-sritish invasion of Egypt
in October and November, 1956.

24

Such bold action by the

two European powers and Israel served to widen the breach
between the United Arab Republic and the Vest and increase
the feelings of distrust which the Soviets encouraged and,
to some extent, exploited.
Israel's response to Egypt's acquisition of Soviet
arms was to make an arms oeal with France in Novemoer, 1935,
w h i c h supplied Israel w i t h ultra-modern Mystere ^ets and

other types of weapons.

Other countries, such as Canada,

also supplied arms to Israel.

These new arms arrived in

Israel in April, 1956, while Monsieur Christian Pineau, the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was visiting the Egyptian
25
capital.
24
Wynn, op. cit., p. 144.
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The completion of the evacuation of the Suez Uanal
Zone, which was begun after the signing of tbe Anglo-Eejptian
Agreement in 1954, was celebrated in uuae, 1936, with a par
ade of Egyptian troops displaying their new soviet-made
weapons.

Nominal units from the armies of several Arab

countries shared in the celebration.

The Egyptians marched

proudly, for this was a 0reat moment of victory,

oioce 1662

"the Egyptian army— not British forces--was the final source
of authority and power in Egypt."
The parade was seen differently from three points of
view,

Bmitiri Bhepilov, the new ooviet r'oreign .minister,

who attendee the parade as 5uest of honor, saw in it a de
cline in Western Influence and closer relations between the
.Soviet Union and the Arab world.

The Western diplomats attend

ing the parade saw in it the possibility that Egypt was ex
changing the old British relationship for a new dependence
on the Soviet Union.

But for juasser, now confident of his

ability to stand behina his policy of "positive neutralism,"
the ceremony was a testimony to the efficacy of his neutral
ist policy for he hao freed Egypt from its past bonds oy
providing it "with the strength to run its own show in its
27
own way."

Creameans,.op. cit., p. 147.
27ibid., p. 146.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
C.

fi^yp«*a hostility Z o «v d « baataro imperialism,
Colonialism, sod Forel0o do—
io tho Arab Norld

Xha United Arao Republic's hostility toward bos earn
laptrlAllu

tho —

mss

but to obit extent
Mbit oaala

mom

mss

la of tbe revolution's foreign policy,
tbia policy revolutionary, and oo

It predicated?

rtelcola &err, la bla article, "Egyptian Foreign Policy
aoo tea Revolution," projects a three-level scale of what is

revolutionary in order to determine to mbat extent a policy
is revolutionary or conventional.

On his first level, he

sees a policy as revolutionary if it is
oaaed on explicit
%
Ideological foundations; on the aiaole level, a policy
might qualify as "revolutionary" if it alms at a signifi
cant diplomatic oreaicthrough in pursuit of objectives be
yond the traditional views of the nation's interest; at the
third level, if the style anc tactics of a policy are en
hanced by new boldness and concerted effort to achieve
Halted and traditional goals, it might oe said to oe
"revolutionary.”

tir. Kerr places Egyptian foreign policy

at tbe middle level since It presents a diplomatic breakthrough in pursuit of new objectives.

2d

Nasser's policies in the foreign arena are oased on
the sensitivity of the Arabs on tbe question of independence.

Kerr, Malcolm, "Egyptian Foreign Policy and the
Revolution" in Egypt Since the Revolution, (New York:

Fredrick A. Praeger, I9hh), p. 115.
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This sensitivity produced strong feelings of anti-imperial
ism.

The Arabs had endured exploitation by the Western

potters for a long time and., having thrown off the yoke of
colonialism, they wished to take their place in the commun
ity of nations as full and equal partners.

With independence

came a desire for total independence, economic and social,
as well as political.

Therefore, it did not require any

particular ideology beyond that of national independence
to cause the United Arab Republic to adopt a general posi
tion of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.
In order to achieve independence, che Free Officers
under Lieutenant-Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser overthrew King
Farouk and his dynasty which hao enslaved the Egyptian people
for more than a century while benefiting

greatly from the

West's desire to economically subjugate his country.

The

Free Officers also intended to eliminate the corruption in
Farouk's regime which sold Egypt to the whims of the West
for the price of personal wealth, and to liquidate the reac
tionary elements in Egyptian society who also benefited
from the status quo at the expense of the mass of Egyptians,
and the elements of imperialism which exploited the people.
Independence, therefore, constituted the immediate aim
of Arab nationalism.

It had deep psychological signifi

cance which, over the years, has broadened the meaning of
the word, "independence," for the Arab peoples.

The exper

ience of the interim between the two world wars convinced
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^

nationalists that anything less than complete sovereignty
was not sovereignty at all.
The reason the nationalists sought total sovereignty
was because they had seen the effects of Nde facto1* inde
pendence.
For example, in some northern African and some other
Arab states, so-called sovereign, the nationalists had seen
how foreign capital and large capital investments from for
eign countries had retained control over policies and deci
sions, causing these so-called freed states to continue carry
ing unfair obligations.
Further, foreign currency was held in foreign banks
on the independent country soil.

These banks "which held

the keys of industry, often remain totally under the con29
trol of foreign capital."
Consequently, the search for complete independence from
the West has made nationalists suspicious of foreign in
vestments and economic interests.

Minorities with special

connnections outside the Arab world, and alliances and other
special relationships with the great powers were also suspect.
From its inception, the United Arab Republic refused to
join in Facts or Agreements which would enable any foreign

29
D'encausse, H. Carrere, "The Background of Soviet
Policy in the Middle East," from The Middle East in Transi
tion, ed. by Walter Laquer, (Mew York: Fredrick A. Praeger,

I95o), p. 393.
30

■
.
Cremeans, op. cit., p. 58.
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power or outside interests to interfere in the affairs of
the country or violate its sovereignty in any way.

When

the Baghdad Pact was introduced, the United Arab Republic
refused to participate and also conducted an intensive cam
paign of propaganda against the Pact.

In addition, the

United Arab Republic used its Influence with the other Arab
states to convince them not to join in what Egypt considered
was a bloc-versus-bloc alignment against Russia.

Egypt pre

ferred to stay aloof from such entanglements and pursue a
policy of non-alignment or "positive neutralism" which would
leave Egypt frefer to make its own way in the area of foreign
diplomacy.
Arab neutralism has its roots in the period after the
Palestinian War when Egypt, in response to the Hashemite
scheme to enlarge its influence by means of a military
pact, proposed an Arab Defense Pact in which every Arab
state felt obligated to join.

The Americans viewed this

Arab Defense Pact as a blueprint for a defense organization
in the Middle East patterned after RATO.
The American plan for a Middle East Defense (MEDO),
however, was based on Improper understanding of the situ
ation in the Middle East.

For example, in the face of overt

action against Britain by nationalist forces in Iraq and the
Suez Canal Zone, the United States still hoped for way to
build a strategic alliance,

in spite of the previous
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rejection by the Arabs of the Tri-Partite Declaration^1
od the grounds that it implied recognition of Israel, the
Americans invited the members of the Arab League and Israel
to join in the MEDO,

a venture not sure to succeed if Arab

feelings concerning Israel were not dealt with.

Thus, the

Arabs continued to reject anything which would imply recog
nition of Israel and any plan which would strengthen the
hand of the west and Israel in the Arab world.
Therefore, the Arabs proclaimed the doctrine of Arab
neutralism which the West could not understand, for to re
ceive aid from the Soviets is not neutralism in the eyes of
the West.

The Arabs were concerned with freeing themselves

from foreign control; hence, they turned a deaf ear to the

31

The Tri-?artite Declaration, issued way 25, 1950,
was an attempt by the Western powers; britain, France,
and the United States of America, to try to limit the chaos
in the Middle East. To this end, they declared, "The three
governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all
need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the
purpose of ensuring their internal security and their
legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their
part in the defense of the area as a whole. Ail applica
tions for arms or war material from these countries will
be considered in the light of these principles." It should
be noted, however, that such a declaration by the three
powers would not be accepted by the Arabs for it implies
a balance of arms, between Israel, a nation of one million,
at the time, and about eighty millions of Arabs. This the
Arabs deny, especially with Israel occupying their land,
denying the Palestinians their right to return to their
homes and farms in Palestine while importing Polish and
Hungarian jews to settle in the confiscated properties of
the Palestinian Arabs. This Western Declaration was re
fused by the Arabs especially when it came from the very
states that championed the creation of the alien state on
Arab soil.
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antl-ooviet propaganda from the Hast anti did not mm in•

teras ted in the East-West conflict.
threat was the Israeli threat.

To the Arabs, the only

For the Araos, Israeli un

provoked attacks were an undeniable fact, whereas dovlet
aggression was remote and uncertain.

The Arabs preferreo

to end dependence on the West and defend themselves and
their rights against continuing Israeli attacks and threats.
Egypt's firm stand against imperialism, its opposition
to foreign pacts, and its campaign against the baghdaa Pact
and later against the Eisenhower Doctrine, which rgypt saw
as "imperialism in disguise," all these positions served
to place Egypt in a "tacticai" alliance with the doviet
Union against Western-Imperialism.

Naturally, the Soviets

used every advantage to be gained by this "tactical" alli
ance in order to confront the West in the Cold War and ex
tend its influence in the Miadie East.
In order to win acceptance for his regime, Nasser had
to formulate policies which capitalized on the Egyptian's
desire for independence and economic and social reform.
Nasser has often been called a "pragmatist” since his pol
icies are not guided by a rigid, doctrinaire philosophy.

The

reason for this is seen in his two-fold approach in foreign
affairs:
world; (2)

(1)

The pursuit of Egypt's influence in the Arab

Non-alignment emphasizing anti-imperialism.

Thus,

Nasser recognizes and deals with long-standing Egyptian national
interests, such as the removal of foreign troops from Egyptian
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8011, and tbe creation of a free state, even in the face of
considerable danger, such as retaliations from colooial
poasrs.
In one of his first actions, Nasser succeeded in creat
ing a climate of Internal political stability by securing
a settlement of the Suez question with Britain on terms
favorable to Egypt.

fhis settlement demonstrated to Egyptians

and to other Arao peoples that Egyptian policies were no
longer subject to pressures from Britain,

xa addition to

securing British withdrawal, Arab nationalist sensitivity
demanded that Egypt resist British ana American proposals
for a xniadle East Defense organization.
Having achieved the 1954 treaty with aritain, Egypt
desired to consolidate her independence, which lea to the
adoption of certain corollaries, the first of which was the
idea of non-alignment.

.Non-alignment with the great powers

would perhaps enable Egypt to ootain support from each against
the pressures of the other.

In fact, Nasser had won some

support from the United Btates during his negotiations with
Britain over Buez.
In 1954 Nasser was responding to the Egyptian's desire
not allow a continued British military presence in Egypt.
Critics feared Egypt might be siding with the Soviets, but
the Soviets at that time had little to offer Egypt, while
the Vest had a great deal.

Staying out of anti-Soviet alli

ances was Just as sensible to Nasser as joining them, it

t
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really didn't matter.

What was important was not the prin

ciple of non-alignment itself, but the end of the “special
and unequal" relationship with Britain, whether in the con
text of the Cold War or any other context.

Nasser's non32alignment policy was begun as a tactical matter.
When the Soviet Union became a source of aid and assist
ance, neutralism as a tactical matter changed.

In 1955 the

Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal was made; in 1956 Egypt recognized
Red China; and in 1958, Nasser obtained extensive Soviet
aid for industry and the Aswan Dam.

By 1958 neutralism
\

was an established policy by which iSiasser used the oppor
tunities available to play off both sides for the benefit
»

of Egypt.
That Egypt should expand her influence in the Arab
world was the second corollary of independence.

Egypt had

a larger population, a more modern economic sector, and a
bigger army than the other Arab countries, and until the
oil boom in the 1950's, Egypt also possessed greater finan
cial resources.

Such advantages made Egypt a natural leader

in the Arab world.
The success of Nasser's revolution coupled with the
decline of British power and prestige in the Middle East
were valuable opportunities which Nasser utilized to make
himself a symbol to Arabs both in and outside Egypt of their

32
Kerr, op. cit., p. 120.
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hopes and dreams, a symbol of revolution which would free
them, politically, economically and socially.^
More practical considerations for an enhanced Egyptian
Influence in the Arab world was the view of the neighbor
ing Arab states as a first line of defense against pressures
from the West which might undermine Egypt's independent for
eign policy.

Egypt*& attack on the Baghdad Pact and the MEDO

were calculated not only to prevent Western control of the
area, but also to inspire the Arab peoples favorably toward
Egypt.

In the case of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt challenged

the vested interests of the great powers, particularly the
British who had just conceded the evacuation of the Buez,
But if Egypt hadn't become involved, iviasser could foresee
that without his opposition, other Arao states, notably
Lebanon and Jordan, might not stay out of the Pact, thereby
isolating Egypt and reducing her to a scate without influence in the world community.
Another fact of life which faced .Nasser was Egypt's
need for economic assistance in the programsof develop
ment of heavy industry and large-scale projects, such as
the Aswan Dam.

An intensive governmental program to improve

the Egyptian standard of living in the face of a bourgeoti&gg
population was, and still is today, urgently necessary.

33
3^

ibid., p. 121.
ibid., p. 122.
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Egypt,

however, lacked the resources that were necessary to cope
with the problem, and had to seek help elsewhere.
The West had been E g y p t t r a d i t i o n a l source of such
assistance, but in light of Egypt's policy of non-alignment
and Jealously guarded sovereignty, little could be expected
from these countries.

Had not the Soviet Union entered the

picture, Egyptian foreign policy might have taken a diff
erent turn.

The pursuit of foreign capital, however, even

tually led Egypt in the same direction as had her struggle
for independence, viz, a policy of non-alignment, and the
cultivation of influence in the Arab world.
Nasser's non-alignment policy enabled him to aevelop
an alternative to complete dependence upon Western capital.
By pursuing such a policy, he managed to get aid from both
blocs, especially in the late fifties and early sixties.
He also cultivated his influence among the Arab masses on
whom he counted to pressure their governments to come to
Nasser's aid if such assistance were necessary.

This policy

has been successful in that since the Suez Crisis of 1956,
Egypt has received economic help from the oil-producing
35
Arab states.
Until the Suez Crisis, the United States was the only
major aid supplier, and Egypt had taken advantage of several

This economic help from the oil-producing countries
comes only (or mostly) in time of crisis, such as the Suez
in 1956 and the Jun, 1967, crisis and after.
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technical assistance greets aoo loans.

Khen the Heat refused

to sell much needed eras to Egypt, masser, waving the oanner
of Arao neutralism, turned to the Soviets,

The latter see

the advantages to oe galneo from such a policy and*preed
to provide the needed neapons.

ihe impact of the Czech-

Egyptian Arms Deal made the negotiations tor Anolo-Aaerlcan
aid for the Aswan Dam a "diplomatic tug-of-war" which re
sulted In the Vest withdrawing its promises of assistance.
Egypt retallateo oy increasing its already ^rowing trade
with the Eastern oloc, and the Soviets came through with
the necessary capital ana technical assistance for the
building of the Aswan Dam.^
As Nasser skillfully maneuvered oetween the two does,
first placating one,.then seeming to turn toward the other,
Egypt reaped the benefits in aid of various «cinds.

Ey i960

it could be said that "positive neutralism" was financially
profitable, and that wasser was not one to discourage the
Soviets and Americans from competing for the privilege of
giving Egypt "unconditional aid."37
D.

The Aswan Dam Negotiations

Ihe plan for the building of the Aswan High Dam across
the Nile River was one of the main objectives of the reform

3^Kerr, op. cit., p. 12337ibid., p. 12*.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prograa which hao oeeo announced by the Revolutionary Com■end Council.

The Free Officers, under the leadership of

Qeeel Abdul Masser, rested their hopes for the achievement
of social democracy, which they had promised the Egyptian
people, on this gigantic scheme to harness the powers and
resources of the Mile,

They also hoped that the building

of the high Dam would help to solve the problem of the pov
erty of the Egyptian peasant by the addition of two million
feddana

3o

of land suitable for farming ano by the ten-fold

Increase of hydro-electric power.
in December, 1935, the United otates and the United
xwingdom haa offered ^rants-in-aia to Egypt for the purpose
of assisting in the construction of the high Dam and also
to counter the recent Soviet "penetration" into Egypt via
the Czech Arms Deal,

m addition, the world hank offered

to lend Egypt the amount of $200 million collars which,
when added to the American ana British grants-in-ald, was
supposed to equal one quarter of the total costs of building the Dam. 39
The Egyptian government delayed acceptance of the
West's offer of assistance for many reasons.

One reason

for this delay was that the Egyptians desired to receive
a guarantee of continued financial support from the Vest
38

A feddan is nearly equal to one acre.

39

Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 176.
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so that the project would not be halted for lack of money
before it was completed, which was supposed to take between
kQ
15 and 20 years to accomplish.
Another reason for the de
lay was that the Egyptian government needed some time to
reach an agreement with the government of the Sudan over
distribution of the water of the Nile and compensation for
any flooding of lands in the. Nubah Region oetween Egypt and
41
Sudan.
A third reason for Egypt1s delay was alleged by
the West to be a part of Nasser’s game of playing off the
West against the East in order to win the best bargain for
Egypt.
The Egyptian government, however, decided to accept
the offer from the West in July, 1956.

ivir. Ahmed Russein,

the United Arab Republic Ambassador to the United States,
who had been in Cairo for consultations, arrived in Washing
ton in mid-July, 1956, with his government’s acceptance
of the international Sank American-British offer of parti
cipation in the financing of the project.
The Aswan Dam negotiations constituted a crisis in
diplomacy between Egypt and the West which precipitated a
chain of events that served to draw the Soviet Union and
Egypt closer together.

The United States’ response to

Soviet and Arab engineers, however, made some changes
on the original plan whereby the construction of the Dam
would be completed in ten years* starting in i960 and
ending in July, 1970.
41
See Chapter IV B for discussion of that agreement.
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Nasser's friendly approach to the Vast following negotia
tions with Britain over the Suez was met with the announce
ment of the withdrawal of the U.S. share of the financing
for the Aswan Dam.

The other parties, Britain and the World

Bank, soon followed 3uit and withdrew their offers also.
Nasser's response to such obvious economic coercion
was to announce the nationalization of the Suez Canal Com
pany.

This bold action oy the Egyptian leader triggered the

1956 Suez War which saw Israeli troops invade Egypt on the
29th of October, followed the next day by British and French
forces sent, ostensibly, to restore the peace in such a
vital area.

Pressures by the Soviet union and the United

States, coupled with a condemnation of the attack by world
public opinion, led to the withdrawal of the invaaers.
The reaction of the Arab world to the West's withdrawal
of support for the Dam was one of anger ana explosive vio
lence.

The Arabs found the alleged reasons for the West's

retraction of its offer unacceptable, and a .cream of abuse
was directed against the United States which had initiated
the offer of assistance and now initiated the withdrawal
of that offer.
Among the reasons offered by the United States to justi
fy its withdrawal of assistance for the High Dam project was
the desire on the part of the Americans to bring to a halt
Nasser's playing off East against West and force a commit
ment from Egypt to the West.

Another reason given by the
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Americans was the alleged changed character of the Egyptian
economy which they claimed had resulted from the “mortgaging*
of a portion of the Egyptian cotton crop for the purchase of
Red arms.

In addition, Egypt's failure, at that time, to

reach an agreement with the other users of the Rile River
was considered justification for the retraction of the West's
42
offer of aid for the .Dam.
To counter the American claims, it was pointed out in
the Arab press that the United states' offer of participa
tion in the Aswan Dam had been made in December, 1955* while
the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal had been made three months
earlier in .September, 1955-

Ihe Egyptians argued chat as

late as July 9th, Er. Eugene .alack, President of the World
Bank, had reiterated in a letter to the Egyptian Minister
of Finance the assurance that "the World Bantc will finance
43
the Hi g h D am s c h e m e . ”

Dir. Bl ack also urged Hasser to

accept the offer of the World Bank.

The Egyptians also

argued rightly that Egypt was a good financial risk at that
time, as the very practical-minded World Bank Governors and
44
its President, Fir. Black, certified.
Arab leaders and newspapers began to ask many questions,
such as:

"Why doesn't Egypt deserve to get $400 million

42
Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 178.
43
ibid.
44
ibid.
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dollars, (which Israel hah bean granted by the United States
at that tiae) against the $900 oil lion dollars which Egypt
undertook to pay for the building of the greatest dam la
the world?”

They further argued that the haw, when com

pleted, would help combat poverty and stand as a dam in the
face of Communism in Egypt.

They also asked:

"Aren't these

the declared alma of the Unitea States?”
The Egyptians viewed the withdrawal of the United States
aa further evidence of Anglo-French pressure ana of Zionist
influence.

For the United States to play "uncle” to the

entire world and then become economy-minded toward Egypt
appeared to them to be an unfriendly gesture.

They knew

that

the $56 million dollars which had been promised to

them

wasa small portion of the American foreign aid pro-

gram

that year which totaled *4.5 billion collars.
The letter from the President of the World Bank to the

Minister of Finance, Abdel Moneim Ealssuny, which was dated
ten days before the United States withdrew its offer, in
validated the argument of the United States' government,
the Egyptians said.

The Egyptian government argued that

if Egypt was a good risic to the President of the world Bank
on the 9th of July, how could she not be a good risk for the
American government on the 19th of July?

They argued further

45ibid., p. 179.
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that Co— untnt interests and goals
tbe Dm
co—

m m

m o m

quietly served if

not built, since tbe senses would tend to be-

— re radical as tbeir economic situation became in

creasingly hopeless.
There re— ined the unanswered question of what had al
tered tbe attitude of Mr. Dulles to— ra the Dem.

The fact

that tbe 4— ricao .Secretary of State did not like the idea
of being put on the spot by the Egyptian acceptance of the
American offer at the same time that the Congress was in

dicating its opposition to the idea of American involvement
in the financing and construction cf the Aswan Dam was
alleged*^ to be a factor.
The former U.S. Ambassador to E^ypt, fir. Byroaae,
testifying before the Senate Joint Committee hearings on
the Eisenhower Doctrine, admitted that he had firct learned
about the cancellation of the American assistance for the
Dam, not from the State Department in Washington, but from
the Egyptian press in Cairo,

he states, "There may have

been — ny reasons untcnown to me why we could or should not
go ahead on the Aswan Dam."

Mr. Byroade added that the

withdraws 1 by the American government of aid for the Dam
was "a mistake."

He said further, "A project such as this

could be the difference as to whether there can be stability
47

ibid., p. 180.
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in Egypt no matter who is running the country twenty years
from now.
The Arabs further regarded the withdrawal of the Vest
from participation in the financial arrangements for the
High Dam as an attempt to overthrow President Gamal Abdul
Nasser, who was pursuing a policy of neutralism which dis
pleased the West.

It didn't take long for Nasser, angered

by the West's action which weakened the financial position
of the Egyptian government, to strike back.

He attacked the

United States government in a fiery speech which he gave on
July 24, 1956, on the occasion of the inauguration of a
new oil refinery in one of the suburbs of the Egyptian cap
ital.

The big strike, however, came on July 26, 1956, when

President Nasser announced to chanting crowds in Alexandria
the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and declared
that the money which previously had gone to London, Paris,
and Brussels, would now be used in the building of the
Aswan Dam.
E.

Emerging Soviet Support of Egyptian Foreign Policy

During the two years following the 1952 revolution, the
Free Officers were busy seeking allies as well as a philosophy
to support the revolution.

The philosophy was found in

Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 85th
Congress, 1st session, on S.C. Res. 19 and H.C. Res. 117
Part II, pp. 708-717.
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Nasser*s book entitled Egypt*a Liberation.

71
The Free Officers

believed that allies were to be found in the new era of good
and constructive relations with Britain and the Vest, based
on mutual understanding and free of domination, which be
gan with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of

1954.
The Free Officers were to find, however, that the West
would not support two concepts that they, the Free Officers,
believed in.

The first of these concepts was the contempla

tion of closer collaboration with the Soviet bloc.

The

second dealt with support of national liberation movements.

49

Immediately following the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement came
the Baghdad Fact.

This pact was to challenge these concepts

of collaboration with the Soviets and support for national
liberation movements and confused the Free Officers about
the motives of the West.

Nasser realized that conflict

with Britain and the West was inevitable if Arab countries
were to see freedom from foreign domination or influence.
The evidence suggested to the Arabs that, under such agree
ments as the Baghdad Pact, Arab countries would fall under
Western influence and perhaps under direct command if they
joined.

From that time on, Nasser was to follow a policy

he called "reaction to events."^0

49
50

As a result of Egypt’s

Little, op. cit., p. 217.
ibid.
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denunciation of the Baghdad Pact, and in spite of Egypt's
persecution of Communists and pursuing a conservative econ
omic policy, the door to cooperation between the Soviet
Union and Egypt was opened.
3y using the nreaction to events” policy, Passer
sought neutrality.

After the British troops were evacuated

from their positions in the Canal Zone, with the resultant
loss of strategic bases to the West, the hopes for the
Anglo-Bgyptian Agreement were not pursued, and hopes for
the success of the Baghdad Pact were slim.
in 1955 the soviets sou0ht entrance into the Arab
Worlo.

At that time, the situation was as follows!

first,

the Israeli threat became a reality when the West failed
to honor its pledge to guarantee the frontiers between

*

Israel and the neighboring Arab states; second, there was
growing fear in the Arab world of Western neo-colonialism
in the guise of the Baghdad Pact; and third, there was a
pressing need to develop the Egyptian economy.

The time was

ripe, and the Soviets responded by supporting the Arab posi
tion against the Baghdad Pact.

The sincerity of the Russians

was taken for granted because the pact was an alignment
51
against them.
in addition, their sincerity was not ques
tioned because the Soviet Union offered to arm the Arab
countries that opposed the Baghdad Pact.

51ibid., p. 218.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73
In truth, th» Soviets had nothing to loss sod every
thing to gala.

if the West resisted Arab nations lisa, the

situation became doubly favorable.

The dominant influence

of Egypt in the Arab world placeo her in the position of
prlaery importance to the Soviet Union.^ • ny aligning them
selves ulth the Arab nationalists, the Soviets hoped to
gain a diplomatic victory over the best.
Israeli raid in the Gaza atrip in 1955 created cir

cumstances which favored the soviets,

fhe raid pointed out

the weakness of the Egyptian Army and its lack of enough
modern weapons,

fhe Egyptian leaders were determined to

arm their forces, out oecause of the «est's position on
the Palestine question ana their unreasonable terms, Egypt's
traditional source of supply was sealed off.
Frustrated in his attempts to secure arms from the
West, Nasser turned to the j&astern oloc for the needed arms.
Since the Soviets had previously offered in January, 1955,
to arm any Arab country that opposed the Baghdad Pact,
coupled with the Soviet desire to establish a good relation
ship with Egypt in order to win a psychological victory over
the West and extend Soviet influence in the Middle East,
the Soviets were willing to arrange the sale of arms to
Egypt on terms which were acceptable to both countries.
The Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal of September, 1955, provided
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Egypt Mlth the allies It sought, Mlth the needed modern

ntpBM

aad

with

enough leverage to puraua a policy of non-allgnmeot.

The

A m

tilth uhlch to resist the I i m l l threat,

D N l also aided the development of the Egyptian econ

omy.

The terms of the Arms ueal provided the sale of Egyptian
cotton for repayment of the loan at prices higher than the

Meat Mould pay.

lo this May, the Soviets tleo a good por

tion of the Egyptian economy to toe has tern oloc.

ifcey Mere

aloed by the greatly reduced purcnases of Egyptian cotton
by Jiritein, who Mas oeveloplo0 a synthetic substitute for
cotton.
rtasser mss delighted to have a new market for Egyptian
cotton.

i'he monies received Mouia heip to fill the void

creates by the West's withdraMal from the AsMan uem project.
Soon the Soviets figured large in the Egyptian balance of
trade.

While in 1954 the soviet Union had only a snail frac

tion of Egyptian trade, oy 1957 that share Mas to locrease
about eleven times to Mhere the Soviet Union alone purchased
ooe fourth of the Egyptian

crop.

Surveying the situation Mhich existed during this period,
one can see the groMing Soviet involvement in the Middle East.
This involvement Mas made possible by many contributing fac
tors.

First, the Soviets came to the Middle East Mith clean

53 ibid., p. 219.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75
hands in comparison with the European powers with'their his
tory of domination, exploitation, and colonization, which
made Western motives suspect to the Arabs.

Second, there

was the list of American offers of aid with political or
military strings attached, which tended to confirm pre
existing nationalist suspicions that the United States
was nothing better than a replacement for the recently
ousted European imperialists.

54

If we add to this the factors which caused the rise
of Arab nationalism, one can see that the goals of the
nationalists coincided with those of the Soviets (i.e.,
the elimination of Western influence and dominant position
in the area).

Such a coincident goal reinforcea tne es

tablishment of strong relations between the United Arao
Republic and the Soviet Union.
■fhis coincidence of the goals of the two parties of
the relationship and their determination to dismantle Wes
tern influence from the Middle East made the "marriage"
both possible and convenient.

54
Fisher, Carol A. and Krinsky, Fred, Ftiddle East in
Crisis, (itfew York: Syracuse University Press, 1959J, p . 33.
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CHAPTER III
THE o U E Z CRISIS OF 1956

A.

The Conflict W i t h The West Over The Canal

E g y p t ana Br itain made a real effort to open a new
page of good will and bury the grievances of the past soon
after the seizure of power oy the Free Officers on the
of July,

1952-

isritain agreed to leave

23rd

the S udan in 1953

and to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone, a ccording to the terms
of the An glo-Egyptian Agreement of

1954.

Britain,

sought to retain other strategic positions,
tant of w hich was in Aden,

however,

the most impor

located at the southern entrance

of the Red S e a .
So on after the reestablishment of good relations be
tween Br itain and Egypt,
caused

things began to go wrong, which

the newly opened page of good relations,

the An gi o-Egyptian Agreement,

based on

to be closed.

A r a b politics were complicated

oy two forces:

anti-

B r i t i s h feeling w hic h later crystallized into anti-Israeli
and a nti-Western imperialism sentiment, and the division
of the Arab world into conservative kingdoms and pr ogres
sive republics.

The progressive regimes,

(i.e., republics,)

regarded Britain as the friend and protector of the tradi
tional regimes w ith w h i c h they were competing for the leader
ship of the Arab world.

New men suc h as the Free Officers

76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
in Egypt and other nationalists in thp A r a b countries
thought that Britain was siding w i t h the reactionaries in
the Arab world to suppress the progressive forces
to keep her influence ana interests

in order

in the area.

The Western powers, out of their desire to maintain
their oil interests and strategic positions in the Middle
East, attempted to create an alliance that would bring at
least some of the countries of the Middle Bast into a Wes
tern-controlled defense pact.
The Suez Canal was inseparably

linked wit h the supply

of oil for Western Europe and W orth America.

Oil was a

matter of critical si0 nificance for B ritain ana France.
In

1955* Continental Europe obtained 17 percent of her total

energy requirements from the Middle E as t e r n oil concessions,
and Britain obtained
the Middle East.

15 percent of her petroleum needs from

More importantly,

oil was used as a fuel

for machinery and processes that only petroleum could serve.
The need for oil was increasing rapidly, year after year.
We st ern Europe and Britain required

67 million metric tons

of oil in 1955* and it was estimated that by 1975*
need 310 million metric tons.
tioned above

they would

Included in the amounts m e n 

(87 million metric tons), were 27 million metric

tons of oil for Britain alone, and in addition to those
figures were

Books,

40 million metric tons for W o r th America, all

^Piner, Herman, Dulles Over Su ez (Chicago: Quadrangle
1964), p. 13.
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of which came through the Suez Canal.

2

One-half of the 75 percent of Europe's oil passed
through the Suez waterway, while the other 25 percent
reached the Mediterranean ports via the pipelines which
brought the oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

±f the tankers

were forced to travel from the oil fields to Europe around
the Cape of Good Hope, it would add a distance about five
times as great as the route through the Suez Canal.

Prior

to the Suez Crisis about a quarter of all British imports
and exports passed through the Suez Canal.

Every day from

forty to fifty ships crossed the waterway carrying onesixth of the cargoes of the entire world.-5
Ihe proposed pact was denounced by i\iasser, who suc
cessfully prevented any other Arab country from joining
the pact.

Haaio Cairo launched an extensive attack against

the West-sponsored pact, warning the Arao peoples from the
"neo-colonialism" and urging the Arao states to stay out
of the pact.

In the case of Jordan, which the British

Prime Minister, Mr. Anthony Eden, tried to persuade to
join the new pact, passer did not only succeed in prevent
ing her from joining the pact, but also pressured King
Hussein to dismiss and send home General Glub, the British
Officer who had been the commander-in-chief of the Arab

2ibid.
3ibid.
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Legion a lace the estaollshment of the Jordanian Arey.

The

good Hill that followed the Anglo-£gyptian Agreement of 195*
had vanished.
The West wanted to wrap up the entire Middle hast in
a defense alliance, out they were particularly interested
in enrolling xran, Turkey, and Pakistan, oecause of their
strategic locations on the southern frontiers of the Soviet
Union.

The British government urged her frlena, Iraq, under

the leadership of auri hssald, to join the pact.

This maue

Nscser very angry because Nuri ^ssaid was the leaoer of the
Arab reactionary forces which opposeo itasser and all that
he stood for.

On Pcoruary 24, 1934, xraq joined the alliance,

which became known as the oaghdad Tact,

with Turkey and xraq

in the Baghdad Pact, passer became concernea that there might
be a conspiracy oetween the Arao reactionary forces and
Britain against the progressive Arab forces.

The Arabs

saw Britain as wanting to come in through the window after
having been kictced out of the door.
The Baghdad Pact destroyed the new spirit of good will
which Egypt had felt towaro the west with the signing of the
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1934.

The Arab nationalists,

represented by Nasser, were determined that they wanted no
Arab country dragged into any pact otter than the Arab
Collective Security Pact, which was drawn up by the Council
of the Arab League in 1930 and became effective in 1933, when
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq rati
fied it.
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ItesMr's offer of friendship to the West by his ac

ceptance of Western financial assistance for the Aswan Dam
was soon met with a reply when Mr. Anthony Eden, Prime Minis
ter of Britain, described Nasser as na man who cannot be
trusted to keep an agreement...”

Mr. Eden remarked in addi

tion, BUe all know this is how fascist governmencs behave,
and we ail remember, only too well, what the cost can be in
_4
giving in to fascism.
The retraction on che part of the United states and the
United Kingdom of their offers to share in the financing of
che Aswan Dam project precipitated the nationalization of
the Suez Canal.

The Aswan Dam consticuted a large part of

the program of the new regime to raise the Egypcian standard
of living, and was considered to oe one of the main projects
of the social reform program which was one of the aims of the
Egyptian revolution.

The world Bank had ai30 announced its

readiness to lend Egypc $200 million which, when combined
with the Anglo-American offer, would make up one quarter of
the cost of the project.

However, when the Anglo-American

offer was withdrawn, the World Bank retracted its offer also.
The Arabs felt that the reasons given to justify the
retraction of financial assistance by the West were invalio.
The United States justified its withdrawal by saying that

it

B.B.C. Archives, cited in: Peter Calvocoressi,
Suez, Ten Years After (New York: Parthenon Books, 1966),
p. 35.
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developments in the Egyptian economy since the otter- was
made "have not been favorable to the success of the pro
ject."

They added, "The ability of Egypt to devote ade

quate resources

go

assure the project's success has become

more uncertain than at the time the offer was made."3

The

Arabs countered this argument by pointing out that the World
Bank considered the Egyptian economy sound enough to offer
$200 million and had reiterated its support in a letter to
the Egyptian i«Iinister of Finance ten days before the cancella
tion of the offer.0
President Nasser was in Brioni, Yugoslavia, meeting
with the other two leaders of the non-aligned nations, Mr.
Nehru and Marshall Tito, ac the time of the West's withdrawal
of assistance.

When he received the news of the retraction,

he returned home immediately.

On the 26th of July, 1956,

Nasser struck back at the West in his historic speech before
a huge audience in Alexandria in which he attacked imperial
ism ana announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal
7
Company.
In that speech, Nasser reminded his audience of the
long-term domination of the Arabs by the Western powers.

^Frankland, Noble, and King, Vera, eas., "Documents on
International Affairs," 1956 (London: Oxford University Press,
1959), PP. 69-70.
^See Chapter II D for further discussion of the Aswan
Dam Negotiations.
7

Until it was nationalized, the Suez Canal Company had
been an Egyptian Company with headquarters in Peris and 44$ of
its stock owned by the British Government. The 99 year lease
expired in i960.
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But, he added:
"Today— since our political freedom has been
achieved after the announcement of our prin
ciples, after our cooperation, and after the
establishment of a united national front of
all the sons of this people against imperial
ism, against despotism, against domination
and against foreign interference— they take
us into account. And they know that we are
a nation with self-esteem which can do what
it pleases. Today the Importance of Egypt
in the international field has grown and
the importance of the Arab nation in the
international field has grown and become
great.”8
Gamal Abdul Nasser reviewed recent Western-Egyptian
relations and pointed out that the West still sought the
opportunity to bring the Arab world and Egypt into a de9
»
fense alliance in which Egypt would oe "an appendage and
subordinate.”

He added that the Western powers, who had

exploited the Middle East for its oil, had provided Israel,
"a nation of one million,” (at that time), with greater
amounts of arms and economic assistance than it had to all
the Arab states combined.

Nasser also denounced the attempts

by the Uniteo States, Britain, and the World Bank to attach
conditions to their offer which would make Egypt again de
pendent on Western bankers.
10
self, Nasser declared.

"History will never repeat it-

p

Lilienthal, op cit., p. 60-61.
9
He is referring here to the Baghaaa Pact.
10
r,
Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 161.
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After reviewing all these events and denouncing the
Vest*a withdrawal of the assistance they bad voluntarily
offered to Egypt, Nasser announced that the Suez canal Com
pany, "a state within a state" was to be nationalized, and
that Egypt was to take control of the canal, which is the
"property of the Egyptian people."11

A compensation of

$210 million was to be paid to the company's shareholders.

12

Looking at the relations between Egypt and the Vest which
had been developing since the Ozech-Egyptian Arms Deal of
1955, it is easy to understand the West*3 withdrawal of
assistance for the Aswan high Dam, ana the reaction of Presi
dent Nasser in nationalizing the Suez Canal.
Many attempts were made to find a compromise between
the position of the An^lo-Ereneh demands for complete inter
national control over the canal and the Egyptian insistence
on its right to control the waterway which runs through her
territory.

The first Lonaon Suez Conference in August, 1956,

was attended by 22 nations which constituted the main users
of the Canal.

Only Greece and Egypt refused to attend the

conference.
The conference produced two plans.

One, submitted by

the head of the Indian delegation, Mr. Erishna Henon, called
for the establishment of an international advisory board with

1Xibld i,
12ibid.
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the actual operation of the canal remaining in Egyptian
hands.

The second plan was submitted by U.o. secretary

of dtate, John Foster Dulles, the head of the American dele
gation.

The Dulles plan provided for operation of the Suez

Canal oy an international board.
The Dulles pi£« von the majority of the votes, and a
five-man committee, headed by hobert Menzies, Prime Minis
ter of Australia, was sent to meet President passer and dis
cuss the plan with him.

passer rejected the plan for inter

national control over the canal because the Arabs aid not
want to replace the British control of the canal with "coll
ective" domination oy the Users Association.

The mission

returned with nothing accomplished.
France and Britain agreed on a pian of stern economic
measures against D ^ p t .

Non-hgyptian canal pilots were

called upon to quit their jobs, and Fir. Georges Picot, the
director of the Juez canal Company, "sent a message to 59
pilots offerin0 them two year's salary for not returning
to work."-13
,

There was an attempt to form a ouez Canal Users Associ
ation, SCUA, which would control pilots and collect tolls,
but this attempt also failed.

Nasser thought that the es

tablishment of a SCUA was aimed at the domination of Egypt
by a group of nations and this, to him, was not aoy different

13ibid., p. 185.
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from domination by one power.
B.

The Br itish-Prench-Israeli Attack On Egypt

Nasser's foreign policy during the years following
the seizure of power by the free Officers until the Buez
Crisis appears to have been mainly concerned with trying
to find arms for the poorly equipped Egyptian Army.

An

arms deal between Israel and Prance had been concluded in
1954 which made the Egyptians particularly anxious about
the defense of their country against the Israeli threat.
In addition, Israel had launched an attack against the
Egyptians in the Gaza strip, ana the Egyptians had suf
fered heavy casualties,

These incidents, particularly the

Gaza raid, caused the Egyptian leader to oe determined to
equip his army with moaern weapons; the Czech-Egyptian Arms
Deal was reached in 1955.
Antagonized by Nasser's purchase of arms from the
Communist bloc and his recognition of the People's Republic
of China in i4ay, 1956, John Poster Dulles, in the name of
the United Btates, withdrew the American offer of financial
assistance for the construction of the Aswan High Dam.
Nasser, angered by this act, which led to the withdrawal
of the British and World Bank offers, struck back at the
West by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company on July 26,
1956.

This series of incidents led to a premeditated and

massive military strike by Britain, Prance, and Israel against
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Egypt in October and November, 1958.

Britain and France

were determined not to let Nasser "get away with”

nation

alizing the Suez Canal.
France during this period was arming Israel with the
most modern and sophisticated weapons in her arsenal, in
cluding J4ystere II jet aircraft.

On the ocher hand, Egypt

was regarded by France as one of the main supporters of the
liberation forces in Algeria, fighting against the French
forces of occupation.

Nasser, in fact, made no secret of

Egyptian support for the Algerian revolution.

In an inter

view with Erskine Childers, Nasser was asked if it was true
that he was helping the Algerian reDeis.

he answered, "Yes.

Yes. From the beginning (in 1954) to the end of the revolu
tion (in 1962).n±5
The campaign by the Western maritime powers against the
nationalization of the 6oez Canal Company was focused against
Nasser himself.

That view was expressed by Mr. Anthony Eden,

then Prime Minister of Britain, when he argued that "a facil
ity of such vital interest to so many nations...could not be
left to the responsibility of a single state, certainly not
to a state run by a man like Nasser.

The West was un

willing to trust Egypt because it was Egypt headed by a strong
man ruler who was anti-Western imperialism in his view and

14
Cremeans, op. cit., p. 153.
15
Calvocoressl, op. cit., p. 37.
^Cremeans, op. cit., p. 152.
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policies.

There was almost no objection to Egypt's right as

a sovereign state under international law, to nationalize
17
the company, 1 especially when one considers that Egypt
intended to compensate the shareholders of the company in
the amount of $210 million dollars, the value of the shares
on the international stock, market on that day.

18

When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, he
was not driven by motives of socialist ideology, nor did he
do' it just for the sake of nationalizing the company, but
he did it for two important reasons:

first, he wanted the

Egyptian government to collect the revenues in order to
use them in helping to finance the High Dam; and, second,
he sought to arouse Arab nationalism against Western imper
ialism.

He and his advisors knew full well that their act

would arouse Western hostility.

They were almost sure that

France and Britain would use force to retain control over
the canal, but they were mildly optimistic about the role of
the United dtates.

They regarded the latter as less imper

ialist than the European powers, they estimated that American
leaders were unconvinced that using force would solve the
problem.

Most importantly, they reasoned, the United estates

was not ready or willing to risk war with the doviet Union.

17

The 99 Year concession would have expired in 1968,
and Egypt would have been able to nationalize the duez
Canal Company without payment.
18
Lilienthal, op. cit., p. l6l.
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For these reasons, the Egyptians felt that they might re
ceive some measure of support from the United States.
Frustrated by their failure to sabotage the function
ing of the canal and the failure of their attempts to re
gain control of the canal from Egypt, France and Britain de
cided on a path of direct military action.

With the cooper

ation of Israel, the European powers planned the invasion
and began building up their military forces in the jtediterranean, using x«lalta and Cyprus as their oases.
On October 29, 1S56, Israel, as part of a long-stand
ing dispute and series of raids, launched a two-pronged
attack against Egypt.

The British I'tediterranean fleet was

moved quickly from Fxalta toward Cyprus in order to be near
the battle field in the Suez.

The Israeli armored and para

troops bactced by French air cover thrust deep into the Sinai
Peninsula toward the Suez.

The announced objective of this

invasion of Egyptian territory was to crush the nests of
"feydayeen" or Palestinian commandos who were "harrassing"
Israeli border positions near the Gaza strip.

There had

been comparative quiet on this front for some weeks, so that
the Israeli attack came as a surprise.

It was later under

stood that this was the "preventive war" that Ben-Gurlon had
been talking about for some time, and now events had brought
him two strong allies who couid help him destroy his enemy.
The day following the attack, France and Britain issued
an ultimatum to the two active belligerents to withdraw their
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troops ton alias back from the Canal Zone so that the
Anglo-Pranch troops could occupy Port .Said, IsaaIlya, sod
other key positions in the Suez Canal Zone.

£he fact that

the Israeli forces were still far away from the Suez in
dicated that the An^lo-French ultimatum was in effect a
demand for E&rpt to withdraw more than a hundred miles,
while allowing Israeli forces to make further advances
into the Sinai Peninsula,
to accept ^he ultimatum.

E^ypt was *iven twelve hours
Gamal Abdel itasser rejected the

ultimatum in the name of E^ypt ana with the sacking of
Arab peoples,

ihe Arab rejection of the British-French

ultimatum was expected but it seems that the two European
powers were looking for an excuse to invade the Suez Canal
Zone.

When their terms were rejected, the oritish and

French announced that they were entering the Suez canal
Zone to "safeguard" passage throu&h the waterway ana to
"separate" the two fi^tin* armies.
Eden and riollet sent their British and French jet
bombers to bomb Cairo and Port 3aid in order to pave the
way for their invasion, which was made by the paratroopers
and Marines who occupied Port Said and ismailya.

This last

desperate attempt by the two European powers, aided by
Israel, failed to achieve its objectives, and one British
observer subsequently termed it "one of the most colossal
blunders ever committed in the history of the British nation.

^Wynn, op. cit., p. 184.
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The reasons for that failure Kill oe analyzed m

the follow

ing section.
C.

soviet Support of Egypt:
United Nations Support

soviet Threats and

The attack by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt,
which case to be Known as the Suez Campaign* contributed to
the trend that was developin', in Egypt's foreign policy.
This Invasion of Egypt and the subsequent drastic economic
pressures, in which the United states participated, proved
to be the last desperate attempt to bring revolutionary
Sgypt to accept the west's terms.

The invasion and the

economic pressures served to drive Egypt closer to the
.Soviet Union, which haa supported the Arabs against the
invaders.

It also servec to inflame Arab nationalism, and

this growing Arab identification with

his devolution gave

Gamal Aodul Nasser a 0reat political victory despite the
military reverses.
Throughout the entire Suez Crisis, from the time Presi
dent Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company until the
Canal was reopened again in ly57 under complete Egyptian
control, the Soviet Union was the only one of the great
powers that gave unwavering support to the Egyptian position.
Rie United States, in an attempt to force Egypt to relin
quish control of the Suez, had opposed the nationalization;
and following the Suez War, had joined Britain and France in
exerting economic pressure on Egypt,

however, the United
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States had helped to bring about the withdrawal of the in
vading forces from Egypt.
15xe day preceding the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt
and Israel, President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced that
the American government would stand by its repeated pledges
to assist the victims of any aggression in the troubled area.
He also announced that his government would bring the Suez
Crisis to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The

two European allies Ignored the United States' announcement,
issued their ultimatum, and when it was rejected Dy the
Egyptian government, went on with the invasion of Egypt by
- their fleets, and the bombing of the main cities, such as,
Cairo and Port Said.

The American Ambassadors in Paris and

London and fel-Aviv were instructea co confirm the statement
of the United States opposing the use of force "as an in_20
strument for the settlement of international disputes.
In the United Nations, the American Ambassador, Henry
Cabot Lodge, sought a resolution, S/3710, October 30, 1956,
which called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the Sinai peninsula and urged members of the world or
ganization not to give any Kind of assistance to Israel.
But the British and French delegations, as permanent mem
bers of the Security Council, applied their respective
countries' vetoes to the resolution and to a variation of

20

Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 190.
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the resolution proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

21

After the veto by Britain and France rendered the Sec
urity Council ineffective in dealing with the Suez Crisis,
Yugoslavia proposed that an emergency session of the United
Nations General Assembly be called under the provisions of
the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of 1950.

ihe American

government sent John Foster Dulles himself to adoress the
emergency session.

Dulles spoke on behalf of an American

draft resolution in which he noted the many violations of
the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements, and ooserved that
Israel a=ain hao disregarded them oy invaain^ Egyptian terri
tory, and that France and Britain were conducting military
operations a^aiost D^ypt, and that traffic through the Buez
Canal had been interrupted.
The resolution called for a ceasefire by ail parties
involved and a halt to the movement of arms and military
forces into the troubled area.

It also urged the parties

to recall the armistice a0reements ano promptly withdraw
all forces behind the armistice lines, aesist from raids
across them, ana scrupulously ODserve the agreements.
In addition, the resolution recommended that all parties
refrain from bringing military equipment into the area and
refrain from acts which would prevent or delay implementa
tion of this resolution.

Finally, it asked the Becretary

21ibid., p. 191.
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General to. observe and report compliance with the resolu
tion to the Security Council and the General Assembly for
00
such further appropriate actions as might be necessary.
This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by vote
of 64 to 5 with 6 abstentions.
against the resolution were:
Australia, and New Zealand.

The nations which voted
Britain, France, Israel,

The six abstaining were:

Portugal, South Africa, Belgium, Canada, Laos, anu the
Netherlands.
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly was
supplemented by a resolution moved by the Canadian dele
gation headed by Lester Pearson.

This resolution aimed at

preserving the ‘'prestige" -of the British, which he and his
government still respected.

The Canadian resolution estab

lished the United Nations Emergency r o r c e (UNEF) as foln - 23
lows:
"The General Assembly, bearing in mind the
urgent necessity of facilitating compliance
with the ceasefire resolution adopted by the
Assembly on 2 November 1956, Requests, as a
matter of priority, the Secretary General to
submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan
for the setting up, with the consent of the
nations concerned, of an emergency interna
tional United Nations force to secure and
supervise the cessation of hostilities in
accordance with all the terms of the afore
mentioned resolution."

22

O.R.G.A., November 3, 1956, A/3276, Annexes, p. 6 .

23

ibid.
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This resolution was adopted by a vote of 57 to 0, with the
abstention of the Soviet Bloc, Egypt, Israel, Australia,
New Za&aod, Britain, and France.

On November 4, the sec

retary General issued a final report for the suggested
24
UNEF, which was adopted by the General Assembly.
Britain i0norea the pressure from the United Nations
because it felt that the "United Nations" was not a world
government "and was subject to questions concerning its
authority."^

The war continued as the invading three

nations refused to comply with the ii.N. resolutions.
D.

Withdrawal of the xnvaders

On November 5th, however, when Britain and France re
jected the United Nations' request for a ceasefire, a soviet
note, signed oy Presmier bulgasin, was delivered to the two
governments.

The note sent to the French Premier read as

■* n
26
follows:
"The soviet government considers it necessary
to draw your attention to the aggressive war
being waged by Britain and France against
E^ypt, which has the most dangerous conse
quences for the cause of peace....In what
position would France have found herself if
she herself had been attacked by more power
ful states possessing every kind of modern

^ibia., November 6, 1956, A/3302, pp. 19-26.
^Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates {Commons),
cols. 1449-51.

26

Pravda, November 6, 1956 (as quoted in Current Digest
of Soviet Press.)
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destructive m m poos? And there are countries
which non... could have used other Means, such
as rockets...* Me ere fully determined to crush
the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle
East through the use of force. Me hope at this
critical sonant you will display due prudence
and dra* the corresponding conclusions from
this."
Five days following the threat to ooaoard the two aggressor
countries with long-range missiles, the Soviet Union threat
ened to send .Soviet volunteers to the war zone to help the
Egyptian people defend their country,
Pravda. Noveaoer 11, 195b, stated:

The statement in

"The .Soviet authorities

will not hinoer .soviet citizen volunteers who wished to de
part for .agypt to fight in her defense."2^
There can oe no douot that these tnreats were an im
portant factor, which forceo the invaders to accept a cease
fire and later withdraw from the occupied points in the Canal
Zone, although they do not seem to be the only factors.
There are some writers who believe that the soviet threats
were "by no means the compelling factor in the decision to
28
withdraw."
The ooviet threats, however, were taken by the
Americans with "deaoly seriousness,” and the ultimatum pro
duced a night of "extreme tension*2^ in Washington.
The most important consideration, however, was the effect
these Soviet moves had on Egypt.

Many Egyptians and other

28
Strausz-ilupe, et.al., Protracted Conflict (New York:
Harper, 1959), p. I08.
29
The New York Times. November 7, 1956, p. 35.
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Arabs were convinced that the threat to bombard London and
Paris with long-range Soviet missiles was the factor that
compelled France and Britain to accept the ceasefire called
for by the United Nations General Assembly io its emergency
session.

Borne writers think chat "this belief is still

widespread.

„30

The New Yor*. rimes declared that the Soviet Un ion had
emerged from the Buez Crisis as the dominant power in the
Middle Bast.

The Times on November 14, 1956, analyzed the

situation as follows:

"...the Soviet Union has w o n a great

victory.... Regardless of the outcome of the immediate c o n 
troversy .. .the Soviet leaders have staked out a new position
in the Middle Bast that outflankcs the W es ter n Eu r o p e a n oil
supplies and the Baghdad P a c t ."^1

World opinion, aided by the inflexible attitude of the
Eisenhower-Dulles government, also exerted pressure on the
invaders, the result of which forced the invading countries
to accept the ceasefire called for by the United Nations.
The Secretary General, Dag Haramerskjold, maneuvered
the withdrawal of the British and French forces from the
Suez Canal positions whichTthey occupied, mainly, Port Said
and Fort Fuad.

The withdrawal proceeded under the supervision

30

MacKintosh, J. M., Strate^cy and Tactics of Soviet
Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962),
p. 169.
31

The New York Times, November 14, 1956, p. 1.
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of the UNEF commanded by General Burns, Chief of Btaff of
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
Hie Egyptian Civil ana Military authorities moved in
and took over their previous positions.

Seven weeks after

the invasion began, the last of the French and British forces
—i

left Egyptian soil (December 22, 1956)."*

r\

The secretary Gen

eral made it clear that she function of che UNEF was "to
monitor the witharawals of invacing forces ano not to in
duce the Nasser government to enter into negotiations for
■'
a final settlement of the Suez Canal or Palestine questions.
With the uritish and French forces withdrawn, the bulk
of the UNEF moved to the oinai desert to monitor the with
drawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory.
The Israelis, however, were unwilling to relinquish the
newly won territory.

The Israeli attac*. on Egypt had been

"merely implementation of avowed Zionist expansionism."^
David Ben-Gurion, then Prime Minister of Israel, in aaaressing the Israeli Enesset (Parliament), declared that he "would
never relinquish the newly gained territory and never consent
that a foreign force, no matter how called, ta«ce up positions
„35
in any area held by Israel..
After six United Nations resolutions demanding uncon
ditional withdrawal, however, the first of which dated as
32

Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 194.

33ibid., pp. 194-5.

^ibid.
35ioid.# p. 195*
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far bade as November 2, 1956, aad American pressure which
threatened to cut off aid, the Israeli forces left Egypt
and the Gaza Strip on March 4, 1957.

Once more the Strip

came under Egyptian control.
The cause of the West was dealt a severe blow oy the
defiance of Britain and France of the United Nations Char
ter and their attack on a small and comparatively weak:
nation, using Israel as a spearhead.
Western pressures on Egypt aid not end with the with
drawal of the invaders, rather it took the form of econ
omic pressure and ooycotts.

Since the United States haa

opposed the invasion, it hoped that at a later date a
rapprochement in American-Egyptian relations could oe
achieved.

But, the unqualified Soviet support for Egypt

was not matched in any way oy the American government, and
the United otates joined her European allies in putting
economic pressure on Egypt, especially durin6 the critical
period that followed the Suez Campaign.

The three western

powers wished to achieve their aim to overthrow .Nasser and
take control of the Suez Canal out of Egypt's hands by
means of economic and political pressures after the mili
tary action failed to achieve their purposes.
Egyptian assets were frozen by. Britain, France, and
the United States, and a partial boycott was imposed .
by France and Britain.

They halted their purchases of

Egyptian cotton, and the American government refused to
sell badly needed wheat to Egypt.

Additional measures
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taken by the United States included a refusal to issue pass
ports to American* tourists who wished to visit the United
Arab Republic.

And when Vice-President Richard *4. Hixon

made his trip through the i4iddie East in i*iarch, 1957, he
avoided Egypt intentionally.^
The Soviet Union came to the aid of Egypt' when Egypt
desperately needea help.

The Soviet Union and the Eastern

bloc purchased ouch of the cotton which formerly went to
the West, and supplied Egypt with wheat and other needed
37
foods.
The need for food imports for a country such
as Egypt was shown in a 1963 survey maae by the United
Nations in which it was deciarea that i^gypt produced only
half of its food requirements.

The report aooeo that

"food aid...had oecome a vital form of economic assistance."3°
In a situation of critical shortages of fooa, the United
States withheld authorization for the CARE school lunch
program.
Commenting on the cancellation of the food program,
Senator Hubert Humphrey (D. Minn.) declared, after his
talks with President Hasser:

"We are losing ground with

the people of £gypt...oy ignoring the Egyptian people's human
needs.
36

The Mew York Times, i4arch 17, 1957, vol. IV, p. 5 .

37wheelock, op. cit., p. 250.
Dept, of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N. World
Economic Survey, 1963* £>art H (hew York: U.H.,
p. 5b
Hews and World Report. "ISIks with U.S. Senators,"
nay 17* 1957, p. 3d.
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The events that were taking place In Poland and Hungary
were overshadowed by the Suez War in Egypt and the Arab
countries.

The suppression of the Hungarian rebellion by

the Soviet tanks aid not affect the favorable image of the
Husslans which the Arabs neid.

The ooviet' stanc by the

Arabs against the western imperialists enhanced their ima^e
in the area despite their actions in Hungary and Poland.
When the votes were lateen .n the United nations for condemn
ing the actions ta*en by the soviet Union in hungary, the
delegation of E^ypt aostalnec.

President Ga;aaiAbdui i^sser

later 0ave an explanation for .a-ypt's attitude oy saying:
"E^ypt abstained out or =ratituce for the ooviet Union's
40
position on Suez."
Uurin= the period of pressure exertec against Egypt
and Hasser by the Western powers, the Egyptian leader and
the Egyptian people came to appreciate the ooviet Union's
offer of assistance, especially during the critical periods.
The gratitude of the Arau people was expressed oy President
hasser when he said:

"When our petrol ran short during the

Suez struggle, Russia supplied it.

Our people are grateful
_4i
to Russia for coming to help us in our hour of crisis.
The Soviet Union, by its unqualified support of the

Egyptian and Arab cause, was regarded by the Egyptians and
5®
As quoted in Wheeloc«c, op. cit., p. 191.
41
Cited in "Current Events," International Affairs
Moscow: Vol. viii#8 , August, 1957), p. 145.
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their brethren in other Arab countries ana their allies in
Asia and Africa* as the protector and supporter of weak ana
small nations.
The Soviet Union benefited greatly from the actions of
the Western powers.

The invaders did not achieve their ob

jectives, first of regaining control of the ouez Canal, and
second, of overthrowing the Nasser government.

President

G. A. juasser emerged from the crisis stronger and more pop
ular with the .Egyptian masses, the Arab peoples, ana amon^
his African and Asian friends.
The Suez Crisis and its outcome, (i.e., the withdrawal
of the attacking, nations, without, the achievement of their
goals to overthrow Nasser and ta*.e control of the Canal
from Egypt), stren^theneo and benefited the ooviet-Arao re
lations.

The Soviets had ~iven their support in the United

Nations and by means of threats sent to oritain and France,
to the Arab cause, which greatly enhanced the Soviet pres
tige in the Middle East.
Egypt now had undeniable control of the Suez Canal.
The threat of Western influence-had been overcome in Egypt,
and the Israeli invasion had been halted.
tained her territories and independence.

Thus, Egypt main
The Soviets bene

fited by eliminating the spread of Western influence,

in

this way, the Soviets demonstrated their friendship for the
Arab people while the West once more demonstrated its colonial
nature.
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CHAPTER XV
SOVIET-UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
RELATIONS AFTER THE SUEZ WAR
The unqualified support given to the United Arab Re
public by the Soviet Union during and after the Suez crisis
paved the way for more cooperation between the two parties*
and encouraged the already existing mistrust between the
United Arab Republic and the West.

The economic and other

kinds of pressures exerted by the former European colonial
powers, Britain and France, joined by the United States,
made the achievement of strong relations between the United
Arab Republic and the Soviet Union easier.
This period of the relations between the two parties
was marked by cooperation generally, although there was a
period of strain in the relations which showed the lac* of
ideological foundations for a strong relationship.

But it

seems as if both the Egyptians and the soviets decided that
their respective national interests demanded that they main
tain good relations and shelve their ideological differences.
A.

Economic and Cultural Aid Programs

The Soviet Union under Khrushchev supplemented its pro
paganda attacks against the economic assistance programs
of the West with a growing foreign assistance program of its
own.

The foundations of Soviet foreign policy toward non

communist countries guided the Soviets during the Khrushchev

102
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era and continued into the 1 9 6 0 *3 . A new theory of "peace
ful co-existence of differing social systems" was enunciated
which shifted the emphasis from the military to more flexible
political and economic methods for achieving Soviet foreign
policy goals.

In addition, the Soviets aimed to isolate

world capitalism by recruiting the Third World, (i.e. the
colonial, semi-eoionial, and formerly colonial peoples) into
the ranks of world socialism.
This new pattern for dealing with the developing coun
tries was confirmed by the 20th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in Feoruary, 1956.

ITae Congress

revised the Party’s policies toward the national oourgeoisie.
The ideas that prevailed in the Congress were that the bour
geoisie of Kgypt, or any country, “which builds up its own
national economy and strengthens and develops the StateCapitalist sector"1 fulfills a progressive function.
Nikita Khrushchev, Party oecretary and Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, in his report to the Central Commitee
re-evaluated the policies of the national bourgeoisie. He
m
_2
said that a vast zone of peace" was emerging in the world.
The "peace zone" consisted of the newly emerging nations
and the socialist countries.

The common interest of them

^Baiabushevieh,
v -> cited in: W. W. Kulski, Peace
ful Co-existence (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959), p. 126.
o
Grulious, Leo, Current Soviet Policies: II, p. 33.
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all Mas anti-western imperialism.

Thus, the .Soviet Union

identified itself with these emerging peoples, with their
nationalistic feelings, and in our concern here with Arab
Nationalism.

The Soviet Union identified itself with Arab

nationalism's anti-western imperialism.
The new policies proposed by Khrushchev ana adopted
by the Congress of the Communist Tarty may be illustrated
3
by quoting from parts of Khrushchev's speech:
"The new perioc in world history, predicted
by Lenin, when the people of the East play
an active part in deciding the destinies of
the whole world and have oecome a new and
mignty factor in international relations,
has arrived.... These countries, although
they do not belong to the socialist world
system, can draw on its achievements in
building an independent national economy
and in raising their peoples' livin^ stand
ards. Today they need not go begging their
former oppressors for modern equipments.
They can get it in the socialist countries,
free from any political or military obliga
tions ."
The Congress, having heard Khruschev's report- adopted
a resolution supporting ana approving the recent establish
ment of good and friendly relations with Egypt and other
countries.
The Russians recognized the aspirations of the peoples
of the emerging nations in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America
with new forms of political and economic policies toward
o
Grulious, Leo, (ea.) Current Soviet Policies: 11,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 33.
^ibid., p. 190.
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them.

The moat ambitious aid programs to non-communist

countries were those ^iven to xndia and the United Arab
Republic.

These programs actually began in 1955 with the

Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal and wish the Increase of exchanges
of various delegations, officials, and cultural groups'.

The

cultural programs included the showin* of Egyptian films in
the .Soviet Union for the first time.

Also a tour of Egypt

was made by the oeryozka Dance ensemble in March, and an
exhibit of Egyptian books was shown at Lenin Library in
Moscow in .September,

in October there was an evening of

Egyptian Arts and Literature.3

in July, 1956, an agreement

concerning the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
6
.
was signed between the two countries, wnereoy Egypt woujlq
obtain her first nuclear reactor, which was to be ouilt
at Anshas.
Three major agreements constituted the oasis for the
great economic aid given by the Soviets to the United Arab
Republic.

These three agreements are as follows:

1 . An agreement providing Soviet aid to the United
Arab Republic for the purposes of industrializa
tion, including credits which totaled $175
million.
This major technical and economic cooperation program was
reached when Fieid-Marsha11 Amer visited Moscow in November,

^Pravda, October 25, 1956, p. 4.

(Current Digest).

6

ibid., Juxy 15, 195&, p. 5-
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1957*

7
2.

ana the agreement was signed on January 29, 1958.

8
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An agreement on Soviet aid for the first stage
of the construction of Aswan High Dam, provid
ing Soviet credits of $100 million to the United
Arab Republic.

This agreement was arrived at and signed on December 27, 1958.
3.

An agreement on Soviet aid for the implementa
tion of the second stage of the Aswan Dam and
the construction of a high-power hydroelectric
station with credits totaling another $100
million.
^
10
This third agreement was signed on August 26, i960.
All of the above-mentioned agreements were basea on
comparatively long-term loans which were to be repaid in
twelve years, starting from the completion of the projects
at two and a half percent interest.'1'1

The most important

feature of these agreements wnich have become a standard
for Soviet dealings with the emerging nations of the third
world, is the use of Soviet credits instead of grants.
These newly independent nations are proud and sensitive,
preferring to buy their commodities or get loans on easy

7

The New York Times, November 20, 1957, p. 1.

a

Remba, Odea, "Public Finance and Private Enterprise
in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. X (1959),
p. 389.
^Goldman, Marshall 1., Soviet Roreign Aid, (hew York:
F. A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), P. 85^ibid., p. 66.
^^Ibid., p. 67 .
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terms, rather than to receive "charity."

107
The Soviets, for

their part, benefited by securing a steady flow of key com
modities needed to support the growing demands of Russian
factories.
Soviet aid to industry, as agreement number one states
above, helped to create an economic sector owned by the
State.

Egypt invested the soviet aid in heavy industry.

This state of affairs had a great influence on the industrial
development of the United Arao republic, since it encouraged
the expansion of the public sector of the economy, and also
was an important factor in determining the form of state
economic planning.

The soviet union, as the agreement pro

vided, would supply the machinery and most of the raw mat
erials which were required for the estaolishment of the fac
tories and projects.

The Russians would also offer tech

nical assistance in planning and constructin0 the plants.
■Six major industrial plants were completed with soviet
13
assistance. These six are:
1.

A 200,000 ton capacity steel plant at Helwan;

2.

Two oil-product processing plants at Alexandria
and Suez producing one million tens;

3.

A large shipyard constructed at Alexandria;

4.

A petro-chemieal plant of 280,000 tons productive
capacity at Aswan;

3.

An antibiotics plant.

12:

Berliner, Joseph S., Soviet Economic Aio,(Rew York,
P.. S. Prager, 1958,)p. 147.
13
Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, pp. 74-75.
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Further demonstrations of this particular part of
Soviet policy during the second half of 195$ include an
agreement providing for direct airline service between the
14
ic
two countries,
an Egyptian film festival in iMoscow, 3 and
visits to the Soviet Union by Egyptian jurists, educators,
ana agricultural experts.
Another agreement providing a Soviet loan of $277
million was announced on May 24, 1964, by Mr. Khrushchev
during his visit to the United Arab Republic,

This loan,

some economists believed, would finance about ten per cent
of the Second Five Year Plan for the Uniced Arab Republic.
The loan was a short-term one, to be repaid within five
years from delivery.

16

It appears that this agreement,

providing for the $277 million loan for industrial plans,
was a supplement for the agreement announced in uanuary,
17
1958, which,was only partly fulfilled.
The Soviet Premier
also announced a gift of

180tractors and abouc 300 farm

trucks for a state-owned

farm of 10,000 feddan upon his visit

to the Province of Liberation
In June, 1965, at a

(Modirist El-tahrir).

time when food reserves in the

United Arab Republic were at a low point, the Johnson Ad
ministration decided to re-evaluate its wheat-loan policy.

^Pravda, September 12, 1958, p. 6 . (Current digest)
1^ibid., November 18, 1958, p. 6 . (Current digest)
Goldman, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
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The Soviets* seizing the opportunity provided by the United
States* withdrawal of its wheat loans to Egypt, decided to
supply the United Arab Republic with 300*000 tons of wheat
as a loan.

This wheat* worth $21 million* was diverted

on the high seas where the Russians were bringing it from

Canada* and sent to aid the Egyptians.

Such a dramatic

move made a great Impression on the nations of the third
world.
Such Soviet-style assistance to Egypt in the form
of loans and credits for Soviet made materiel was benefi
cial not only to the economies of both nations* but also
to the sense of national pride.

This type of assistance

preserved Egypt’s sense of pride and dignity and had a con
siderable impact on other nations of the third world.

These

other nations* acutely sensitive to anything which seemed
like charity* also needed ana wanted technical and economic
assistance on generous terms* but terms which preserved
their dignity and sense of national pride.

Of significant

importance for both its effect on the Egyptian economy and
its impact on the nations of the third world was the offer
of Russian aid to build the Aswan Dam to which we now turn.

B.

The Aswan Dam Agreement and Its Implications

The Russians first indicated that they might finance
the High Dam in October* 1955.

Later* on December 17> 1955*

Soviet Ambassador Solod announced that his country would
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participate la financing the Dam, "unless contrary stipula
tions in Egypt's accord with, the western powers excludes
«l8
us specifically.
This occurred while negotiations be
tween Egypt and the Vest were 6oing on.

The Americans,

especially, were very concerned about Egypt's ability to
repay the loans.

After a series of maneuvers by both sides,

the United States withdrew its offer, and the United Xin,-19
dom and the World Bank followed suit.
The United Arab
Republic felt insulted, particularly about the way the
offer was withdrawn and retaliated by nationalizing the
Suez Canal Company.

This decision led to the tripartite

invasion of Egypt by Britain, Prance, and Israel in October
and .November, 1956.
After the West had withdrawn its offer, the question
was:

would the soviets accept the challenge, or were they

bluffing?
In September, 1950, Nuritcin A. wukhitdinov, Chairman
of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Council of Nation
alities of the Supreme Soviet and a member of the Presidium,
visited Cairo.

Subsequent events suggest that his visit

was concerned with Soviet participation in the financing
of the Aswan Dam, although no official mention was made.

isibid.,

p. 64

19,
(Note: For further discussion, refer to the
previous discussion in Chapter II.)
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The following eonth, October, 1938, Field Marshall Abdul
riakia Aaer, then Minister of Defense and Vice-President
of the United Arab Republic, visited Moscow.

During a re

ception for Marshall Amer, Premier Khrushchev announced the
Soviet participation in the financing and building of the
High Dam.

The soviet Union agreed to loan the United Arab

Republic $100 million toward construction of the first
stage of the Aswan Dam.

The loan was to be repaid in twelve

equal installments at 2.3 percent interest over a period of
twelve years commencing with the completion of the first
stage.

The Soviet Union further agreed to accept Egyptian

commodities as repayment for the loan.
Construction on the Aswan Dam was preceded by a long
period of negotiations between the Egyptian and the Sudanese
governments.

Although the Dam was to be built about two

hundred miles inside Egyptian territory, the resevoir which
would be created would extend about one hundred miles inside
the Sudan, submerging the Nubian Sudan, and necessitating
the evacuation of the population and its resettlement else
where.

Therefore, an agreement between the Egyptian and

Sudanese governments dealing with the Aswan Dam was necessary.
There had been an agreement in 1929 dealing with the
distribution of the waters of the Rile River which had to
be re-negotiated.

The matter of allocation of the waters

and also compensation to the Nubians for the loss of their
properties, were the subjects of the first negotiations between
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the two governments which had begun as early as 1954•

At

that time, however, the Sudanese were annoyed by the fact
that the Egyptian government had allocated money for the
project before consulting with the Sudanese.

20

The negotiations continued without success; things
appeared to be deadlocked.

The Egyptian government decided

to unleash a campaign oy the mass media against the govern
ment of Abdullah Khalil.

Khalil responded by engineering

a coup d ^ t a t which he thought would strengthen his hold on
the government and place his followers in *ey positions.
The coup had the opposit results, however.

General Abboud

and his folowers in the Army too* over with an orderly
21
seizure of power in Novemoer, 1956.
-

The new rulers of the Sudan were radical officers who
were linked with their Egyptian friends by oonas forged dur
ing their service together when the ouaan was under AngloEgyptian rule prior to the British evacuation of the Sudan
in 1953.

The new Sudanese government was immediately recog

nized by the Egyptians, and in return, the oudanese sent a
message to Nasser declaring that the "Sudan was not opposed
22
in principle to the High Dam scheme."
While not opposing the High Dam project, the new Sudanese

20

Little,op. cit., Hiah Dam at Aswan, p. 63.

21ibid., p. 64.
22ibid., pp. 64-65.
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government was Intent on securing enough water for the
Sudan.

Negotiations proceeded under more favorable condi

tions for several months, and a final agreement was reached
between the two countries on November 6, 1959; whereby the
United Arab Republic would take 72 milliards of cubic yards
of water and the Sudan would take 24 milliards of the water
of the Nile.

The two countries agreed to share the loss

of 13 milliards of cubic yards of water by evaporation.
The United Arab Republic agreeo to pay 15 million Egyptian
pounds to the Sudanese government for resettlement of the
Nubians whose lands and property would oe covered Dy the
water accumulating from the Aswan Dam.
At the end of January, I960, a new agreement was signed
whereby the Soviet Union agreed to loan the United Arab Re
public $225 million for the second and third stages of the
project.
The final arrangement for the financing of the second
and third stages of the Aswan Dam was arranged for and signed
on August 27; I960.

According to this final arrangement,
24
the High Dam was to be financed as follows:
Total Cost
First Stage
Second and Third Stages

23
24

Soviet Portion

$614,000,000

$100,000,000

551;000,000
$1,165,000,000

225.000.000
$325,000,000

ibid., p. 65.
Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, pp. 66-67.
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The Technobrom Export Organization was empowered by
the Soviet government to complete the Soviet share of the
project.

The Egyptian authority gave to the Technobrom

people the design for the Dam which had been made in the
1950’s by the German Hochtief-Dortmund Combine.

25

The de

sign had been approved by an International board of con
sultants, and despite some modifications by the Russians,
was the fundamental design of the prefect.
The Aswan Dam agreement (between the United Arab Republic
and the Soviet Union) constituted a marriage of convenience.
The Russians were only willing to aid in the building of the
Dam if their engineers and equipment were to be used to ensure success in their portion of the project.
The agreement had political as well as economic impli
cations.

Erora the political standpoint, the agreement was

interpreted Dy the West as a commitment by i»asser to stake
the future development of Egypt on Soviet rather than Western
assistance.

The effect upon the strained Egyptian-Western

relations is obvious.

In fact, the Dam had long been con

sidered the key to the country’s future, the Aladdin’s lamp
of Egypt's development agriculturally and industrially.
To be sure, the success of Soviet foreign aid to the
United Arab Republic was associated to a large extent with
the negotiations and work on the High Dam.
25

Little, op. cit., High Dam at Aswan, p. 218.
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This project points out the lack of Western insight
into the area of priorities to the Arab World.

Thus, when

the West turned their backs to Esypt, they lost their chance
by default by withdrawing their offers of assistance.

26

The

situation was summed up by the normally pro-Western news
paper, An hahar, published in Beirut, in which the follow
ing comment was made "...the boviet union had taken the
place of the West on the banks of the wile to help .«asser
at long last to build the pyramid of the twentieth century...."
The newspaper went on to show that the ham and its i m p o r 
tance as "—

a powerful ana probably final dam to western

influence, not only in the Arao wcrio, out in the wnole of
Asia ana Africa..."^
In addition, the a=reement meant a further *^'ptian
commitment to trade with tne Soviet bloc during tne perioo
commencing in the late 1 ^ 0 's and extenaing into the 1970's.
This is oue to the fact that repayment of the loans is to
be made in Egyptian commodities, while the loan itself was
in terms of credits extended by the Soviets to the Egyptians.
There are many economic implications and advantages to
the High Dam.

Besides the increase of the irrigated areas

by some 25 percent, the production of ten billion £ b'H of
electricity annually, it also has very important advantages.

26

The New York Times, October 25, 1956, p. 1.

27
Little, op. cit.
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1X6
Xfcerc Kill be a
able for each

certainty about the amount of water avail

crop Curing summer or winter.

This

will enable

the agricultural planners to plan the products of the land
in proportion to the needs of the people and for the oest
export opportunities,
able to allocate

The Unitea Arab hepuoiic will be

a million acres of land to rice and., there

by reduce its dependence on cotton, tne value of which has
oeclined since the advent ox* synthetic floers.
Another important economic advantage to the hi^h Dam
will be that of regulating and controlling the flooding of
the M l e which used to Inflict great damage on Egyptian
villages and agriculture,

aowever, with the nigh Dam

(Essadc El-Aali) the wild nile will oe tamec ano the money
and manpower that used to oe allocated for guarding the
river and strengthening its bantcs will not be necessary and
can be allocated to otner productive projects.
it is hoped that the high Dam, when completed and all
the projects related to it, will increase the Egyptian
national income by about $500 million, a sum which, if
achieved, will be enough to pay for the Dam and the word
2Q
associated with it in two years' time. 7
The new resources which the Dam wilx produce will bene
fit the Egyptian economy, although that will depend to a

2d
Little, op. cit., p. 225.
^ibid., p. 218.
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large extent on the wise planning of industrial development.
The new resources will help raise the standard of living of
the Egyptian people, one of the important aims of the July
23rd Revolution.
The Egyptian Revolution was staged against a stagnant
economy as well as a reactionary ruling class, ana Nasser
and his associates realized from the outset that the im
provement of the lot of the masses requires not only the
redistribution of the wealth of the country, but also a
substantial increase in national production.

Agriculture

alone cannot achieve the immense increase in national in
come needed to improve conditions for the masses, and,
therefore, industrialization is regarded as the crucial
objective.

The expansion of industry depends, in turn, on

the creation of new sources of power, and the High Dam at
Aswan is part of this national drive to develop power sources
30
to support industrialization.
The setbacks suffered by the relationship between the
United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union did not affect
the construction and completion of the Dam.

The finished

Dam stands as a symbol of Arab determination and soviet
persistance to build the Dam in spite of all the obstacles.
The Aswan High Dam is now practically completed with
the exception of some decoration wor*.

30

It is planned to be

ibid., p. 226.
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completed and celebrated by July, 1970.

31

The celebration

of completing the building of the greatest Dam in the world
will coincide with the celebration of the eighteenth anni
versary of the Egyptian revolution that brought President
Gamal Abdel Nasser to power on the 23rd of July, 1952.
C.

Military Aid

32

Programs

The Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal of September,

1955* was

the step that opened the way to cooperation in military
fields between the United A ra b Republic and the Soviet
Union.

The soviet Union ana the Soviet bloc agreed to sell

different kinds of military equipment and arms on short term
credits.

The Soviets, however,

never made any grants or

long-term loans for the purchase of military equipment by
the United Arao Republic.
ments

The E ast e r n bloc accepted p a y 

in E gy p t i a n rice and cotton, w h i c h they sometimes r e 

sold in western markets for cash, rather than demanding p a y 
ment in dollars or gold w h i ch is "hard currency" for the
•

United Arab Republic and in short supply in Egypt.

33

•31

It was reported in the U.S. Mews ana World Report
of December, 1969, that eight of the twelve turbines which
will constitute the hydro-electric power station on the
Dam, are installed and producing three billion KWH of
electricity feeding Egypt all the way from Aswan in the
south to Cairo and Alexandria in the north. The other
four will be installed before July, 197032».s. News and World Report, December, 1969, p. 66.
For discussion of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, see
Chapter II D.
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Cooperation ana friendship expanded between the United Arab
Republic and the Soviet,Union in the years following the
Arms Deal.
It was the first in a series of steps which led to the
deterioration of relations between the United Arab Republic
and the West,

The Soviets wasted no time discrediting the

Western powers, presenting itself as a friend of the oppress
ed

against the oppressors, and enhancing its own position

in the Middle East,

The Arms Deal served soviet foreign

policy and economic interests while meeting Egyptian nationax
interest and domestic needs.
During the period of strain in the relations between
the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union, which occurred
in 1959-61, the United Arab Republic continued to receive
military hardware from the soviet bloc, although she was
not aole to ootain the most modern weapons.
The year 1962 brought a continuance of the arms race
between Egypt ana Israel which continued in 1963.

The United

Arab Republic was reported to have purchased additional arms
for the purpose of replacing the old MIG-19 with new MIG-21
jet Tighters.

Israel responded by purchasing a number of
34
HAWK surface-to-air missiles.
The arms race continued between the United Arab Republic
and Israel. During 1963* it was thought that about 500
34

The New York Times. Sept. 27, 1962, p. 1.
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Europeans, most of them Vest Germans, were developing rockets
35
and military aircraft for the United Arab Republe.
Per
haps this number is exaggerated.

As it was reported in

The Mew York Times, the reason for Egypt's employment of
these technicians to develop her defense system was because
she wanted to reduce her "almost total reliance on the
Soviets for military equipment."^
it was also reported that the United Arab itepuolic had
obtained a numoer of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles from the
Soviet Union, which were installed in the ouez Canal area.

37

Following the 1964 ehan0e of leadership in ^ioscow with
the ousting of Nikita Ehrushchev and his replacement oy
Leonid Srezhnev as secretary General and Alexis Eosygin
as Premier, the soviets appeared to be a little more cautious
in giving aic, incxudin^, armaments,

iio major arms deals were

concluded between Egypt and the new soviet leaders until after
the June,1967, Arab-israeli war.

The Soviets and the Chinese

had been ^ivin^ some quantities of small arms to the Repub
licans in Yemen, either directly, or by giving them to the
United Arab Republic, which, in turn, gave the arms to the
Republicans.
r35

ibid., April 3, 19*>3> p. 1.
36
A statement by Mr. Averill Harriman, the Under
secretary of State of the United States, as reported in
The New York Times. April 12, 19^3* p. 3.
^ T h e Mew York Times, April 13, 1963, p. 5.
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ftasse soviet weapooa were helplho tbe Egyptian effort
to beck up tbe new revolutionary re0 ime which caws to power
in 1962.

Xbe Unlteo Arao Republic had some 70,000 troops

fighting 00 tbe Republican sloe a lace tbe devolution (1962)
until sbe withdrew ber forces from Yemen after tbe eune fear
of 1967, when sbe needed tbea for her own defense.
The 00viet weapons, even though they conslatea of small
arms and ammunitions, coulo oe considered military ala from
tbe Solet Union to the United Arab Kepuollc for it was In
Egypt's interest to overthrow tbe anti-uasser monarchy in
Yemen and bac* tbe "progressive" hepuoilcans against tbe
"reactionary" Xmamite in Yemen.
moviet military aid to tbe United Arao hepuolic has
political and economic implications.

The Impact of this

*ina of Soviet a la on Egyptian relations with the West is
important,

it heipeu wloen tbe gap and tbe first Czech-

Sgyptian Arms Deal of September, 1955, ®ay have precipitated
the decision taken oy oohn roster Dulles to withdraw tbe
American offer to participate in financing tbe Aswan High
Dam.

Inis last decision helped create a series of incidents

that all led to the worsening of the relations oetween the
United Arab Republic and tbe Vest in general, and the United
States in particular.

Th* Vest responded by arming Israel

with tbe most sophisticated weapons in its arsenal, thus
making the arms race in the Middle East even more dangerous,
and got the area into the Cold Var zone.
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Soviet military aid to Egypt helped Egypt to challenge
Israel's policies of invasions, encroachment and expansion
into the Arab lands.

It also helped enhance the United Arab

Republic's prestige within the Arab world and in Africa,
although this prestige has suffered some decline since
June, 1967 War with Israel since Egypt lost the battle.

Soviet military aid to Egypt helped enhance the image
of the Soviet Union in the Arab world and among some devel
oping countries in Africa and Asia, where the Soviet Union
appeared as a friend of these poor countries and the sup
porter of the oppressed against the oppressors.
finally, Soviet military aid to the United Arab Repub
lic had some economic implications.

The Soviets found a

large market for their military hardware and gained some
economic profits,

it also helped divert a large portion

of Egypt’s trade toward the Soviet Union and the Soviet
bloc, thus forcing Egypt to allocate considerable amounts
of cotton and other commodities to be exported to the
Soviet oloc for payment of military equipment.

These amounts

alloted for buying arms could have been spent on industrial
ization and development projects such as the Aswan Dam,
if the arms were not needed to.wi-thhold the Israeli threat.
D.

Growing Strains in the Relationship

What brought about the close ties of friendship between
Egypt and the Soviet Union was the fact that their national
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interests ran parallel in a common position of opposition
to Western "imperialism” during this period.

This mutual

ity of interests was strengthened by the series of events
which began with the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal and was fol
lowed by the West's withdrawal of assistance for the Aswan
Dam Project, the Suez Crisis, the expansion of cultural
and economic ties between the two countries, and the Soviet
agreement to ouild the Aswan Dam.

With few exceptions,

the period following the Arms Dea l until 1957 was a har
monious one, and may be described as the h o n ey moo n of the
relationship oetvteen the two countries.

Friction within the relationship began with the oeparture of the Soviet Ambassador to Moscow in early uune, 1957

39

for talks on mounting differences between the two parties.
These grew out of Egyptian complaints over price increases,
inferior products, and late deliveries that lea the Egyptians
40
to require price guarantees and punctual deliveries.
At this moment in the United Arab Republic -.soviet Union
relationship, a new development occurred which was beyond
the control of either country.

The United States decided

to take advantage of the friction and the ideological differ
ences between the two countries in much the same way as the

(Note: In April, 1956, the Soviet Union offered to
discuss the Suez Crisis with Britain, out the Arabs protested,
considering it interference in their affairs.)
^9
The New York Times, June 5, 1957* p. 1.
40
ibid.
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Soviet Union had exploited the situation when the United
States had withdrawn its offer of support for the High Dam
Project in 1956.

When Secretary Dulles was Questioned about

the relations of the United States with the United Arab
Republic and Passer, he answered:
ii
with him as far as x am aware.

"We are gettin6 along
The two countries appeared

to be ready to open a new pabe in E^yptian-American relations.
43
Dr. Fayez Sayegh
described this new trend in the Amer
ican policy toward "positive neutralism" as having be^un
to abandon its "pactomania" ana to outgrow the resultant
44
"neutrophobia.11
Nasser welcomed this new American position toward "posi
tive neutralism."

On his return from a tour of the Soviet

Union early in May, 1956, he gave a speech to the welcoming
crowds in which he said:
”....1 Know ana feel that the people of
the United States aim and wor* for peace.
Before 1 left for the soviet Union, 1
was informed by the United States that
it would pursue a new policy towards the
U.A.R., that it would recognize our right

41

ibid., April 9, 1956, p. 10.

42
Ellis, Harry B., Challenge in the Midale East (New Yor*
The Ronald Press Co., 19&OJ, p.54.
43
Dr. Fayez Sayegh, graduate of Georgetown University
with a Ph.D. in philosophy, has written many books both in
Arabic and English, and has served as advisor to the dele
gation of Lebanon at the United Nations, as a counselor of
the Delegation of Yemen, and as Charge d ’affaires of the
Arab States Delegations Office.
44
Sayegh, Fayez, ed., The Dynamics of Neutralism, p. 25.
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to pursue s policy of positive neutralism..,.
Oils independent policy of positive neutral
ise end non-alignment baa finally triumphed,
bavins neen recognized by the.two strongest
posers in tbe nhole world..."*5
Accompanying tbe developing rapprochement in tbe rela
tions between tbe United Arab Republic and the Meat, parti
cularly in tbe United .States, were a number of articles in
tbe Egyptian press whlcb criticized tbe Soviet Union for
what was termed the "Yugoslav lesson."

This charge related

to the situation wbereoy tbe Soviets announced their decision
to delay tbe previously granted aid to Yugoslavia for about
five years because of tbe continuing iaeolo0ical and poli
tical conflict between the two countries.
At this point, President :«asser decided to reduce his
dependence upon the .Soviet Union because tbe "Jugoslav
lesson” demonstrated what could happen to the United Arab
Republic.

Perhaps Rasser's oecision was influenced, also,

by the close personal friendship between tbe Arab and
Yugoslav leaders who, with rtehru, were recognized as tbe
leaders of tbe Third World, or -non-aligned bloc of nations.
The worsening of relations between the .Soviet Union and
tbe United Arab Republic was typified by a statement in tbe
semi-official Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram. January 4, 1959,
which noted that "The struggle against imperialism has ended.

45

WbeelocK, op. cit., pp. 261-62.
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Wbat m i l be tte attitude of tbe Communists Id the future?*
It s e e m tbit tbe%yptian leaders, at tbla point in
1959* were impressed by tbe achievements that bad taken place
in tbe Arab world since they case to power In 1952.

During

this period a lot bad oeen achieved in the struggle against
Western imperialism and pacts in the kiddie East.

'hie Sudan

received its inoependence from tne joint Angio-Egyptian rule
in 1953.

The 60,000 oritisn troops hao been evacuated froa

the Suez Canal Zone according to the oritish-Egyptian Agree
ment of 195^.

The ouez canal was nationalized ana oecatoe a

property of the Egyptian people.

General Glubb was sent home

to Enplane oy Ein0 hussein, under Egyptian pressure, after
he had been the Commander of the Arab i-egion in uordan since
the establishment of the cordanian Army bac* in the late
1940's.

The nibble Eastern Command, the .oa6hdad ?act, and

the Eisenhower doctrine nab been fought and defeated.

The

strongly pro-Western monarchy hao been overthrown in maghbad
in 195^ and the only Arab country that joined the Westernsponsored pact withdrew.

And, finally, the merger between

Egypt and Syria in February, 195d, formed the baited Arab
Republic.
The leaders of the United Arab Republic believed, at
this point, that the struggle against imperialism had ended.
Believing that the "struggle against imperialism" had

45

Laquer, Walter, "The Rational Bourgeoisie," Inter
national Affairs (hoodoo: Vol. JQGCV,a#3, Juiy, 1959), p. 331-
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ended, Nasser wished to pursue his policy of achieving Arab
Unity.

With the pursuit of a policy of Pan-Arabism by

Nasser, the interests of the Soviet Union ana the United
Arab Republic clashed over the desire by both parties to
dominate the area.

The Soviets, had lona championed Arab

nationalism as a force directed against "Western Imperialism.”
When, however, it manifested anti-Communist sentiments in
Arab policies and reacted against external great power in
fluences in the Arab world, the Soviets opposed it, at least
indirectly.
The formation of the United Arab republic finished the
honeymoon period and orou0ht differences out in the open.
The m e r g e r of E^ypt and oyria in .February, 195b, was rushed
by Nasser and some Syrian Army officers who favored unifi
cation in the face of what they regarded as a "Communist
conspiracy."

47

From the time the Free Officers had seized power under
the leadership of Nasser, the revolutionary government had
been anti-imperialist and anti-Communist.

Even at that time

of the Suez Crisis when Egypt received the unqualified sup
port of the Soviet Union, President Nasser declared his
determination not to become the "stooge or hireling or pawn
or satellite" of anyone, and he declared further his ideologi
cal independence of "all foreign ideologies, such as Marxism,

47

"Soviet Influence Gaining in Egypt," The New York
Times, October 22, 1957, pp. 4-5.
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Fascism, Racism, Colonialism, Imperialism, and Atheism."^
The new regime in Egypt, however, has always distinguished
between the Soviet Union as a state and Communism as an ideol
ogy.

The new leaders acted on the assumption that destroy

ing the Communist party in Egypt, and later in Syria after
the merger of the two countries, would eliminate the threat
of Communists,,.

The Egyptian leaders did not associate the

Communist threat with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
From the time he came to power, Passer’s statements and
actions lend credence to the view that he was and continues
to be anti-Communist,

in an interview in September, 1954,

Passer declared that "...if there is ever a government here
that wants to be on the side of the Russians, I don’t think
it can be tnis government.

_ito

^

The attitude of the i«ioscow-directed Syrian Communist
Party toward the unification of Syria ana Egypt serves as a
good example of Soviet opposition.
Party, opposed the unification,

The Syrian Communist
especially since unifica

tion meant that the Syrian Communist Party, and all political
parties, would be dissolved as one of Nasser’s conditions for
accepting Syria into a merger with Egypt.

After unity was

achieved,the Syrian Communist Party distributed a pamphlet

The Mew York Times, November 22, 1956, p. 21.
^"tfhat Should the U.S. do In the i4idale East?" U.S. News
& World,Report. Vol. XXXVII, Part 1 (Sept. 3, 195*0* p. 32.
^°Nolte, Richard, "Arab Nationalism and the Cold War,"
The Yale Review. Vol. X jl.IV, No . 1 (Sept., 1959), p. 19..

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
denouncing the unification and calling for the separation of
51
Syria from Egypt.
The reaction of President Nasser and his strong man
in Syria, Colonel Abdel Hamid el Sarraj, was to undertake
a campaign against domestic Communists.
them as traitors.

Nasser described

In an obvious effort not to offend the

Soviet Union by linking the Arab Communists to it, Nasser
spoke on a nationwide broadcast about "JSionism and Communism”
and branded the Syrian Communists who opposed Arab Unity
as "Zionist agents."^2

Following the speech, a series of

arrests of Communists in both regions were made, and two
printing houses with Communist sympathies were closed.

53

The timing of these mass arrests of Egyptian and Syrian
Communists almost coincided with the initial session of the
Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.

Nikita Khrushchev, in his report to the Congress,

criticizeo Nasser for his anti-Communist measures.' ‘In..*.
5^
discussing Nasser and Kassim,
Khrushchev hailed their
efforts to overthrow imperialism, out he added that:
"...we cannot fail to state our attitude
toward the fact that a campaign is oeing
conducted against the progressive forces

51
Radio Cairo, December 23, 1956.
52
The New York Times. January 2, 1959, p. 1.
53Ibid.
54
General Abdel Karrim Kassim emerged as a leader of the
revolutionary regime that overthrew King Faisal of Iraq in 1956.
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in some countries under the spurious slogans
of anti-Communism. Since there recently have
been statements in the United Arab Republic
against the ideas of Communism and accusations
were leveled at Communists, X, as a Communist,
consider it necessary to declare at the Con
gress of our Communist Party that it is wrong
to accuse Communists of helping to weaken or
divide national efforts in the struggle
against imperialism."-^
Because the Soviets were disappointed with the “reaction
ary nature" of the national bourgeoisie, the alternative for
the Soviets seemed to be that of resuming their support of
local Communists.

This approach apparently had been neg

lected following the decisions of the Twentieth Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

xt appeared

that the Soviets had returned to the policy pursued prior
to the revision of their attitude toward the national bour
geoisie in 1956.

Khrushchev, attacking the national bour

geoisie in the Congress of 1959, soundea like Stalin, although
a bit more flexible.
The events which took place in Iraq in 1959 dia the
most harm to the relations between the Soviet Union and the
United Arab Republic.

On the 8th of f-iarch, 1959, a revolt

took place led by Colonel El-Shawaf against General Kassim
in the province of Al-Mosul.

This revolt was supported by

pro-Nasser elements in Iraq, tribal sheikhs, merchants, and
army officers who favored joining the United Arab Republic.

55

Grulio, op. cit., p. 59-
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General Kassim, though oot himself a Communist, used tbe
organized militia of tbe Iraqi Communist Party to crush tbe
rebellion.

Passim also employed units of tbe army led by

officers Kith Communist leanings Mho used their tanks to
56
crush the rebels Mith much bloodshed.
During and following these bloody events, the propa
ganda networks of the United Arab Republic were directed
against General Kassim.

The general theme asserced that

Iraq was bein6 dominated by Moscow-directed local Communists.
President Rasser himself gave a speech three days after the
57
unsuccessful revolt
in which he accused General Kassim
and "Communist agents of a foreign power" of working against
Arab Unity and charged that x^assim was an opportunist and
the Soviets were imperialists who used the local Communists
the way the West had used the feudal powers to control the
*

Middle East.

This was the first time President Nasser had
58
attacked General Kassim and the Soviet Union,
but it was
not to be the last.
In the midst of this new crisis in the iiiddle East, an
Iraqi governmental delegation happened to be visiting Moscow.
Tbe delegation used this opportunity to maximize everything

56
Harari, Maurice, Government and Politics of tbe Middle
East. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Ha 11, inc., I9t>2),.p. 101.
57ibid.
58.
„
(Note: When Nasser said in bis speech "Communist agents
of a foreign power," it was understood that be.meant tbe Soviet
Union.)
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that Nasser said and gain further Soviet support for the
Kassim regime.
Khrushchev answered the charges of President Nasser in
a speech he gave while he was receiving the Iraqi delegation
in the Kremlin.

In this speech, Khrushchev described Iraq

under General Kassim as more "progressive" than the neigh
boring countries.

The Soviets mistakenly believed that be

cause Kassim was using the Communists against the pro-Nasser
forces, they would have a better future in Iraq than with
Nasser.

By "neighboring countries" Khrushchev was under

stood to mean the United Arab Republic, and hinted that the
Soviets were placing more emphasis on Iraq than on the United
Arab Republic.

Mr. Khrushchev described President Nasser as

"a rather young man and rather hot-headed," ana accused him
of attempting to annex Iraq, by which action "he took upon
59
himself more than his stature permitted."
At the same time, however, Khrushchev noted that the
Soviet Union could maintain friendly relations with both
Iraq and the United Arab Republic, as he indicated in the
following statement:
"What will relations...be now? I think they
will be the same as before. After all, when
we built up friendly relations with the U.A.R.
we were aware of President Nasser's anti-Com
munist views. True, we thought that more tol
erance and more attention to the people's
democratic demands would be shown in the

59

The New York Times, March 20, 1959,. P- 2.
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course of the natlonal-liberation struggle,
which requires unity of all anti-imperialist
forces. Unfortunately, measures are being
taken instead to suppress freedom-loving
aspirations.... Me would like to say as
friends that such a policy, if continued,
will inevitably fail.11
President Nasser angrily responded to Khrushchev's remarks
by warning that:

"Except for ray hot-headedness, our country

today would be a Western base for rockets and atomic bombs
directed against the Soviet Union itself.

With that same

hot-headedness, we will face the new danger as we have faced
enemies in the past.... We will also win against the new
„6l
agents of Communism."
The height of the bitter exchange came in a speech
given by President Nasser on March 30* 1939, in which he
said:
"We tried not to make the local activities
of Arab Communists in Iraq or Syria a reason
for’any clash with Russia as long as Russia
did not interfere in our affairs. We were
trying to convince ourselves that the Com
munist parties in our countries were indepen
dent of international Communism. We found
out that they were not, and that was why I
called them. Communist stooges. They carried
out orders and instructions to liquidate pat
riotic and national elements in order to place
our country Inside the zones of Communist in
fluence. We were suddenly faced by flagrant
interference in our internal affairs by Russia.
There was concrete evidence of an alliance

60

Pravda, March 17, 1959, P. 1-2, as translated in
Current Digest of Soviet Press.
^1The New York Times, March 23, 1959, P. 3.
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between the Russian leaders and Communists
working against us inside our country.®
Attempts to repair the damage to Sovlet-Egyptian rela
tions were initiated by the Soviet Union during the May Day
celebration of 1939•
was one stating:
lic."

Among the slogans issued for May Day

"Warm greetings to the United Arab Repub

There was also an exchange of letters between Mr.

Khrushchev ana President Nasser, initiated by the Soviet
leader.

Although Nasser appreciated the Soviet leaders'

initiative, he declared that the United Arab Republic was
"the only stumbling block for Eastern Communism or Western
Imperialism in the Middle East."°^
Another move initiated by the Soviet leader came while
visiting India in May, 1959* where he declared that rela
tions between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic
would continue as usual.

As quoted in The New York Times.

Mr. Khrushchev said:
"We, properly speaking, have no conflict
at all with the U.A.R. We do not demand
anything of the United Arab Republic, or
for that matter, any state. We intend to
go on baling our relations with the U.A.R.
on equality and respect for sovereignty
to our mutual advantage."
At this point in Soviet-Egyptian relations there was

62
Wheelock, op. cit., p. 275.
63
„
As quoted in "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs.
Vol. X, No. 6-7 (June-July, 1959)* P* 2bb.
64
The New York Times. May 21, 1959* p. 1.
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another significant trend toward an economic rapprochement
between the United Arab Republic and the West.

On July 1,

1959, an agreement providing technical assistance was reached
between the United Arab Republic and the United States.

This

agreement provided for resumption and expansion of American
aid, and it was clear that the agreement was more important
for its political significance than for its economic impli
cations.

The United Arab Republic also took measures to re

enter Western markets by reducing the price of cotton.

This

action demonstrated the desire of its leaders to decrease
dependence on the Soviet bloc.
With this change in the political atmosphere between
the United Arab Republic and the West, more assistance was
made available.

The Ford Foundation awarded a grant of
65
$300,000 to the United Arab Republic,
and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development granted a loan of
$36.3 million for widening and deepening the Suez Canal.
The United Arab Republic re-established diplomatic
relations with the United Kingdom on December 1, 1959, which
had been severed by Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956,
and its relations with the United states were described in
late 1959 as being "on a more normal and natural footing than
they have been for the past ten years.

-66

65

ibid., November 5, 1959, P» 1^*

^Ellis, Harry, "The United States and the Arab World,”
Middle Bast Forum, Vol. KXXVI, No. 3 (March, i960), p. 23.
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Subsequently, however, two Incidents occurred, in
April and May of i960, which greatly damaged the newly re
established good will between the United Arab Republic and
the United States.

Members of two labor unions in .New fork

picketed on April 14 to protest the refusal of the Unitec
Arab Republic to allow ships under the Israeli fla* to pass
through the Suez Canal.

The unions refused to unioaa the

United Arab Republic's ship "Cleopatra" and continued their
picketing despite the denouncement of that action by the
67
State Department.
The Arab workers in the United Arab Republic, Saudi
Arabia, and Iraq responded to the continued picketing of
the hew York Zionist-oriented unions by refusing to handle
American chartered ships in Arab ports.

The boycotts ended

on the 7th of May, but by that time much damage had been
done to United States-Arab relations.
The second, more important, event which dealt a strong
blow to the new spirit of good will was taken by the United
States Senate.

Senator Paul Douglas introduced an amend

ment to the Mutual Security Act which would authorize the
President to withhold foreign aid from any country that
waged economic warfare against another country.

The amend-

68

ment was adopted by a vote of 60 to 23.

67

Mem Stack Times, ApriL-2g, .I960, ,p. 1.

68

The Congressional Record, Vol. CXI, Part 7 (April 27,
i960, p. 8756.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137

President hasaer considered this action by the United
States an interference in the internal affairs of the United
Arab Republic and another example of "Zionist domination.

-69

He criticized the government of the United States and
praised the government of the Soviet Union, pointing out
that although there were differences oetween the United
Arab Republic and the Soviet Union over ideological matters,
"Yet Russia never threatened to cut off aid or taunted the
United Arab Republic about such aid.
70
our eternal gratitude."1

j?‘or this she earned

Soviet economic aid continued to flow to the United Arab
Republic despite the strained relations between the two
countries.

Perhaps the Soviets sought to continue their

economic aid to .Egypt because they did not want to lose
the fruits of their previous political support to Egypt
started at the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956.

soviet

"leaders, also, perhaps wanted to continue their pledge of
helping the Egyptians to build

the High Dam and did not want

to lose their previous investment in the Dam, and the loans
they had given to the United Arab Republicfe industry.
In addition, the Soviet leaders were trying to avoid
attaching political conditions to their aid programs to
underdeveloped

countries in response to the sensitivity of

The New York Times, May 8, i960, p. 26.
70
ibid., May 9, i960, p. 5.
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these countries over their newly

moo

sovereignty.

The

Soviets, however, manipulated their aid programs to coun
tries of doubtful ideological impact, such a-s Finland,
Yugoslavia, Iceland and Australia, according to the political situation.

71

It is of great significance that the .Soviet Union con
tinued its economic aid to the United Arab Republic during
this period.

This fact convinced the Arab leaders that

Soviet aid does not have strings attached to it.

They

appreciated the Soviet attitude, especially with the Amer
ican decision to cut aic to the United Arab Republic in
front of them.
E.

A New Soviet Diplomatic Offensive and Rapprochement

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United Arab
Republic had undergone a substantial change from the honey
moon period which began with the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal
in 1955 until 1959 when the ideological dispute erupted.
Yet, in the 1960‘s the two countries decided that they still
needed each other.

The United Arab Republic had continued

need of economic and military aid which it could not get
from the West, particularly after the Suez War of 1956.

Con

sequently, the United Arab Republic began again to turn to

71

Kouner, Milton, The Challenge of Co-eslstenee.
(Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press/,1961, p. £4.
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the Eastern bloc to find the sources of support needed in
the drive to modernize and to oppose Israel.
The Soviets, for their part, also needed the United
Arab Republic because it was considered to be one of the
most influential nations among the non-aligned countries
of the Third World.

The Soviets needed the example of the

United Arab Republic as a means to encourage support for
national liberation movements in Asia and Africa since
Egypt had suffered under colonialism and wanted to work
with the emerging nations to deter neo-colonialism.

Thus,

the Soviet national interest of encouraging national liber
ation movements coincided with the domestic needs of the
United Arab Republic, and the marriage of convenience was
patched up.
Further, the

Soviet Union needed the United Arab Re

public on its side in its growing ideological dispute with
China in order to deter Chinese influence in the emerging
nations of Asia and Africa.

The Soviets also wanted to

prevent the Arab countries from being used by the West for
their strategic importance, for bases directed against the
Soviet Union, for the vital oil supplies, and as pawns in
the Cold War.

The Soviet Union sought to increase its in

fluence in the Middle East in order to widen the political
gap between the Arabs and the West.
Another reason for the Soviets to want to retain the
good relations with the United Arab Republic was to preserve
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and protect their economic aid investments, such as the
work already started on the Aswan Bam.

The Soviets had no

wish to invest heavily in the economy of the United Arab
Republic and then lose the political advantage to be gained
from such maneuvers.

Rather, the Soviets wished to tie the

Egyptian economy even closer to the Eastern bloc by having
the Egyptians commit much of their economic production to
the repayment of Soviet loans.

Commencing in 1961, there

fore, the Soviets again initiated a diplomatic offensive
aimed at reinvigorating and expanding its influence in Egypt
and other under-developea countries.
At the 22nd Party Congress in 19ol, the soviets adopted
a new policy which included support for the concept of a
"national-democratic state." This program suggested a non72
capitalist'
path of development which would be made posisible oy the unification of all "democratic and patriotic"
73
forces
in the national-democratic state. Under the title,
74
"The Rational Liberation Movement,"
the program said:
"The establishment and development of
Rational Democracies opens vast prospects
for the peoples of the economically under
developed countries. The political basis
of a national democracy is a bloc of the
progressive patriotic forces fighting to

72

(Rote:

non-capitalist, though non-Communist, also.)

73

Gruliou, Leo, Ed., Current Soviet Policies: IV (Rew
York: Columbia University ffess, 1952), p. lOfc.
74
ibid., p. 10.
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win complete oatiopal independence and
broad democracy."75
The Soviets sav this program as a blueprint for the future
development and transition of emerging nations to the path
of Socialism by the strengthening of the public sector of
the economy and the strengthening of the political position
of the wording classes.
The adoption of this new Soviet program in 1961 coin
cided with the enactment of economic reforms, known as the
"Socialist Laws,"^ by the United Arab Republic which sug
gested an improvement in the relations Detween the United
Arab Republic and the Sovet Union was forthcoming.

These

reforms by the S^yptian government had a favorable effect
on the Soviet leaders and paved the way for a rapprochement
between the two countries after the damage suffered curing
the stormy period from 1959 to 1961.

The two parties de

cided to maintain good relations, although this time they
were cautious and to some degree, reserved as compared to
the harmonious relations during the period from 1955 to 195d«
Along with these economic reforms, a meeting of the
77
National Congress of Socialist Principles'1 was called to

75

ibid., p. 11.

76
According to these laws, major industries, all banks
and insurance companies were nationalized and they became
known as the July, 1961 Socialist Laws.
77
"The Charter for National Action of the U.A.R." American
Universities Field Staff Reports. Northeast Africa Series.
Vol. IT. No. 5'.
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discuss Passer's program for tbe implementation of a demo
cratic* cooperative* socialist society in Egypt, and if
agreed upon* to adopt this program.

The Rational Charter

itblch resulted from the deliberations of the Congress re
flected Nasser's ideas on socialism* later to be known as
"Arab Socialism."

The program adopted by the National Con

gress for Socialist Principles assigned the workers and
peasants 50 percent of the seats in the National Assembly
and the management of the factories or companies in which
they worked.
"Arab Socialism" differed from the communist defini
tion of socialism in many ways.

Plrst, Arao Socialism re

jected the idea of the class stru0gle and saw its elimina
tion through peaceful means; second, Arab oociaiism respected
national or unexploitive capitalism; third, Arab Socialism
acknowledged inheritance although it was taxed; fourth,
Arab Socialism respected religions and personal beliefs.
The effect of these measures taken oy the Egyptian gov
ernment on Soviet-United Arab Republic relations was favor
able.

Although there were varying positions taken toward

these developments within the Communist world, there was
general agreement that the new measures did not go beyond
State Capitalism.

Even so, this was an acceptable situa

tion under the concept of national democracies, for the
Soviets hoped that it would be a stage in the transition
which would lead to a "true" socialism.
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The Soviets placed considerable emphasis on political
reforms, for they followed the convention of the National
Congress of Popular Forces in 1962 with greater interest
than other Communist states.

The New Times described the

National Charter as a progressive and positive document,
and the convening of the meeting was hailed as the most
significant political act taken by the government of the
76
United Arab Republic since it came to power in 1952.
As a result of the adoption of the National Charter
as state policy, Egyptian workers, on May 1, 1962, observed
their first May Day festival in the Repuolic Square in
79
Cairo.
This event and the Socialist Reforms adopted the
previous year appeared to have a salutary impact on the
rapprochement between the United Arao Republic and the
soviet Union.
The Nasser regime, while inhibiting the activities of
the local Communists, seemed to be more conscious of the
importance of the public sector of the economy.

This re

cognition, dating from the early months of 1961, coincided
with the adoption by the soviets of the policy of acceptance
of the non-capitalist, national front path which they sug
gested for Third World nations.

78
„
Avokov, R. and Andereasyan, R., "Revolution on the
Nile," New Times, No. 30 of 19o2, p. 17.
79
The writer was watching the thousands of workers
gathered in the Republic Square for their first festival
ever held in Egypt.
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The Soviets accepted Arab Socialism as a force with
which they could find accommodation, at least for the time
being.

G-. Mirsky, a correspondent of the New Times, de

clared:

“There is no denying that no other non-Socialist

country in Asia or Africa had ventured on such radical reforms.

„80

He axso described Egypt as dynamic, although he

Si

considered Nasser’s concept of democracy “nebulous.”

Relations between the two countries proceeded on a
friendly basis again in the‘period after 1961 as the United
Arab Republic went forward with its economic and political
reforms and the Soviet Union accepted and supported the new
approach.

The official attitude of the Egyptian government

toward the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1962 was deDp
scribed by a Western jabserver as a “good deal more friendly,”
than it was two or three years earlier,

it was at this time

that the Soviet Cosmonaut, furi Gagarin, visited the United
83
Arab Republic and was warmly received.

Mirsky, G., ”lhe U.A.R. Reforms," New Times, No. 4
of 1962, p. 12.

. . 81

ibid., p. 13. (Note:
West also seemed to-be satis
fied or at least less worried about the new reforms, because
they seemed to be expecting Arab .Socialism to be more radi
cal. She Arab Socialism was described as "much milder, more
humane, and less doctrinaire than that of Communist countries."
See Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology
in Egypt," Middle Eastern Journal. Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Sent. 1062)
p. 140.

82

Parker, J.S.F., "The United Arab Republic," International
AStairs (London) Vol. XXXVII, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 27.

83

The writer was there watching wagarin touring the streets
of Cairo in a black Cadillac convertible, saluting the crowds.
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During this period, a new three-year trade agreement was
84
signed in June, 1962, providing for “a new high* 'in the
relations.

According to this agreement, the United Arab

Republic would receive machinery, chemicals, oil, metals,
and machine tools, while supplying cotton, textiles, oananas
and gasoline to the Soviets.
Another new element affecting the United Arab RepublicSoviet Union relationship occurred on February d, 1963,
when Nasser's rival regime in Iraq under General passim
was overthrown by the pro-Nasser, pro-Unity forces under
Colonel Abdel Salam Aref.

General Nassim was executed the

same day.
The fall of the Soviet-supported ivassim regime and the
seizure of power by pro-Nasser elements was followed by the
persecution, arrest and execution of Communists.

How, con-r

temporary observers musea, would the Soviets react?

What

would be the effect of their reaction.on United Arab RepublicSoviet Union relations?
There were some angry and unfavorable reactions in the
Soviet press toward the anti-Communist policies of the Aref
regime, but it appears that the Soviet leaders had no alter
native after this development but to deal with the strong
man in the area, viz., Gamal Abdel Nasser.
By 1963 the Egyptian government was proceeding with the

84

The New York Times, June 26, 1962, p. 10.
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implementation of the .Socialist fieforms adopted la 1961.
The Soviets assumed a "salt-and-see* attitude toward the
implementation of the reforms.

They seemed to feel that

the situation left touch to be desired, although they thought
the economic -reforms were progressive.
Another event which was out of Soviet control too*
place in 1963, when the United States Congress voted to
disqualify the United Arab Republic and Indonesia as bene
ficiaries of United states1 aid programs.

This action by

Congress angered Egyptians, provoked isiasser to sharp criti
cism, harmed Unitea otates-Unitea Arab Republic relations,
and served to strengthen sovlet-United Arab Repuolic re
lations.
The reason given oy the Congress for this action was
that the United AraQ Republic was "preparing for aggressive
efforts against countries receiving its (U.S.) a i d.*^

The

Arabs believed that the Zionists and pro-xsraeli elements
had a hand in this decision.

This action demonstrated once

again to the Arabs that the United States attached strings
to its aid programs in contrast to the Soviet aid programs.
Even during the height of the ideological dispute between
the Soviets and United Arab Republic leaders in 1959-61,

85
According to the Mutual Security Act, aid should be
halted from ^ 7 country that is "engaging in or preparing for
aggressive military efforts against the-United States or
any country receiving its aid." See: Congressional Record
Vol. CIX, Part 16 (November 7, 1963), 21353 ff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Soviet aid bad continued uninterrupted.
even threatened to stop such aid.

Nor bad tbe Soviets

The result was that Soviet

prestige in tbe Middle £ast was greatly enhanced, while
American prestige continued to slump.
During 1964 many Important events took place which
strengthened the Soviet-United Arab Republic relationship.
The First Arab Summit Meet.Ing in Cairo in February, 1964,
was extensively covered by the Soviet press and met with
its approval.

The aim of the heads of the Arab States was

to make plans which would prevent Israel from diverting the
waters of the Jordan r.iver.

This plan, if completed by

Israel, would deprive Arab lands in Jordan of water for
irrigation and water supplies for villages and towns,
Izvestla described the Arab Summit Meeting as "a significant
landmark in the history of the liberation struggle of the
Arab East,” and attributed the success of the conference
66
to the far-sighted policies of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
A new provisional constitution for Egypt was also adopted
on March 23, 1964, and the state of emergency that had been
in effect since the Free Officers came to power In 1952
was ended,

in connection with the new constitution, the

government announced plans to release all untried political
87
prisoners.
This move also enhanced United Arab Republic

86

As c '.e<* In the Current Digest of Soviet Press.
Vol. XVI, Nc
' 'February 19, 1984), p. 2f>.
87
As reported In World Marxist Review, Vol. VII, No. 3
(March, 1964), pp. 45-46.
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Soviet Union relations since many were Communista.
Chairman Khrushchev visited the United Arab Republic
for two weeks in May of that year when the first stage of
the Aswan Dam Project was completed.

Khrushchev, Nasser,

Aref, and Abdullah Al-Sallal, President of Yemen, partici
pated in ceremonies in which the Nile was diverted by means
of explosive charges.
A possible source of friction in the relations between
the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic concerning the
first payment for the first stage of the Aswan High Dam,
which was cue, was avoided curing the Khrushchev visit.
It was reported that the plight of the United Arab Republic
63
In early 1964 ana mia-1965 was serious.
In such a situa
tion, the loan had either to be renewed or the debt had to
be postponed.

The situation did not promise of a new Soviet

loan and what was worse was the fact that the American
=overnment decided at this point to "re-evaluate" its wheatloan policy in 1965, because the United States thought that
it was helping the Egyptians indirectly to repay the Russian
loans.
Khrushchev, however, decided unexpectedly to loan the
United Arab Republic $227 million during his visit to the
United Arab Republic to participate in the celebration of

^ T h e Wall Street Journal, April 28, 1965, p. 1.
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completing the first stage of the Aswan Dam.
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This new

loan relieved the stress and allieviated the tensions be
tween the two countries.
The increased tempo of the Soviet offensive was possibly
directed toward deterring the spread of Chinese influence
90
in the Arab world and in Africa,
since Chou En-lai, the
Chinese Premier, had visited the United Arab Repuolic only
four months earlier.

The Khrushchev visit helped to strengthen

the Soviet position.
Following the Khrushchev visit to the United Arab Re
public, more frequent mention was made in the Soviet press
of the "national-sociaiism" concept.

After all, the con

cept of "national-democracy” had been invented by the Soviets
to justify their continued support to regimes such as Passer*s
even though his program was neither scientific socialism
nor capitalism.
The Nasser regime had taken many steps to the Left in
the transition to Socialism, but Nasser continued to denounce
Communism.

The Soviets seemed to accept this situation and

Nasser's statements about unity of the working people against
exploiters, even though Nasser was obviously not approaching
the question of Socialism from the correct ..Marxist-Leninist

89
Soviet Foreign Aid, pp. 72-73.
90
As reported by Y. Marin, “Soviet Policy in Africa,"
Bulletin of the Institute for the Stody of the U.S.S.R.,
Vol. Xi; tioYT (June, 1954i;"pTS".
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The Soviets seemed to accept the idea that the

working class did not have to lead in the revolutionary
struggle and that they, the workers, have to follow the
progressive intelligentsia and revolutionary democrats in
this stage of development.

The Communist-inspired revolu

tion of the proletariat and peasants would come later.
92
The announcement on October 16, 1964,
that Khrushchev
had been relieved of his position did not appear to affect
the relations between the United Arab Republic and the
Soviet Union.

On the contrary, the new Soviet leaders

quickly assured the Egyptian government that all the commit- .
ments of the previous government would be honored.
Positive evaluations of progress in the United Arab
Republic continued in the Soviet press.

The United Arab

Republic was described as offering instructive lessons to
other developing countries.

93

The most significant event,

however, was the repeal of the Emergency Laws which had
occurred in March, 1964, prior to the .Khrushchev ouster.
The Soviets warmly supported this action since it would en
able those who were detained for their political beliefs,
including Communists, to play a part in the advance to new
forms of social life in their country.
91
New Times, No. 23, 1964, p. 2.
^ T h e New York Times, October 16, 1964, p. 1, and
October ltt, 19b4, p. 10.
93
Backaryov, Yori, "Forging Ahead," New Times. No. 30,
1965, p. 6.
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Tbe apparent resolution of the ideological dispute*
(i.e.* not letting tbe differences of opinion on ideolo
gical matters cisrupt economic and foreign policy programs)*
restored good relations between the United Arab Republic
and the Soviet Union and preserved their "tactical" alliance
against Western imperialism.
F.

The June War

in 1965 * the Palestinian Arabs, frustratea in their
94
attempts to return to their homeland
and tired of living
in refugee camps, suosisting on United Nations' charity for
seventeen years, decided to establish a military organiza
tion, known as £1-Fateh, which would coordinate commando
attacks against Israel.

The Israelis refused to acknowledge

the claims of the Palestinians, and responded to their raids
with attacks against their neighbors in the hope that these
countries would control £1-Pateh in order to prevent further
Israeli reprisals, mainly axong the oorders with Jordan ana
Syria.
q4

.

It was not until 1947 that the United Nations devised
a plan for the independence of Palestine which would divide it
into two parts, one for the Jews and one for the Palestinian
Arabs. In 1943, in the absence of agreement over the Parti
tion Plan, the British withdraw from Palestine, and the Zion
ist terrorist organizations* such as the Haggaoah and the
Stern, which had waged guerrilla war against both the Arabs
and the British, burned their full force against the Pales
tinian Arabs* forcing them to flee for their lives. In May*
1943* the state of Israel was established in Palestine* and
both the United States and the Soviet Union granted recog
nition.
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During the first quarter of 1967, the border between
Israel and Syria remained the chief trouble spot.

Israel

persisted In sending ics tractors to plow the "disputed”
lands in the demilitarized zone even though they knew from
past experience that the Syrian 0uns would open fire on
them.

The most serious clash occurred on April /, 1967.

An Israeli air attack on April 7> 1967* in which Israel
used napalm bombs against syrian villages, increased the
pressure on the United Arab Republic to help Syria in the
95
face of threats of further Israeli attacks.
Syria and
-Egypt had signeo a treaty of defense in 1966 through which
Syria could invoke Egyptian assistance.

Furthermore, re

ports from other Arab countries claimeo that a senior jjsraell
military officer had stated that xsrael "would carry out
military operations a0ainst Syria in order to occupy Damas«96
cus and overthrow the Syrian government.
These reports
were confirmed when The sew York Times revealeo on Aay 14,
1967, that Israeli leasers had "decided that the use of
force against Syria," might be "the only way to curtail
increasing terrorism."

It adoed, "Any such Israeli reaction...

probably would be of considerable strength but of short dura
tion and limited in area."

The author added that "the comments

95

The Middle Bast Journal, Summer, 1967, p. 386.

^Yost, Charles W., "The Arab-Israeli War: How It Began,"
Foreign Affairs, January, 1968, p. 305f*
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being beard (in Israel) in recent weeks, and especially
since last weekend (have been) stronger than those usually,
heard in responsible quarters,"
2hese events in Syria placed President Nasser in a

difficult position.

He realized that the Arabs were too

divided and still too weak militarily to cnallense Israel.
Nasser tried to caution the Arab militants who overestimated
their strength, and other Arab powers who challenged him to
have a showdown with Israel, perhaps out of a desire to see
him defeated.
On May 1^, 1967, Syria indicated that she would seetc
Arab support and would invoke her defense agreement with
the United Arab Republic if Israel attacked,

in addition,

Syria drew the attention of the United Nations to the Israeli
threats.
In this situation, Nasser found himself with no alter
native except to take a "calculated risk."

xn order to

protect his ally, Syria, expecting the Soviets to come to
his aid if necessary, and to save his prestige in the Arab
world, Nasser put his army on alert on May 15.

Ihe next day

be placed it on an emergency footing and began to move some
97
- —
divisions to the Sinai Peninsula.
In order to emphasize
his moves, he asked the United Nations Emergency Forces to
concentrate in the Gaza area and leave the way clear for

^ The New York Times, May 18, 21 and 22, 1967.
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Egyptian troops to occupy its former positions on the fron
tiers with Israel,

for the first time since 19564 the

Egyptian and Israeli military forces found themselves fac
ing each other across the border.
With the UNEF withdrawn from Sharm El-Sheikh at the
entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, the Egyptian troops reoccupied
that strategic spot,

The Israelis had been using the Gulf

for importation of'oil and strategic materials and regarded
it as a lifeline in carrying on trade with much of Africa
and Asia.
The United Arab Republic closed the Gulf of Aqaba

96

to any Israeli shipping which carried oil or strategic materials

99

with the intention of creating pressure on Israel

to deter her from invading dyria.

Rasser did not regard

this action as certain to lead to a showdown with Israel
since it was clear to him and many independent observers
that neither Egypt nor the other Arab states were ready for
war.
According to The Rew Yortc Times of ivsay 30, 1967* several

98

The Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United
Arab Republic have maintained that under international law,
the Gulf Is a territorial water, not an international waterway,
since each nation claims 12 miles as its territorial waters
and the Gulf is in most parts less than
miles wide. More
over, the United Arab Republic and other Arab states con
sidered themselves still in a state of war with Israel, and
on that basis, felt that Israel could not enjoy the right
of innocent passage because belligerents cannot be described
as innocents in their relations with each other.
99
The Hew York Times, May 21, 1967* and May 23, 1967.
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high Egyptian and Syrian officials visited Moscow in late
May and returned believing that the Soviets would support
the Arabs if there was a showdown, especially if the United
States intervened in support of Israel.
At first, Israeli leaders took a dovish stand toward
the blockade, but later, because of political pressures
from such hawkish politicians as General Moshe Dayan, they
reversed themselves and took a tough and inflexible posi100
tion.
The United Nations Secretary General U. Thant described
the situation as ngrave”i°‘i upon his return from a visit to
Cairo.

The matter was taken to the Security Council which

held an emergency session on May 24, 1967, upon the urgent
request of Canada and Denmark.

The Security Council held

many meetings which were unsuccessful.

The Council meeting

of June 3, 1967 was the last of these meetings before the
war broke out on the fifth of June.

The Security Council

failed to prevent the military showdown between Israel and
the Arab states bordering her.

This failure to solve the

problem and prevent the breakout of war is due to the failure
of the super powers to reach an agreement on the Gulf of
Aqaba issue.

100

Evening Bulletin, May 17 and 23, 1967.
101
Kasut, Hal, ed., Israel and the Arabs; The June 1967
Mar, Pacts on Pile, Inc., Hew York, 1967, pp. 90-59.
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The United States took the lead in the Security Council
in criticizing the Secretary General for his hasty response
to the United Arab Republic^ request that the UNEP be with-*
drawn from Egypt.

The United States also denied the United

Arab Republic's right to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba against
Israeli shipping.

Finally, the United States introduced an

interim draft resolution

102

in which it urged the parties

concerned to "exercise special restraint" and suggested
that the United Arab Republic would have to reopen the
Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli shipping.

103

The Arab delegations were willing to accept a resolu
tion that would cool off the crisis, but were against lift
ing the blockade imposed upon Israeli shipping through the
Gulf of Aqaba.

They criticized the United States1 resolu

tion and accused it of acting on behalf of Israel.

They-

also criticized the United States of being biased when it
remained silent while Israel attacked Syria and planned fur
ther attacks with the intention of overthrowing the Syrian
government, and at the same time, came to the defense of
Israel when that country's Intentions were checked by the
prohibition of the passage of strategic materials through
the gulf, and seemed ready to use its armed forces to pro104
tect Israel.

102

ibid., p. 5&.

103

Evening Bulletin. June 1, 1967.
104.
ibid., June 3 and 4, 1967.
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Soviet support for tbe Egyptian and Arab position in
general was unyielding.

In tbe Security Council tbe Soviet

Union and Bulgaria supported tbe Arab position and were
joined by India and Mali which also supported tbe Arabs
and tbelr position on tbe question of tbe Gulf of Aqaba.
The Soviet Union and tbe Eastern bloc members accused Israel
of moving her troops toward tbe Syrian border, and charged
that the "Knesset” defense and foreign policy committees
had adopted a policy of initiating military operations
105
against Syria.
The Soviet Union rejected the American resolution, ano
they used the opportunity to show their support and solid
arity with the Arab states.

The American delegation maae

no effort to modify this resolution because they knew in
advance that the Russians would reject it.

106

Thus, the United States encouraged the Israelis to oe
more militant and uncompromising especially by giving them
strong support on the Guif of Aqaba issue and by assuring
Israel that American influence would be used to guarantee
Israeli security and integrity.

The Soviets, for their

part, encouraged the Arabs to be more militant and uncom
promising on the issues, resulting in a diplomatic stale
mate.

105

The New York Times, June i and 4, !$67.

106

Evening Bulletin, June 4, 1967.
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'Hie Soviet Union encouraged the Arabs to take strong
positions out of a mistaken belief that they would be able
to control events and prevent an actual outbreak of war be
tween the Arabs and Israelis.

Soviet behavior contributed

to the Arabs1 illusion that the Russians would help them in
the event of a confrontation with Israel., especially if the
United States intervened on behalf of Israel.
The war began on the morning of June 5* 1967> when the
Israeli air force unleashed a series of successive surprise
raids on Arab air fields, destroying the Egyptian and Syrian
air forces and concrolling the skies over the entire area.
With the threat from the Araoian air forces removed, Israel
was free to napalm the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian troops
who were forced to fight without benefit of air cover unaer
the savage onslaught of the xsraeii oombers.

The battle was

waged in the desert of the Sinai, and in Jordan and Syria,
where the Arabs fought without benefit of good ground cover
to protect them from the Israeli air strikes.

The Arabs

were unprepared for such a battle, they were not unified in
their efforts, and the short duration of the war contributed
to the Arab defeat.
During and following this brief war between the Israelis
and the Arabs, it became clear what kind of relations existed
between the Russians and the Arabs in general, and the United
Arab Republic in particular.

The Soviets were willing to

give the Arabs strong support on the diplomatic level and in
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the Security Council of the United Nations, out, when the
crisis developed into a military confrontation between
Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the Soviets became cautious.
They feared that a minor, localized clash between Israel and
the Arab states might escalate into a large-scale great
power military confrontation.
They were also fearful that the United States might
intervene on behalf of Israel at a time when they were un-.
willing or unprepared to ris« a major war with the United
States over such an issue.
They really did not want to get involved in a war de
fending the Arabs who were taking an anti-Communist stand
when they a la not get involved in Communist countries, such
as North Vietnam, in their efforts to achieve a victory in
Southeast Asia.

The Russians wanted to preserve and extend

their influence in the Middle East, first, by giving economic
and military aid to the Arabs, especially to the United Arab
Republic and Syria.

They supported the Arabs in the Security

Council during the war and also encouraged the Communist bloc,
Muslims, and some Afro-Asian states to support them.

Although

they gave limited amounts of arms to the Arab' states to rearm
their forces, they did not give them'enough to make them
confident enough to launch an all-out attack on Israel in
order to regain the occupied lands.

In fact, Russia gave

defensive weapons to the Arabs but not offensive weapons.
Perhaps this fact, together with the disappointment of some
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Arabs about the insufficient Soviet support during the
crisis and their fear of the America-ns, contributed to
some resentment that built up against the Soviets in the
Arab world following the war.
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CHAPTER V
FINAL ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS
Tbe basic assumption of this thesis is that "the rela
tionship which developed between the Soviet Union and the
United Arab Republic during the period from the Suez Crisis
of 1956 to the June war of 1967 constituted a marriage of
convenience," and that this relationship would be maintained
so long as it continued to be mutually beneficial to the
parties involved.
Out of the foregoing data emerges a number of signi
ficant questions which relate to the basic hypothesis.

For

example, did the United Arab Republic benefit from Its close
political and economic relationship with the Soviets?

To

what extent did the Soviets benefit from the arrangement?
How did the relationship help to shape the United Arab Repub
lic's foreign policy of positive neutralism?

What impact

did this relationship have on Nasser's role as leader of
the Arab World?

Did the Soviet-Egyptian relationship develop

solely as a short-range "marriage of convenience," or was
it part of a long range historical trend?

Or was it, con

versely, the West which indirectly pushed the United Arab
Republic into the marriage by not recognizing Arab aspira
tions of self-determination, independence, and unity?
On analysis of these questions as they relate to the

161
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basic issue, and the setting forth of tentative answers to
them, Mill lead into the final conclusions of this thesis.
First, the data shoe that despite the lacx of ideolog
ical unity, the policies pursued by the Soviets and by
xMasser sere salutary to the national interest objectives
of both.

It has been a matter of policy with the Soviet

Union to dismantle the instruments of Western imperialism
wherever they may be found and to extend Soviet influence
among the developing nations.

The Soviet policies challeng

ing Western imperialism coincided with the desire of the
Egyptians to free themselves from .British and later “Western"
control, and this coincidence served as the basis for a
mutually advantageous relationship.
The motivation for the Soviet position is found in
the uesire to extend the Marxist-Leninist ideology through
out the world.

In the countries of the Middle East, however,

local Communists were weak and poorly organized.

The Commun

ist .ideology hao little success in a pre-industrial Arab
society motivated by steadfast attachment to a common re
ligion and a strong emerging nationalism.

In the face of

such existing conditions, and with ideological and political
goals in mind, the Soviets decided to replace their support
for local Communists with support for national liberation
movements led by the national bourgeoisie, in an attempt
to substitute Soviet influence for the meager influence of
the local Communists.
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Nteo, in 1955, the Egyptian free Officers had assumed
the responsibility for the direction of their country, they
were primarily concerned with overcoming the effects of
Western imperialism.
by the Soviets.

In this concern, they were supported

It is significant, however, that the

Egyptians were successful in negotiating the British evac
uation without much Soviet assistance.

It was not until

Nasser determined to modernize the Egyptian Army in the
face of the Israeli threat-1- that the Egyptians, denied unen
cumbered military aid by traditional western sources, took
advantage of Soviet assistance through the opening wedge
Known as the Czech-Egyptian Arms Beal of 1955.
The significance of the Arms Beal lies in the western
reaction to it.

if the best nad Deen willing to provide

the needed weapons at reasonable terms, the Egyptians wouxc
not have had to seek arms from the Eastern Bloc,

having

precipitated the event, the West erred again by interpret
ing it as a serious ideological and political link-up between
the Arab and communist worlds rather than as a business
arrangement.

The West compounded the problem when the

United States reacted to the Arms Beal by withdrawing its
offer of financial assistance for the Aswan Bam.

This ac

tion precipitated a series of events, including the national
ization of the Canal, which culminated in the Suez War of 1956.

1The Gaza Raid in 1955 by Israel showed the'weakness
of the Egyptian Army.
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The Soviets pressed the advantage to he gained from
Western diplomatic fumbles in a continuing effort to ex
tend their influence and prestige in the Middle East.
The Western actions during the period, 1955-1956, liter
ally forced the Egyptians to a Hobson's choice (i.e., deal
ing with the Eastern bloc for needed goods).
In other words, the actions and directions used by
the West closed all doors to the Egyptians.

What in essence

the West did was to seek its own goal of the containment of
Soviet power.

In subordinating ail other considerations to

this goal, the West overlooked the rising nationalist feel
ing of the Arab people to control their own destiny.

Thus,

when Egypt turned to the Eastern bloc to secure the arms
denied her by her traditional Western sources, the West
ern powers feared that the Egyptian leaders were joining
the Communist camp in the cold war.

The West first attempted

to entice, then to coerce, Egypt back into the Western fold.
Under the direction of the American Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, the West sought to complete its globegirdling system of alliances to contain Communist power by
building a Middle East defense arrangement.

This alliance

would lend Western support to common anti-Communist Middle
Eastern alliance aimed at preventing a Soviet penetration
into the region. Arab leaders, more fearful of Western in
fluence and intervention than of Eastern (which they had
never experienced), rejected the plans for the Middle East
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alliance.

The Arab rejection, based largely on Nasser's
*

opposition, led the West into an effort to “tighten the
screws" and apply greater pressure on Nasser by withdraw
ing the offers of assistance for the building of the Aswan
Dam.

This action precipitated the nationalization of the

Suez Canal by the Egyptian government, which, in turn, pro
duced the British, French, and Israeli countermove in the
form of a joint attach on Egypt.
Later developments gave some indication that Egypt was
not on the verge of becoming a Communist state and that co
ercive methods applied by. the West were npt particularly
successful.

The West in the late 1950's began to change

its policy to compete with the ooviet Union in attempts
to win Egypt's favor.
made.

Loans and grants of assistance were

The West also began to recover from its "pactomania"

and accepted "positive neutralism" as a legitimate policy
for Third world states.

Just as the Boviet Union had

earlier taken advantage of the West's diplomatic fumbles,
so, too, in 1959-61 the West exploited Soviet mistakes.
By 1961, however, the Soviets were actively seeking a
rapprochement with Egypt, and again the West reacted adversely
to these circumstances.

Perhaps the inability of the West

to develop long-range goals and a consistent policy towards
Egypt and the Arab world based on such common areas of in
terest as anti-Communism and regional unity had a great deal
to do with the faltering diplomatic policy which the Soviets
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so ably dramatized to their own benefit.
The relationship between Egypt and the .Soviet Union
also encouraged Western support for Israel.

The West pro

vided military, economic, and diplomatic support for Israel
during the period under review.

The Western powers aided

in Israel's expansionist moves during the Suez Crisis in
1956 and later during and after the June War of 19^7.
As a result of their narrowly contrived foreign policy
vis-a-vis Egypt ana other Arab nationalist elements in the
Middle East, the Western powers fumbled an opportunity to
work out mutually agreeable relationships and to make
friends out of their former colonial possessions.

They

lost the advantageous and prestigious position which they
had enjoyed for years in the Arab world, and succeeded only
in forcing the Araos to look to the Soviets for aid and
support.

Western policies, it can thus oe concluded, were

primarily responsible for -forcing Egypt into a position
of seeking political, economic, and diplomatic support from
the Soviet Union during the period of the 1960's.
This apparent Hobson's choice leads us to an analysis
of "the first question of whether the United Arab Republic
on balance benefited from Soviet support and, conversely,
what gains or losses resulted from the relationship.

Ob

viously, there were both gains and losses, but given the
necessity of a Hobson's choice, the gains tended to out
weigh the losses.
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The establishment of a close relationship with the
Soviet Union had served to strengthen the Egyptian posi
tion in world politics.-

Without Soviet support, the

Egyptians probably would not have been successful in
achieving full political emancipation from the West.

With

Soviet support, the Egyptians have been aDle to overcome
Western imperialism by nationalizing the Suez Canal, by
increasing their military capabilities, by increasing
their economic progress and by ending their dependence
upon the West.

Soviet assistance filled the gap created

by the withdrawal of the West from the Aswan Cam Brcject.
The trade agreements provided ^gypt with new markets for
Egyptian products and new sources for imports.

The

De-

...innings of industrialization were made possible oy Soviet
agreements to provide technical assistance and loans for
specific infrastructure and industrial projects.
Tom .nittle, British political scientist, in his book,
High Dam at Aswan, states that such assistance "impressed
the Egyptian masses" and directly benefited the people.
As a result, there has been increased popular support for
the Egyptian government.

Social legislation enacted to

Improve the lot of the peasants and workers and other dom
estic policies of Arab Socialism have contributed to that
popular support.
On the other hand, the relationship with the Soviets
has cost the Egyptians most Western support.

This has
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resulted largely from the West’s misunderstanding of the
force of Arab nationalism and the concept of "positive
neutralism.”

The concomitant alteration of the socio-econ

omic structure to the ideals of "Arab socialism” also cost
the Egyptians the support of some of the feudalists and
traditionalists of the Arab world.
Finally, it would appear that the development of close
ties with the Soviets cost the United Arab RepuDlic some
freedom of action in her pursuit of neutrality.

Egyptian

leaders felt some obligation to the soviet Union to return
some of the support they had received in their struggle with
the West.

This odigation extended from declarations of

friendship to abstentions in United Nations General Assembly
votes on questions of censure during the 1956 Hungarian
Crisis.

At times the Egyptians, in their pursuit of an

independent policy, might have wished to protest some Soviet
action, but they refrained out of gratitude, demonstrating
some lac*, of freedom of action.
Yet, gratitude toward the Soviet Union has not prevented
protests in the Egyptian press and public opinion which have
opposed Soviet actions that indicate interference in the in
ternal affairs of a sovereign state.

For example, the United

Arab Republic strongly protested the resumption in 1961 of
nuclear testing by the Soviets which constituted a health
and genetic danger to the peoples of the other states.

Such

actions show a pragmatic approach to dealing affirmatively
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with the government on one level while responding unfavor
ably to its actions on another level.
At this point, we should point out the reason why the
two-fold approach of dealing with the Soviets proved so
effective.

.Nasser has stated on many occasions that the

Communist ideology will never be compatible with the Arab
way of thinking.

The Soviet Union, as a nation state however,

could be dealt with as any ocher state that wishes to help
the Arab world achieve its independence and neutrality,
so long as it did not try to force its ideology upon Rgypt
or the Arabs.
The Soviets for their part gained some definite advan
tages over the West with the establishment of good relations
with the United Arab Republic.

The Soviets, for example,

successfully reduced 'Western influence in the Middle Sast
and, at the same time, were aole to fill the political
vacuum by extending their influence in the area.

Subsequently,

by their actions toward Rgypt, they were able to expand their
influence among the emerging nations of Asia and Africa.
Moreover, Soviet support of the United Arab Republic against
Western imperialism helped to prevent the establishment of
Western military bases on the southern borders of the
Soviet Union, and Soviet encouragement helped Egypt to
withstand the pressure from the West to participate in a
Western-controlled defense organization.
In addition, good relations with the United Arab Republic
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and other Arab states gained the Soviets access to the
Mediterranean.

The Russians were able, for the first time,

in their history as a naval power, to establish a fleet in
the Mediterranean supported by friendly ports in Syria,
Egypt and Algeria.

As Soviet support of the United Arab

Republic continued, the Soviets also found growing support
among most of the Arab states in the United Rations.
Good relations with Egypt served as an example to
other developing countries of the kind of support they
could expect from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets dramatized

their claim that their economic assistance programs, unlike
those of the Western powers, hao no strings attached.

Such

an example helped to extend Soviet prestige and influence
among the developing nations of Asia and Africa.
Economically, the Soviet Union gained new markets for
its goods and also succeeded in diverting a large propor
tion of Egyptian trade away from the West to the Eastern
bloc.

Soviet economic assistance was designed to encourage

recipient nations to follow the path of socialism.

They re

garded the "Arab Socialism" which resulted as a step in
the right direction even though it was nothing more than
"State Capitalism" for the present.
In choosing to support Nasser, however, the Soviets
lost the alternative of supporting other Arab leaders or
local Communists.

When the Soviets attempted to develop

pro-Communlst Kassim of Iraq as Nasser's rival for leadership
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of the Arab world, they found that Nasser's influence was
so strong that pro-Nasser forces overthrew i£assim.

Since

the Soviets had previously sacrificed support of local
Communists in order to extend their influence in the area,
they were left with no alternatives except increasing their
support for Nasser.
;

In spite of the Soviet's economic, military, and dip
lomatic support of the United Arab Republic, they made
little headway toward the achievement of their long-range
goals.

The most important long-range ^oal was the creation

of Soviet-styled socialism in the Middle East.

For example,

Charles Cremeans, in his book, The Arabs and the World, con
cluded that the effect of sporadic attempts at supporting
local Communist parties failed and also created opposite
reactions.

Some of the local Communist parties which were

already weak were uprooted by nationalist forces and the
Communists were branded agents of foreign powers.

Thus,

when "Arab Socialism" evolved in the United Arab Republic,
it forced the Soviets to modify their ideas of the path of
socialism in order to justify continued support of the Nasser
regime.

The Soviets paid a high price in the international

ideological arena.

They have since been branded as "revision

ist" and"capitalists" by the Chinese Communists.

Soviet

Middle East policies contributed substantially to the grow
ing world-wide schism in the once monolithic Communist world.
Reviewing briefly, one can see that both the United Arab
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Republic and the Soviets had constructed a marriage of
convenience, for neither side had gained a totality of
their goals.

Nonetheless, the gains were enough to bond

the parties into a continuing pragmatic relationship.
The next question concerns the impact of the relation
ship on the role of Nasser both in domestic and foreign
affairs.

It should be obvious that the personality of

Nasser played a crucial role in shaping the relationship
between the United Arab Republic and the soviet Union dur
ing the 1956-1967 period.

What we must examine now is the

effect that this relationship had on Nas3er's leadership
in Egypt and the Arab world.
The effect of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal served to
strengthen Nasser’s political position in Egypt and en
hanced his prestige in the Arab World.

The Arabs saw

Nasser as having broken the West’s monopoly in the i4iddle
East.
The economic and cultural ties which resulted from the
relationship with the Soviet Union enabled Nasser to effect
broad social and economic changes within Egypt.

Exposure

to the Soviet ideology helped Nasser to develop his own
political-economic domestic program which he termed, "Arab
Socialism.”

Prior to the establishment of relations with

the Soviet Union, no mention had been made of socialism;
indeed, the Free Officers had no program except to overthrow
the old monarchy and its corrupt government and free Egypt
from imperialism.
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Prior to 1953, Nasser was involved In the political
upheaval created by the revolution and the struggle for
political power.

The signing of the agreement with Britain

to evacuate the Suez, and Czech Arms Deal, brought Nasser
political pre-eminence in Egypt.

As a result of his leader

ship position in Egypt, Nasser found it necessary to develop
programs which would effect the desired social, political,
and economic changes. As a result of these considerations,
Nasser developed a program for cooperative, democratic,
socialist society in Egypt.

The program of “Arab Socialism"

which resulted created a shift in Nasser’s political base
from elements of the national bourgeoisie and remnants of
the feudal:, elite to the masses who would benefit most from
his Socialist-styled programs.

“Arab Socialism" also tended

to realign Nasser’s support in the Arab League away from
traditionalists toward the progressives.
Soviet support of Nasser had the unexpected result of
eliminating his rivals. When the Soviets tried to develop
Kassim of Iraq as an alternative leader in the Middle East,
they found that Nasser had grown too strong; he had become
the man to deal with in the Arab world.
The Soviet-Egyptian relationship enabled Nasser to
develop his policy of "positive neutralism" which make him,
along with Nehru and Tito, a leader of the non-aligned nations
of the Third World.

Soviet support of Nasser implied support

of neutralism; in fact, the Soviet's encouraged developing
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countries to pursue policies of neutralise in their effox
to becoae Independent in their doeestlc end foreign programs
froe the continued power and influence exercised over thee

. by their foraer colonial rulers.
The relationship was a "marriage of convenience,* with
each sloe benefiting from it.

Nasser wasn't the best solu

tion for the .Soviet Union's exploitation of anti-Westernism
In the backwash of colonialism, but he was available ana he*
needed a new liaison with a great power as E ^ p t ' s older re
lationship with the West disintegrated.

Nasser's support

from the doviet Union came at a critical time ano made it
possible for him to continue his policies of "positive
neutralism” characterized by anti-Western imperialism and
of building "Arab Socialism" in Egypt,

his leadership role,

both in the Uniteo Arab NepuQlic and in the Arab world, in
creased by the political, military, and economic support
resulting from the relationship with the Soviet Union.
This support was needed to withstand Western pressures,
Israeli attacks and threats, and to make his new program
viable.
Having examined the causes underlying the SovietEgyptian relationship and having analyzed its-impact on
both countries and on President Nasser's leadership role,
we now come to the final point of analysis.

Is the rela

tionship a temporary marriage of convenience or is it the
result of historical trend that will continue and fortify
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the relationship between the Egyptians and the Soviets over
the long-term future?
In this section we shall confront the problem in two
stages. The first shall deal with the impact of the sovietEgyptian relationship on the United Arab Republic’s policy
of Neutralism, and, second, the short-term or long-range
effect of the relationship.
Dr. Fayez Sayegh, in his book, Dynamics of Neutralism
in the Arab World, divided the Egyptian approach to neutral
ism into four stages.

The policy of neutralism which began

to evolve in Egypt about 19^7 started with the first stage
of "passive neutralism" which was characterized oy a rejec
tion of either alternative in the dold War.
As Egyptians became more concerned with getting Britain
out of Egypt, and remaining out of the Western i'Jutual decurit
System,neutralism in E^ypt moved into its second stage which
Dr. Sayegh called-"negative neutralism."

This meant the

Egyptians began to ta«<e action to remove a colonial power.
The Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal of 1955 announced the birth
of the third stagJ- of "positive neutralism" whereby Egypt
rejected alignment with any cold war antagonists and aug
mented this policy with an affirmation of the right of a
neutral country to deal with any country regardless of its
political or ideological complexion.
In 1959 kke Soviets, disappointed by the "reactionary
nature" of the national bourgoisie, revised their policy
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of support for national liberation movements in favor of
support for local eommunists.

When the Egyptians became

aware of this shift, they shifted and reorganized their
economic, cultural, and technological ties with the Soviets
to achieve a balance between the Soviets and the Western
nations.

Having achieved their balance, neutralism in the

United Arab Hepuolic was to evolve still further and assume
the fourth.stage, a stage Dr. Sayegh calls "messianic."
The final "messianic" stage Degan- in the late I^fjO’s
and developed around three world leaders:
and Nasser.

Nehru, Tito,

The hope of these men was that their brand of

neutralism would create a third Dloc, called the Third World.
These three men hoped that their countries would assume the
leadership among the other neutral countries.

They also

hoped that this bloc of neutralist countries could become
a strong voice in the international arena and make themselves
felt in the United Nations.

Also, they hoped to give former

colonies and semi-colonies a third choice.

Once these nations

were independent, the Neutralist Triumverate believed, they
would once more fall prey to neo-colonialist policies of
the powerful nations if there were no other alternative.
Hence, "messianic” neutralism was to spread the word and
create the new Third World.
* The impact of the new relationship with the East and
the West served to make this evolution of neutralism possible.
The trade agreements with the Eastern bloc helped to crystalize
the Egyptian ideal of neutralism and helped to develop the
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concept of the third world.
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Thus, Dr. Sayegh believes that

positive neutralism and its evolution into a "messianic”
concept is destined to be a powerful force in the world
arena.
The second part of our final analysis deals with the
question:

Is the relationship that developed between the

United Arab Republic ana the Soviet Union during the period
of 1956-1967 one of short-term impact or is it of long-range
implication?
The writer concludes that the relationship between the
United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union constitutes a
"marriage of convenience" and that the situation wili con
tinue only so long as it is mutually advantageous to both
parties.

Egypt began the relationship with the Soviet Union

as a pragmatic solution to the problems of developing an
industrial economy, dealing with the Israeli question, and
securing Arab goals of "Freedom, unity, and Socialism."

As

long as the Soviet Union remains Egypt’s source for military,
economic and diplomatic support, and the West continues to
deny such support to the Arabs while, at the same time
supporting and strengthening Israel, the situation must
continue.
port.

The Egyptians have no alternative source of sup

Moreover, they reject the kind of "strings" or con

ditions which the West has attached to the aid it has pro
vided in the past.

Soviet aid, on the other hand, has been

relatively free of the kinds of political conditions that
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might alienate the Arab World.
The Soviet view is that Egypt ia not now, but Mill be
come, socialist.

They are Milling to accept as a temporary

status Mhat the Egyptians call Arab Socialism, but they
define it as "State Capitalism. “

The Soviets continue to

aid and support Egypt in the belief that such assistance
will further Soviet influence and goals for the Middle- East.
For the short run, therefore, Soviet national interest appears
to be absorbed with the political afiu diplomatic gains se
cured by driving the West from a long-^eld sphere of in
fluence.

Soviet leaders prooably believe that short-run

political gains will also contribute to the long-range
ideological objectives of gaining world support for Sovietstyled socialism.

To this end, the Soviet government pro

vided the United Arab Republic with the kinds of aid de
signed to increase the importance of the public sector of
the economy.

The Soviets believe that the concentration

and strengthening of the public sector will concentrate the
worker's 25*j pcasss t *s cesssds for political participation
which will lead to soviet-styled socialism.
As long as the West refuses to modify its positions,
move away from its traditional colonialist attitudes, and
develop a mutually agreeable policy in the Middle East, it
cannot hope to alter the Soviet Union-United Arab Republic
relationship.
If the Arabs should achieve political unity and make
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spectacular economic progress by utilizing effectively their
huge natural resources* such as oil and human resources, a
third alternative to depending on help from either cold war
parties would be possible.

Also, if there should be a major

change in the personalities Involved, or a change In the atti
tude of the Vest on the Middle East problem, such altera
tions of circumstances might deeply affect the "marriage."
It is probably the hope of the Soviet Union that by develop
ing its influence in the area, it can prevent any lessening of dependence on its support and it will be able to
lead the Middle East on the path to "true” socialism in
the future.
The three years that have elapsed since the June War
of 1967 give some indication that the special relation
ship will continue and may develop into the kind which
neither partner will be aole to regard as a temporary
"marriage of convenience."

Each partner in the relation

ship, in other words, may Decome increasingly dependent on
the other and find the strengthening of their ties essen
tial as a result of growing hostility and involvement of
the West.

The key explaining the nature of the relation

ship is mo3t likely the internal political-economic system
of the United Arab Republic.

If, in the future, Egypt were

to adopt Soviet-styled socialism, this would indicate that
the "marriage of convenience" haa'changed to a more permanent
relationship.
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it Is the author's belief that such a development is
not lilcely to occur cue to the force of Arab Nationalism
combined Kith strong religious ties that will oppose for
eign ideologies and preserve Arab independence.
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